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This thesis is composed of four chapters: One introductory chapter and three chapters
that each include one of the three essays that make up the main body of the thesis.
Common features of the essays are empirical assessments of health in later life and the
econometrical challenges caused by selection–either in the form of people self-selecting
into “treatment” or in the form of sample-selection in the data applied.
The first essay, co-authored with Signe A. Abrahamsen, is concerned with how in-
creased access to publicly provided eldercare affects the immediate and long-term health
of informal caregivers. The evidence of the causal effects of care responsibilities on health
is limited, especially for long-term outcomes. In this essay, we estimate long-term effects
of a formal care expansion for the elderly on the health of their middle-aged daughters.
We exploit a reform in the federal funding of formal care for Norwegian municipalities
that caused a greater expansion of home care provision in municipalities that initially had
lower coverage rates. We find that expanding formal care for the elderly reduced sickness
absence for single-child daughters of lone parents in the short run, and that the decrease
seems to be driven by absences due to musculoskeletal disorders and psychological dis-
orders. When assessing long-term health outcomes for the same group of daughters, we
find that, overall, long-term health is not affected.
The second essay, co-authored with Otto S. Lillebø, is concerned with the health effects
of retirement and the potential heterogeneity in these effects according to socioeconomic
status. Using a local randomized experiment that arises from the statutory retirement
age in Norway, we estimate causal effects of retirement on health across socioeconomic
status. We apply health information from full population administrative registers and
from survey data to investigate the effects of retirement on acute hospital admissions,
mortality, and a composite physical health score. Our results show that retirement has a
positive effect on physical health, especially for individuals with low socioeconomic status.
We find no retirement effects on acute hospitalizations or mortality in general. However,
our results suggest that retirement leads to reduced likelihood of hospitalizations for
individuals with low socioeconomic status. Finally, we show that the positive health
effects are driven by reduced pain and reduced health limitations in conducting daily
activities. Our findings highlight heterogeneity in the health effects across socioeconomic
status and across subjective and objective measures of health.
The third essay analyzes the extent and consequences of health-related non-response
in survey data, defined as either initial non-response or attrition across waves. The first
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part of the paper provides a thorough description of the initial non-response and attrition
between waves in the Norwegian Study on Life Course, Aging, and generation (NorLAG),
a typical survey sample. In the second part, the potential bias from sample selection is
examined using econometric analyses of educational differences in health across age as a
case study. This is an empirical application that is believed to be particularly prone to
bias from health selection, as non-response correlates with both health, education, and
age. I make use of a sample of Norwegian older adults and register data that cover the
full population to make various assumptions about the selection process and find that
using population weights, inverse probability weights, the Heckman selection model, and
a Copula selection model does not produce substantially different estimates. Across all
models, educational differences in health converge in old age, as is commonly found in
analyses that use survey data. This convergence is also found using the register data.
Taken together, these results suggest that survey data are well-suited to describe patterns
of health inequalities as they manifest in the population. Finally, the register data reveal
that healthy survivor bias among the low educated is an important factor driving the
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Population aging is a global phenomenon caused by increased longevity and decreased
fertility rates (Bloom et al., 2015). The fraction of the population aged 60 and above in
the world has more than doubled since 1980 and is expected to double again by 2050. The
fraction of the population aged 80 and above is even expected to triple from 2017 to 2050
(United Nations and Social Affairs, 2017). Furthermore, the global old-age dependency
ratio, defined as the number of people aged 65 and above for every 100 persons of working
age (20-64), has increased from 20 in 1975 to 28 in 2015, and is expected to almost double
by 2050 (OECD, 2017).
Population aging has lead to an increased focus on sustaining good health and well-
being in later life. This is because maintaining good health and well-being in later life
is a key societal aspiration in itself (Steptoe et al., 2015), but also because population
aging causes challenges for the sustainability of public finances. Older people have low
employment rates, more health problems and greater long term care needs than younger
people (Bloom et al., 2015).
The pressure on public finances has lead to an increased focus on extending working
lives. A widespread policy tool in this regard is pension reforms, as has been or are on the
verge of being implemented in several developed countries (OECD, 2017). Despite health
being of critical importance for staying in work, the key policy tool of these reforms
has been improving financial incentives, rather than measures to preserve health. If
postponed retirement is detrimental to health, unintended side effects of pension reforms
may include increased health care expenditures or reduced efforts in the informal care
sector.
As the share of the population and number of individuals aged 80 and above increases,
so does the need for long-term care. Norway has among the highest spending levels on
publicly provided elder care in Europe (Huseby and Paulsen, 2009). Still, the amount
of informal care provided is estimated to be of the same magnitude as the amount of
publicly provided elder care (for those aged 67 and above) (Ministry of Health and Care
Services, 2006). Hence, another crucial resource for the sustainability of public finances is
informal caregivers. Informal caregivers are typically peers or family members of frail in-
dividuals, who provide care without being financially compensated for the effort provided
(Jakobsson et al., 2012).
An important group of informal caregivers are those caring for frail, older parents.
These caregivers are often daughters who are in the last stage of their working lives. As
younger cohorts of women have higher rates of labor force participation and as the aim
of the pension reforms is to increase working lives, the health implications of caregiving
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are important, not only for individual well-being and health care expenditures, but also
for female labor supply.
Determinants of health in later life have received relatively little attention in eco-
nomics. However, individuals in this phase of life represent a significant resource for the
formal and informal labor markets. It is not uncommon to have at least 15 potentially
active years from retirement to institutionalization or death. Health is crucial for the
residual working capacity, as well as for individual well-being and public and personal
finances. Thus, more knowledge about later life health and the health effects of common
events, such as retirement and becoming an informal caregiver, in this phase of life is
needed.
The health of people in early senescence and old age is the focus of this thesis, which
comprise three self-contained essays on different aspects of health and aging. Common
features of the essays are empirical assessments of health in later life and the econometrical
challenges caused by selection–either in the form of people self-selecting into “treatment”
or in the form of sample selection in the data applied. Specifically, the thesis is concerned
with estimating causal health effects of retirement and informal caregiving in later life,
and with the problems associated with health-related non-response in analyses of health
and ageing based on survey data.
A common critique in the applied health economics literature is that limited sample
sizes and subjective health outcomes pose problems for empirical analyses of health,
typically due to the reliance on survey data. This is also a limitation in the literature
on health effects of retirement and informal caregiving, and the literature on sample-
selection. This thesis contributes to the literature by providing causal and descriptive
evidence based on full population individual level register data.
Careful attention to the identification of causal effects is needed to provide policy
relevant empirical evidence. As individuals to some degree self-select into retirement and
informal caregiving, not accounting for this selection is a potential source of bias for two
reasons. First, the age in which a person retires, or who becomes a caregiver, is likely
to be correlated with unobservable factors that also correlate with the person’s health,
which can cause omitted variable bias. Second, poor health in itself is a likely cause
of early retirement and poor connection to the labor market, which again increases the
likelihood of providing care to a frail family member, which can cause bias due to dual
causality.
The literature on causal studies of the health effects of retirement is growing. How-
ever, these studies are often based on lower retirement age thresholds and early retirement
opportunities. The causal evidence of caregiving on health is altogether limited, and sev-
eral authors highlight the importance of, as well as lack of evidence on, long-term health
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effects of providing informal care (Leigh, 2010; Schmitz and Westphal, 2017). In this
thesis, I employ quasi-experimental methods in which eligibility rules and institutional
changes provide sources of exogenous variation in the retirement eligibility and caregiver
burden and, thus, allow identification of the causal effects on health.
Socioeconomic status (SES), typically proxied by education, income, or occupation,
is often overlooked in analyses of the implications of retirement and caregiving. However,
SES can be important for the mechanisms behind the effects in question, and the hetero-
geneity in the effects across SES groups can be large. For example, having a physically
demanding job or a job with high demands, but low control, can cause physical and men-
tal strain. Retiring from such jobs is likely to have positive effects on health. These types
of jobs are often concentrated among the lower SES groups (Case and Deaton, 2005).
If, in addition, retiring from the types of jobs concentrated among the high SES groups
is detrimental to health, then, on average, retirement can be found to have no effect on
health, whereas, in fact, it significantly affects health. Ultimately, this heterogeneity can
imply that retirement reforms are socially distortive, especially if early retirement implies
a fiscal penalization. Those with low SES are faced with a trade-off between a monetary
cost and a health cost, whereas individuals with high SES may not face such a trade-off.
In this thesis, I provide evidence based on formal tests of effect heterogeneity by SES
groups in the health effects of retirement and informal caregiving.
A large literature in the health sciences, demography, and social gerontology is devoted
to the question of whether social inequalities in health are converging or diverging across
age in later life. On the one hand, later life is a phase when determinants of inequalities in
health, such as type of job and income, are of secondary importance as most individuals
have retired and pensions are more evenly distributed than wages. On the other hand,
after a life-time of exposures to risks and opportunities, several of which are socially
determined, inequalities can be large and increasing due to the accumulation of these
exposures. The majority of analyses on this topic are based on survey data.
A recurring issue in this thesis is that survey data, especially on older individuals,
are hampered by health-related non-response. The third essay of the thesis is devoted
to investigating how health-related non-response in survey data affects analyses of social
inequalities in health in later life. While selective attrition across waves in survey data
has been extensively studied, there is limited evidence on the impact and magnitude
of health-related initial selection due to the limited information available for the initial
non-responders. In this essay, access to full population registers for the population that
the survey data is based on, is used to create an arguably generic measure of health,
namely reimbursements from primary care health services. This health measure makes
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it possible to study the health-related non-response in the survey data. This is a novel
approach to assessing the impact of sample selection. In addition, it enables assessing
initial non-response.
Health and Aging: What Can We Learn from Economic Theory?
The essays in this thesis are mainly empirical and methodological. However, the empirical
questions raised have a theoretical foundation. A useful benchmark of how health evolves
across the adult life-course is the widely cited human capital model of the demand for
health, known as the Grossman model (Grossman, 1972). The Grossman model derives
the structural relationship between costs of health care, earnings, education, prices and
time preference, and the demand for health and health care. The model is originally a
dynamic optimization problem where lifetime utility is maximized subject to a budget
contraint, but it has also been common to report simplified two-period versions of the
model (Zweifel et al., 2009). Here, I discuss a version of the Grossman model accommo-
dated more specifically to investigate social inequalities in health and health deterioration
in later life, applied by Case and Deaton (2005).
In the Grossman model, health is defined in terms of a stock variable that depreciates
over age (time). The rate of depreciation is assumed to increase with age. Individuals can
invest in own health by purchasing medical services and healthy food (or restrain from
unhealthy consumption), or they can spend time doing physical exercises or other health
promoting activities. Individuals demand health both for direct utility (consumption
good) and as a means of production in the labor market for generating earnings or
household production (investment good). Additionally, the individual faces a trade-off
between health and consumption of all other goods.
In addition to health capital, the individual possesses human and financial capital.
The three sources of capital are imperfect substitutes in generating earnings and utility.
The rate of health decline across age is thus determined by two parts: a biological process
of aging over which the individual has little control, and the usage of health capital in
consumption and in generating earnings. Since the three sources of capital are substitutes
in generating earnings and utility, individuals with low education or low levels of financial
capital will rely more heavily on their health capital. Consequently, individuals with low
education or wealth will experience a higher rate of depreciation of health as they age. In
addition, education affects the effectiveness of health investments so that higher educated
individuals are more efficient health producers.
The Grossman model provides theoretical insights into the health effects of retirement
and informal caregiving. Individuals use health capital as an input in the formal and
informal labor market. Thus, being relieved of caregiving responsibilities or retiring from
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work is likely to affect health positively, all else constant. The Grossman model can also
be used to study how retirement and informal caregiving affect health across SES groups
differently. More specifically, the model predicts that being relieved of work and informal
caregving tasks is likely to have a larger health effect for low SES groups compared to
higher SES groups. There are mainly two mechanisms for this relationship in the model:
First, individuals with low levels of human or financial capital use more of their health
capital as inputs to generate earnings. Retirement will therefore have a larger health
impact for this group. Second, individuals with higher levels of financial capital can
purchase formal care, making them use less health capital in providing informal care.
Being relieved of informal caregving tasks is thus likely to have a larger effect on health
for the low SES groups.
In addition, the Grossman model predicts that individuals with lower levels of human
and financial capital, will experience a higher rate of health depreciation as they age.
This has implications for health- and SES-related non-response in survey data and how
the selective non-response increases with age. Assuming that health above a certain level
is needed in order to be able to respond to a survey, those with lower SES will have lower
likelihood of responding, for a given age, due to poor health. This difference becomes
stronger as age increases, causing the responders from the low SES group to become
increasingly less representative of that group as a whole. This leads to sample selection
problems in analyses of health, SES and aging, which is the topic of the third essay.
Measures of Health in Empirical Analyses: Survey Data vs. Register Data
How to measure health in a certain context is a recurring issue in this thesis. This section
briefly discusses common measures of health as well as limitations and possibilities with
different types of health data, especially within the context of later life health and SES.
A common definition of health is the one applied by the World Health Organization
(WHO) in the first paragraph of its constitution: “Health is a state of complete phys-
ical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”
(World Health Organization, 1946). However, in order to conduct quantitative analyses,
a measure that is quantifiable, or at least has an ordinal nature, is needed. The most
common operalization of such a general health measure, is the “self-rated health” (SRH),
where individuals are asked to rate their health on a scale from one to four or five (Idler
and Benyamini, 1997). Jylhä (2009) describes SRH as a “cross-road between the social
world and psychological experiences on the one hand, and the biological world, on the
other” (Jylhä, 2009, p. 308). In addition to being a generic measure of health, the ben-
efits of using SRH are that it is easy to implement and widely applied, thus facilitating
comparisons across analyses.
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Other commonly applied measures are the Short-Form 36 (SF36) (Ware Jr and Sher-
bourne, 1992) and the shorter Short-Form 12 (SF12) (Ware Jr et al., 1996). The SF36
includes a multi-item scale that assesses eight health concepts,1 and was constructed for
use in clinical practice and in population surveys (Ware Jr and Sherbourne, 1992). The
SF12 is based on the SF36 and was developed to substantially shorten the survey time.2
SRH is one of the components in the SF36 and SF12.
Although extensively used, measures of self-reported health are criticized for being
contextual and to suffer from justification bias (Bound et al., 1991; McGarry, 2004). One
can easily imagine how the response to a question about own health depends on several
factors besides own health, such as the health of the respondent’s peers or how current
health is compared to past health or compared to what the respondent’s expectations of
health for a given age is.
The criticism of self-reported outcomes often lead the researcher to look for more
objective measures, such as data from administrative registers (register data). Register
data is reported by a third party and typically includes measures of health related to
records of health care utilizations, such as hospital admissions or primary care consulta-
tions, diagnoses, or certified leaves of absence. In addition, register data often contain
health records for the full population, and hence is not hampered by health-related sample
selection like survey data often is, as discussed in the third essay in this thesis.
Register data do however have its own limitations. The health measures found in
register data are often related to specific dimensions of health, such as a diagnosis or
measures of health care utilization, rather than generic measures of health. For instance,
in my third essay, I study how the social gradient in health 3 changes across age in
later life. Without a generic health measure, using a health measure with a steep SES
gradient (such as diabetes or cardiovascular disease) or a measure that does not have a
clear gradient (such as certain types of cancer) could lead to very different conclusions.
Furthermore, although measures based on register data are objective in the sense that
health is not self-assessed or self-reported, many are contingent on the patient actually
seeking medical help. In addition, the diagnosis or treatments provided by the physician
depend, to some degree, on the explanation of symptoms given by the patient. In this
1These are: 1) limitations in physical activities because of health problems; 2) limitations in social
activities because of physical or emotional problems; 3) limitations in usual role activities because of
physical health problems; 4) bodily pain; 5) general mental health (psychological distress and well-
being); 6) limitations in usual role activities because of emotional problems; 7) vitality (energy and
fatigue); and 8) general health perceptions. (Ware Jr and Sherbourne, 1992)
2The items that constitute the SF12 are those from the SF36 that best predict the results using the
SF36 on a US reference population as measured by the R2 (Ware Jr et al., 1996).
3As education or income increase gradually, health increases gradually, i.e., those with higher income
have better health than those with lower income, also within different SES groups (Lleras-Muney, 2005;
Cutler et al., 2008)
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sense, there is an element of self-assessment also in several of the register data health
measures. In fact, it has been shown that SES matters for the amount of care provided
by the secondary health care services (Elstad, 2018).
The challenges of endogeneity are further exemplified in the thesis’ second essay, where
we assess the health effects of retirement. In this setting, applying a health outcome that
correlates with the alternative cost of time may lead to biased results. As retirement
reduces the opportunity cost of time, the likelihood of seeking medical help, and hence,
the likelihood of having a diagnose or record of health care utilization, increases post
retirement. A change in health measured by various objective measures can therefore
erroneously be ascribed to retirement, when in fact it was caused by the reduced oppor-
tunity cost of time. On the other hand, once an individual is retired, the need for sickness
absence certifications is no longer present, thus reducing the need for health care services
for that specific reason. In both instances, actual health can remain unchanged for the
individual, but the changed circumstances that follows retirement cause the health record
to change.
The gold standard of health measures among economists is mortality (Case and
Deaton, 2005).4 Mortality is indisputable in that it measures exactly the same across
all subjects and contexts. It is an outcome that is readily comparable across data sources
and circumstances. However, as mortality is an extreme and final outcome, the scope
research question that can be assessed by this measure of health is limited. For instance,
a central policy issue in the context of population aging is whether postponed mortality
also implies compression of morbidity or rather a prolonged phase of morbidity prior to
death. Obviously, mortality data alone cannot be used to answer this question.
The discussion above has followed the conventional discourse within the field of ap-
plied health economics, namely the statistical properties of different health measures.5
Objective measures of health, often based on register data, are generally preferred over
more subjective measures.
A dimension to this debate, which I often find overlooked, is that health by nature is to
a large degree subjective. An individual’s utility and demand for health is not independent
of the circumstances in which the individual finds itself. Thus, having certain health
limitations does not entail the same for every individual. The ability to work depends on
the type of work, but also on how the individual experiences health. Provided the same
objective health limitation or disease and the same type of job, some people will work,
whereas others will remain at home or obtain a certificate of sickness leave. This idea is
4A benefit of self-reported health outcomes that is often emphasized, is their ability to predict mor-
tality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Lacson et al., 2010; Jylhä, 2009).
5This is disregarding the large literature on the cost and demand and supply of health care.
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also present in the Grossman model, where the amount of health that is demanded as an
input in the formal and informal labor market depends on the amount of other sources
of capital. As economists, we care about individual’s utility, not health itself. With this
in mind, self-reported measures, despite their poor reputation, can provide important
insights and highlight dimensions of health that mortality or data from health registers
cannot.
In this thesis, I use measures of health that, as far as possible, fulfil the objectivity
and sample selection criteria within the particular contexts studied. In light of the above
paragraph, however, I complement these objective measures with self-reported, generic
health measures where possible.6 The next sections summarize the three papers of this
thesis and provides a brief conclusion.
Paper 1: Formal care of the Elderly and Health Outcomes Among Adult
Daughters
With an aging population, health-care expenditures and the demand for caregiving are
increasing concerns for policy makers. Informal caregivers are a crucial national resource
in this regard. In Norway, the amount of informal care is estimated to be of the same
magnitude as the amount of the publicly provided formal care received by the elderly
population (Berge et al., 2014). However, providing care to a frail family member can be
detrimental for health.
In this essay, co-authored with Signe A. Abrahamsen, we assess the immediate and
long-term health effects on informal caregivers of increasing the publicly provided formal
care. The relationship between care responsibilities and health has been well assessed, and
the majority of the empirical evidence documents negative correlations between health
and caregiving.
Despite a well assessed link between caregiving and health, much of the empirical
literature suffers from a lack of causality. Several studies have poor or even lack reliable
identification strategies. In addition, a large share of the available studies are based
on cross-sectional data with small sample sizes, and often rely on subjective measures of
health. There is little evidence using large-scale register data that rely on objective health
outcomes. Thus, the evidence for causal effects of caregiving remains limited, especially
for long-term outcomes.
Estimating causal effects of reduced care responsibilities on health is difficult for sev-
eral reasons. First, formal care uptake is endogenous. Elderly individuals who receive
formal care typically have a higher need for care. They may be older and less healthy than
6Unfortunately, this was not possible in the first essay, as the survey data used could not be linked
to municipal data. It would, however, have been interesting to assess the effects of increased formal care
on self-reported and generic measures of health for the caregivers.
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those not receiving formal care. Health has a genetic component and a strong connection
to lifestyle which may also be inherited. Therefore, simply comparing children with differ-
ent levels of parental care responsibilities may lead to biased results. Second, caregiving
may have endogenous uptake, too. Individuals with poor relations to the labor market
and, thus, lower opportunity costs are more likely to provide care (Carmichael et al.,
2010). Poor relations to the labor market may be related to poor health in itself. Thus,
poor health is a likely cause of being a caregiver which may further bias results obtained
by comparing health outcomes for individuals with different levels of care responsibilities.
We address the endogeneity problem by exploiting a reform introduced in 1998, which
aimed at equalizing the availability of care services across Norwegian municipalities. This
reform led to an arguably exogenous regional variation in the expansion of formal care
services, which enables us to estimate causal effects of increased formal care by comparing
outcomes across municipalities with different levels of formal care expansions. We assess
the sub-sample most likely to be affected by the reform: single-child daughters who have
only one remaining parent who is at least 80 years old, and estimate causal effects of
expanding publicly provided eldercare on short and long-term health outcomes for these
daughters.
First, we replicate the main finding from Løken et al. (2017) and show that increased
formal home-based care leads to reduced insured sickness absence from work. We sup-
plement their finding by exploiting detailed full population register data on underlying
diagnoses and assess whether certain diagnoses drive the observed reduction in leaves of
absence. Our results indicate that musculoskeletal and psychological disorders are the
main drivers.
We then assess long-term health outcomes for the same sub-sample of daughters.
Here, we employ rich and detailed register data on the utilization of primary health-care
services and on diagnoses and symptoms. With one exception, we estimate no effects on
health care utilization or on the occurrence of a number of diagnoses identified in the
literature as potentially affected by caregiving. The exception is an estimated 11 percent
decrease in the risk of hypertension in the longrun, which may be explained by lower
stress levels caused by reduced care burden following the reform. However, this finding
does not remain statistically significant after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing,
and thus, must be interpreted with caution.
In addition, we assess whether there are heterogeneous effects by SES group. This
dimension is not much assessed in the literature, and it is not straightforward to hy-
pothesize whether individuals with high or low SES will be more affected by the care
expansion. In general, we find that there is not much difference in the effects of the care
expansion across educational groups.
9
Paper 2: Health Effects of Retirement: Evidence from Survey and Register
Data
With increasing life expectancy, the number of retired individuals as a share of the total
population is rising in most OECD countries. This has led to concerns about the fiscal
sustainability of public pension systems, and to policy initiatives that aim to extend
working lives and increase retirement age.
In the second essay, co-authored with Otto S. Lillebø, we investigate the health effects
of retirement across SES groups in Norway. This study is related to a growing body of
economic research about the effect of retirement on health. Given the important aspect
of this issue and the growing amount of literature on the topic, there is a surprising lack
of consensus across studies. In this study, we seek to contribute to four limitations in
the current literature. The first is that people self-select into retirement, making causal
evidence difficult to identify due to the endogeneity of retirement in the health equation.
The second is that most studies assess retirement effects in the early 60s, an age threshold
that is substantially lower than proposed policies to postpone retirement toward age 70.
The third is the reliance on self-reported outcomes from smaller samples of survey-data.
Finally, heterogeneity in the retirement effects across SES is a dimension that is under-
explored.
The endogeneity problem arises because people self-selection into retirement. Poor
health is a likely cause of retirement, and simply comparing the health of the retired
to the non-retired part of the population is therefore likely to produce biased results.
Moreover, individuals might have unobservable knowledge about own longevity or other
factors that influence retirement behaviour and correlate with health. To control for
the endogeneity of retirement, we exploit a statutory retirement age that caused a dis-
continuous change in the likelihood of retiring at the exact timing of eligibility. This
implies a local randomization around the retirement eligibility age threshold, and makes
a regression discontinuity (RD) framework suitable. RD entails comparing the health
outcomes for those right above the statutory retirement age threshold (i.e. the treatment
group) to those right below (i.e. the control group). This allows for identification of the
causal short-term effects of retirement on health. The age threshold that we exploit, is
retirement at 67 years, which was the statutory retirement age in Norway in 2007.
We apply measures of health from full population register data and survey data to
get a comprehensive approach to health. From the registers, health is measured by acute
hospitalizations and mortality. To capture more moderate health effects and to enable
comparison with the previous literature, we include the SF12 from the NorLAG survey.
We assess both the overall physical score and the specific components that goes into the
SF12.
10
Finally, although some studies highlight the importance of SES in the health effects
(Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Eibich, 2015), there is limited evidence from formal of effect
heterogeneity. SES is important in the analysis of health effects of retirement because
it determines the kind of work situation an individual retires from. Manual labor jobs,
associated with low education, are considered “wear and tear’ types of jobs, in which
health deteriorates at a more rapid pace than for individuals in non-manual professions
Case and Deaton (2005). Thus, retirement can be seen as a mechanism that levels health
inequalities between SES groups. In this analysis, we provide a formal test of effect
heterogeneity according to SES group or gender.
Our results confirm what has been found in several studies, namely that retirement
has a positive effect on health for subjective health outcomes. In addition, this study
contributes to the literature by generalizing the positive physical health effect of retire-
ment across a larger age span. Further, we find that the positive health effect is especially
strong for the low SES group, whereas we find no effects for the high SES group. How
retirement affects objective health is less clear as there exist little evidence using objective
health measures, especially for the full population. In general, we find no effects on the
objective measures, besides suggestive evidence of a retirement effect on reduced likeli-
hood of acute hospitalizations for the low SES group. We thus conclude that retirement
mainly affects subjective health.
The objective health measures assessed in this study can be seen as extreme in the
sense that they cannot capture moderate health effects. Assessing the factors that go
into the SF12, indicates that retirement affects health in a more fundamental way than
subjective health. Future research should thus seek to assess objective health outcomes
that are generic or that enables identification of moderate changes in health. In doing so,
it is key to recognize that retirement necessarily coincides with the reduced opportunity
cost of time.
Finally, this study accentuates the importance of assessing heterogeneity in the re-
tirement effects due to individuals’ different circumstances. Our findings indicate that
the retirement reforms aimed at prolonging working life by financial penalties for early
retirement can be socially distortive due to the differential health effects based on SES.
Paper 3: Old Problem, New Evidence: Health-related Sample Selection in
Analyses of Health and Aging
Statistical inference about health is typically based on survey data. This is due to the
feasibility of obtaining generic measures of health from surveys (compared to, e.g., admin-
istrative registers) and due to the limited availability of population-level data containing
health information. Health might be a particularly important predictor of non-response
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in survey data, and health-related non-response might become even more pronounced in
samples of older individuals. This causes, studies of health and aging based on survey
data to be particularly prone to bias due to selective non-response.
The impact of sample selection in analyses using survey data is an old question that
has been extensively assessed. The majority of the empirical literature has focused on
attrition across waves in longitudinal surveys. Although evidence of health-related at-
trition across waves has been documented in several well-known household surveys, it is
found to cause little bias (Becketti et al., 1988; Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Contoyannis et al.,
2004; Jones et al., 2006). Empirical evidence assessing the impact of initial non-response
is, on the other hand, limited.
In this essay, I assess the bias from health-related sample selection, defined as either
initial selection or selective attrition across waves, in a health survey of older individu-
als. The potential bias from selective non-response in the second wave of the NorLAG
survey is assessed both compared to the survey’s reference population using full popula-
tion register data and population weights (initial selection), and compared to all those
who responded to the first wave (selective attrition) using conventional sample selection
methods, such as inverse probability weights (Wooldridge, 2002) and the Heckman selec-
tion model (Heckman, 1979), in addition to the more recently developed Copula selection
model (Smith, 2003).
A novelty of this analysis is access to sufficient individual level health information
collected from register data to compose a generic health measure for each individual in
the population. The register data are not hampered by non-response, and thus, the
registers can serve as a base for evaluation of health-related non-response in the survey
data. This approach hinges on the comparability of the health measures applied from the
two data sources. I apply the SF12 from the NorLAG data. From the registers, I propose
the following measure of health: the annual reimbursement for a patient claimed by the
primary care physician (PCP). I show that the annual PCP reimbursements (PCPR)
have the same pattern of distribution as the SF12 across dimensions that are central to
this analysis, and thus, can arguably be used as a benchmark for how the SF12 would
be distributed in the population across the variables that are of interest in this study:
gender, age, and education.
As a case study, I apply an empirical problem that is especially prone to bias from
health-related sample selection: social inequalities in health across age. This is an appli-
cation where the problem of health-related sample selection is believed to be especially
salient, as the outcome of interest, health, and the explanatory variables, age and SES,
are likely to correlate with non-response. Unless properly accounted for, the consequence
of this sort of sample selection is empirical evidence of converging social inequalities in
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health in later life, which is a common empirical result in the social gerontological liter-
ature, where the health-SES-age relation has been most widely studied (Mirowsky and
Ross, 2008).
I find that the health trajectories estimated by the different weighting and selection
models do not substantially differ from a baseline of no selection correction. This result
corresponds to the literature on sample selection, where, despite evidence of selective non-
response in the data, the bias is found to be small or negligible. Across all specifications,
I find that the social inequalities in health are falling across age in later life. Converging
inequalities in health in old age are also found in the analysis using the full population
register data. Thus, taken together, these results suggest that selective non-response in
the survey data is not causing the empirical evidence of converging health inequalities in
later life, which suggests that survey data are well-suited to describe patterns of health
inequalities as they manifest in the population. However, using a large panel of full
population register data, I show that selective mortality leads to stronger healthy survivor
bias in the lower SES groups compared to higher order SES groups.
The aim of this study was to shed new light on the potential bias from sample selection
in analyses of health and aging, and the study makes two contributions to the existing
literature. First, a novel feature is the presentation of a register-based generic measure of
health, available for the the full population (PCPR), that serves as a base for evaluation
of health-related non-response in the survey data. Second, although IPWs has commonly
been used in similar settings, few examples use selection models to analyse the bias from
health-related sample selection. This is especially true for the Copula selection model.
Finally, this study highlights the importance of selective mortality in analyses of
health and aging. The population alive at older ages provide a poor representation of the
population alive at younger ages. Mortality selection, present even in the most perfect
dataset, is a concern in analyses attempting to measure the relationship between groups
with different mortality rates across time or age, or in analyses of later life outcomes in
general, provided mortality is correlated with the outcome of interest.
The magnitude and impact of health-related initial non-response in survey data re-
main largely unresolved. This essay highlights the importance of allowing survey data to
be combined with measures of health from registers that are available for the full pop-
ulation. This would not only allow assessing the bias from health-related non-response
more explicitly, as the exact health distribution in the population compared to in the
survey data would be known. This would also allow assessing whether those in low SES
groups or high age groups have lower response rates because these groups also have worse




Population aging warrants more knowledge about how circumstances and events in later
life determine health. Despite its importance for labor market participation, health care
costs, and general well-being, later life health has received relatively little attention in
economics. This thesis comprise three self-contained essays assessing different aspects of
aging and health.
The contributions from this thesis lies in providing causal evidence of the health effects
of providing informal care and retirement, and providing new evidence on the impact of
health-related non-response in analyses of health and ageing based on survey data. In
addition, all essays in this thesis answers to the common critique of limited sample sizes
and reliance on subjective health outcomes in the applied health economics discourse.
The thesis provide evidence based on a combination of full population register data and
survey data, and can, thus, be applied in a larger discussion about how survey results
might differ from what we would have found if using full population data and more
objective health outcomes.
A limitation of the findings from the two essays on the health effects of retirement
and informal caregiving, is that the results are local in the sense that they cannot easily
be generalized to other contexts. This is a common critique in the applied work that
classify as what has been labelled The credibility revolution in economics (Angrist and
Pischke, 2010). The focus within this field of research is on internal validity, which
is fundamental for the identification of causal effects, whereas external validity is of
secondary importance.
However, there is a cumulative force of studies on one particular topic if it is studied
across a wide variety of settings. The magnitude of evidence on the same phenomena
across various sub-populations or contexts is what constitutes the the evidence base and
the epistemology of applied microeconomics. In light of this perspective, more knowledge
about how an individual’s circumstances in later life determine health is needed in order
to provide reliable policy advice regarding how to best protect individuals against poor
health in later life.
Future research should acknowledge the extent of heterogeneity in health among older
individuals. Health in later life is a function of a life-time of health behaviours and dif-
ferential exposure to risks. On the other hand, as age increases, the impact of selective
mortality makes people more similar with respect to health as only those who are biolog-
ically more robust, i.e., the healthy survivors, are left in the population.
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Abstract
Health-care expenditures and the demand for caregiving are increasing concerns
for policy makers. Although informal care to a certain extent may substitute for
costly formal care, providing informal care may come at a cost to caregivers in terms
of their own health. However, evidence of causal effects of care responsibilities on
health is limited, especially for long-term outcomes. In this paper, we estimate
long-term effects of a formal care expansion for the elderly on the health of their
middle-aged daughters. We exploit a reform in the federal funding of formal care for
Norwegian municipalities that caused a greater expansion of home care provision
in municipalities that initially had lower coverage rates. We find that expanding
formal care reduced sickness absence in the short run, primarily due to reduced
absences related to musculoskeletal and psychological disorders. In general, we find
no effects on long-term health outcomes.
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1 Introduction
With an aging population, the demand for care along with increasing health-care expen-
ditures places an increasing burden on public finances. Informal care may both substitute
for and complement publicly provided formal care; see e.g. Bonsang (2009), Bolin et al.
(2008), and Van Houtven and Norton (2004). However, studies have shown that infor-
mal care may come at a cost to caregivers. For instance, care responsibilities can be a
stressor as they often come in addition to other obligations, such as work and household
chores, thus leading to reduced work hours or less leisure time (Vaage, 2000; Gautun and
Hagen, 2010). Much of the care burden falls on close relatives, especially on the spouse
or children of the person in need of care (Vaage, 2000; Jakobsson et al., 2012).
In a recent study, Løken et al. (2017) show that lifting the care burden for adult single-
child daughters with one elderly parent led to a decrease in insured sickness absence from
work. In this paper, we build on that result and assess which underlying diagnoses drive
the reduction in sickness absence. Moreover, we assess whether the formal care expansion
effected long-term health outcomes for these daughters.
The relationship between care responsibilities and health has been well assessed; see
Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015) and Pinquart and Sörensen (2003, 2007) for reviews. How-
ever, the link is complex. On one hand, taking care of a frail parent can be rewarding
(Toljamo et al., 2012). On the other, care responsibilities often involve physically de-
manding tasks, as well as mental strains over substantial periods of time, which may
have negative effects on health both in the short and long run. Finally, time spent on
caregiving may also supersede health-enhancing activities, such as physical exercise and
other recreational activities.
The majority of the empirical evidence in this area documents negative correlations
between health and caregiving. Moreover, a substantial share of the empirical evidence
focuses on psychological aspects, such as stress and depression (Bauer and Sousa-Poza,
2015; Gautun and Hagen, 2010; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003, 2007). Living with elevated
stress levels or poor mental health over time has, in turn, been linked to reduced physical
health, such as cardiovascular disease, hypertension, lung ailments, accidents, and suicide
(Von Känel et al., 2008; Capistrant et al., 2012). Care responsibilities may also have direct
and immediate impacts on physical health through physically demanding tasks (Pinquart
and Sörensen, 2006). Finally, it may take time for the burden of caregiving to manifest
as health adversities. The importance of assessing delayed health effects of caretaking
has been highlighted by Coe and Van Houtven (2009), Leigh (2010), and Schmitz and
Westphal (2017).
Despite a well assessed link between caregiving and health, much of the empirical
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literature suffers from a lack of causality. For instance, a large share of the available
studies are based on cross-sectional data with small sample sizes, and often rely on sub-
jective measures of health. In addition, several studies have poor or even lack reliable
identification strategies. Also, there is little evidence using large-scale register data that
rely on objective health outcomes. Therefore, the evidence for causal effects of caregiving
remains limited, especially for long-term outcomes.
Estimating causal effects of reduced care responsibilities on health is difficult for
several reasons. First, formal care uptake is endogenous. Elderly individuals who receive
formal care typically have a higher need for care. They may be older and less healthy
than those not receiving formal care. Health has a genetic component, as well as a
strong connection to lifestyle which may also be inherited. Therefore, simply comparing
children with different care responsibilities for their elderly parents may lead to biased
results. Second, caregiving may have endogenous uptake, too. Individuals with poor
relations to the labor market and lower opportunity costs are more likely to provide
care. For instance, Mentzakis et al. (2009) find a negative correlation between health
and the likelihood of providing care, and further, being employed is found to reduce the
willingness to provide care (Carmichael et al., 2010). Therefore, poor health is a likely
cause of being a caregiver, and comparing health outcomes for caregivers to non-caregivers
likely provides biased results. Finally, poor relations to the labor market may also be
related to poor health in itself, which may further bias results obtained by comparing
individuals with high and low care responsibilities.
In this paper, we address the endogeneity problem and estimate causal effects of
expanding publicly provided care of the elderly on later life health outcomes for their
middle-aged children. We exploit a reform introduced in 1998, which aimed at equalizing
the availability of care services across Norwegian municipalities. This reform led to an
arguably exogenous regional variation in the expansion of formal care services, which
enables us to estimate causal effects of increased formal care by comparing outcomes
across municipalities with different levels of care expansion.
As in Løken et al. (2017) we focus on a sub-sample that is particularly likely to be af-
fected by the reform, namely, single-child daughters who have only one remaining parent
who is at least 80 years old. We replicate the main finding from Løken et al. (2017) and
show that increased formal home-based care leads to reduced insured sickness absence
from work in the short-run. We supplement this finding by exploiting detailed data on
underlying diagnoses and assess whether certain diagnoses drive the observed reduction in
leaves of absence. Our results indicate that musculoskeletal and psychological disorders
are the main drivers. This is an interesting finding because musculoskeletal and psy-
chological disorders are both associated, in previous studies, with caregiving. Moreover,
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these diagnoses are particularly difficult to verify and thus, vulnerable to misdiagnosis.
We then assess long-term health outcomes for the same sub-sample of individuals.
Here, we employ rich and detailed register data on the utilization of primary health-care
services and diagnoses related to caregiving in the literature.1 Overall, our results show
that long-term health is not much affected by increased formal care. More specifically,
with one exception, we estimate no effects on the occurrence of a number of diagnoses
identified in the literature as potentially affected by care responsibilities. The exception
is an estimated 11 percent decrease in the risk of hypertension in the long run, which
may be explained by lower stress levels in the sample of daughters who experienced a
reduction in their care burden following the reform. However, this finding does not remain
statistically significant after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, and thus, needs
to be interpreted with caution.
Finally, there might be heterogeneous effects in dimensions such as socioeconomic
status (SES). However, it is not straightforward to hypothesize whether individuals with
high or low SES are more affected by the care expansion assessed in this paper. On
one hand, we might expect individuals with low SES to be more affected by the policy
change, as low SES individuals are more likely to take on a caregiver role (Schulz and
Sherwood, 2008). On the other, we may also expect a strong reform response from high
SES individuals as they may be more able to gain their parents access to the increased
formal care capacity.2 In general, being a caregiver can be especially stressful for low
educated individuals as they might have less job flexibility with regard to e.g. working
hours. At the same time, this group also has lower opportunity costs and may be more
likely to reduce work hours due to caregiving responsibilities, making the higher educated
group more likely to be in a situation that combines work and caregiving. However, in a
meta-study Pinquart and Sörensen (2007) find no differences in the associations between
caregiving and health across education. We add to the analysis by assessing differences
in the effects for daughters with high and low education. In general, we find that there is
not much difference in the effects of the care expansion across educational groups. The
exceptions are a larger reduction in the probability of a sickness absence leave related to a
psychological disorder for the group with low education, and that the estimated increase
in the risk of hypertension in the long run seems to be driven by the group with high
education.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In
1Importantly, as, for instance, the use of primary health-care services varies across the employed and
the non-employed, we show that the expansion had no long-term effect on employment, or on death, or
on the likelihood of receiving disability insurance.
2Fiva et al. (2014) argue that highly educated individuals (high SES) may be more able to navigate
the public care provision bureaucracy to get proper care.
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Section 3, we provide details on the institutional background and the reform. Section 4
describes the different sources of data, and Section 5 explains the empirical strategy. In
Section 6, we discuss the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Informal caregivers
Several studies have documented that informal care of the elderly may to a certain extent
substitute for formal care; see e.g Cutler and Sheiner (1994); Bonsang (2009); Stabile et al.
(2006). However, the substitution rate seems to be weakening as the elderly individual
in need of care becomes older or his or her health becomes more frail (Bonsang, 2009;
Daatland et al., 2009; Bolin et al., 2008; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004), and some
studies argue that when it comes to more severe care needs, such as nursing or inpatient
hospital care, informal care is a complement to formal care; see Bonsang (2009) or Bolin
et al. (2008). Nevertheless, with an aging population and an increasing demand for care,
informal caregivers are a critical national resource. Even in Norway–a country with a
large public sector and one of the highest spending levels on publicly provided eldercare
in Europe (Huseby and Paulsen, 2009)–the amount of informal care is estimated to be of
the same magnitude as the amount of the publicly provided formal care received by the
elderly population (Berge et al., 2014).
Most informal care received by a frail elderly individual is provided by family members,
usually the spouse or adult children (Vaage, 2000; Jakobsson et al., 2012). Informal care
is, however, highly gendered. On the receiving end, mothers receive more care than
fathers. However, this is likely because women tend to outlive their spouse, and thus,
as men often die in a two-person household, women more often spend their last years
widowed (Daatland et al., 2009). More notable is the gender difference in the provision
of informal care: Female spouses provide more care than do male spouses, and daughters
provide more help to their elderly parents than sons (Stark, 2005; Jakobsson et al., 2016).3
Several potential explanations for these gender differences are given in the literature. For
instance, women may have lower opportunity costs and/or a weaker connection to the
labor market. A second explanation relates to the way formal care services are allocated.
Stark (2005) and Jakobsson et al. (2016) note that public service managers often have
gender-differentiated expectations for the amount of informal care that will be provided.
In particular, informal care from daughters is seen as a closer substitute for formal care
than informal care from sons, and no, or a lower level, of formal care is assigned when
3Interestingly, in a survey conducted by Jakobsson et al. (2012), men were more likely than women
to report that they think family should provide care.
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daughters are present.
Several studies have focused on the effects of care responsibilities on various labor
market outcomes, and findings include reduced work hours (Schmitz and Westphal, 2017;
Bauer and Sousa-Poza, 2015; Kotsadam, 2012; Gautun and Hagen, 2010), lower earnings
(Løken et al., 2017; Schmitz and Westphal, 2017; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007), and
a weaker connection to the labor market in general (Kotsadam, 2012; Leigh, 2010; Lilly
et al., 2007).4 Most notable for the present study, Løken et al. (2017) find that expanding
formal care in Norway led to reduced sickness absence for daughters of single parents aged
80 and older. These results were especially strong for the subsample of daughters with
no siblings, which is the group most likely to have a higher burden of care. There are
two possible mechanisms for why caregiving affects sickness absence. First, as further
elaborated in the next section, being a caregiver can have direct and indirect health
implications. Second, a sickness absence can be used as a means of being granted paid
leave from work to gain flexibility to provide care for a frail parent. Although all sickness
absences longer than three days must be certified by a physician to prevent fraudulent
use of leave, several studies confirm that this program has been used for other reasons
other than an individual’s sickness. Markussen et al. (2011) conclude that the sickness
insurance system in Norway is a more general absence system, where physicians help
individuals cope with demanding life situations by certifying sickness absences. This
conclusion has been confirmed by interviews with physicians (Carlsen, 2008) and by
survey data (Gautun, 2008).
2.2 Health Effects of Caregiving
A vast amount of empirical evidence documents negative correlations between caregiving
and various health outcomes. Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015) and Pinquart and Sörensen
(2007) provide reviews of this literature and note that the focus is often on various psy-
chological aspects, or mental health, such as stress, depression, anxiety, and dementia, of
which depression is the most common outcome. Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015) argue that
caregiving could have mental health consequences because caregiving is time-consuming
and often difficult to combine with work and family duties, and because caring for close
relatives may induce negative emotions due to compassion and fear of loss. Moreover,
Schulz and Sherwood (2008) note that caregiving is seen as having all the features of a
chronic stress experience, as caregiving is usually accompanied by high levels of unpre-
dictability. Having caregiving responsibilities has even been used as a model for studying
chronic stress (Schulz and Sherwood, 2008).
4Allthough some studies find that the labor market effects hold only for the more intensive caregivers
(Lilly et al., 2007; Kotsadam, 2012), this is not true for all studies.
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In addition to the documented effects on psychological aspects, caregiving can affect
physical health. This link could be explained through the mental health channel, as living
with depression, or poor mental health in general, over substantial periods of time may
manifest as physical health problems. Elevated stress over a longer time span has, for
instance, been linked to hypertension and cardiovascular disease in the long run (Kivimäki
and Steptoe, 2018; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2006; Capistrant et al., 2012; McEwen, 1998).
In addition, care responsibilities may have direct effects on physical health. Some studies
link care responsibilities directly to an increased risk of hypertension and cardiovascular
disease (Von Känel et al., 2008; Capistrant et al., 2012). Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015)
argue that caregiving often includes physically demanding tasks over longer periods of
time that in turn, may cause musculoskeletal injuries and aggravation of arthritis and
other chronic conditions. Having care responsibilities can also require physical effort,
especially in the case where the care recipient develops behavioral problems (Pinquart and
Sörensen, 2006). Finally, caregivers tend to neglect physical exercise, eating healthy, or
other factors associated with a healthy lifestyle (Bauer and Sousa-Poza, 2015; Capistrant
et al., 2012).
Despite the well-assessed link between caregiving and health, there are several draw-
backs with the existing literature. The evidence on physical health effects is still very
limited, especially for more objective health outcomes. The majority of studies apply
survey data, where the representativeness of the sample and the fact that the health
outcomes can be highly contextual are potential issues. Importantly, as discussed in the
introduction, the endogeneity problem due to selection into caregiving is an issue seldom
addressed (Leigh, 2010).
Among the evidence that accounts for endogeneity, Coe and Van Houtven (2009) find
that long-term caregiving reduces self-rated health and increases depressive symptoms.
The increase in depressive symptoms is persistent, and the long-term consequences are
larger than the immediate consequences. The negative effect of caregiving on depression
is supported, for instance, by Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015). Schmitz and Westphal
(2015) find short-term effects of care-giving on mental health but no effect on physical
health. Finally, Do et al. (2015) apply parent-in-law’s health limitations as instrumental
variables and find negative effects on pain, self-rated health, and out-of-pocket health-care
spending for daughter-in-law caregivers.
Gender differences are found in the health effects of caregiving. Female caregivers
report higher rates of depression compared to men (Bauer and Sousa-Poza, 2015). How-
ever, this is partly due to women being far more exposed through longer and more intense
care (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2006).
Finally, little is known about persistence or the long-term health effects of caregiving.
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Coe and Van Houtven (2009) argue that it takes some time for the effects of caregiving
on health to manifest, and several studies stress the importance of assessing long-term
outcomes (Leigh, 2010; Schmitz and Westphal, 2017).
In sum, theoretical and empirical studies have provided links between caregiving and
health outcomes. This study contributes to the literature by assessing long-term effects
on a number of these outcomes, in particular, musculoskeletal diagnoses, cardiovascular
disease, psychological disorders in general, depression, hypertension, and lifestyle disease.
Our identification strategy is based on arguably exogenous variation in caregiving fol-
lowing a formal care expansion. We rely on unique, high-quality individual-level register
data that cover the entire Norwegian population. Further, in contrast to a large share of
this literature, we apply objective health outcomes, measured as the diagnosis provided
by a physician.
3 Formal Care in Norway and the 1998 Reform
With the emergence of the modern Norwegian welfare state in the 1960s, public respon-
sibility for care of the young, frail, and elderly was expanded. The legal responsibility
for elder care shifted from the family to the public sector in 1964, and during the 1970s,
public expenditures on elder care more than doubled. Most of this expansion was in the
form of support for home-care services, either in private homes or in adapted facilities.
Responsibility for elder care services gradually shifted from the central authorities to
the municipalities during the 1980s. This was a period of decentralization, and municipal-
ities were granted more autonomy in the provision of services to their elderly population.
This implied that earmarked grants for elder care were replaced by transfers to munic-
ipal budgets based on demographics, income, and estimated needs in the municipality.
Consequently, municipalities were free to allocate their budgets with close to full dis-
cretion, resulting in large differences in the coverage rates of home-care services across
municipalities.5
During the mid 1990s, the need for care expanded rapidly due to a growing elderly
population resulting in declining coverage rates of home-based and institutionalized care
for the elderly aged 80 and older. At the same time, the large differences in home-based
care coverage rates across municipalities were seen as inequitable. This resulted in an
action plan for elder care services.6 The plan was implemented in January 1998, with a
four-year implementation period. The main purpose of the action plan was to increase
capacity in buildings and personnel, and to create a more equitable level of care services
5Although municipalities have nearly full discretionary control over their budgets, certain amounts
of public services have to be provided as all Norwegian citizens have a statutory right to basic welfare
services regardless of where in the country they live.
6In Norwegian: "Handlingsplan for Eldreomsorgen".
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across municipalities (Brevik, 2001).7 Explicit goals of the action plan included that all
municipalities should be able to provide 24/7 assistance to at least 25 percent of their
population aged 80 and older. Specifically, the plan was to increase the number of spaces
in adapted apartments and institutions, and to increase the number of labor input in the
home-based care sector nationwide by 6000 work years (Borge and Haraldsvik, 2006).
There was a strong desire to preserve the autonomy of the care recipients, and most of
the expansion in care services took the form of home-care in adapted facilities, rather than
in nursing homes. This also had cost advantages compared to institutionalized services,
as in the latter there is 24/7 access to highly qualified personnel (Løken et al., 2017).
The plan was implemented by the municipalities through federal grants. Although all
municipalities in principle could apply for the grants, there is evidence suggesting that the
municipalities with the lowest home-based care coverage rates were more likely to apply
(Borge and Haraldsvik, 2006). We confirm this in a regression of growth in home-based
care coverage rates on municipality characteristics in Table 1. We show that munici-
palities with the lowest pre-reform home-based coverage rates experienced the largest
post-reform increase in home-based care coverage. This regression also confirms that
there was no relation between the increase in coverage rates and pre-reform institution-
alized care coverage, the share of the population aged 80 or older or aged 67 or older,
respectively, and the municipal budget.
In Figure 1, we show that the levels of home-based care coverage rates are converging
and almost levelling off in the post-reform period. Moreover, we show that the level of
pre-reform coverage rates of home-based care is a strong predictor of absolute change in
coverage rates from the pre-reform period to the post reform period. In Figure A3, the
top graph shows that the coverage level for institutionalized care remained fairly constant
across the time period. The same holds for the fraction of the population aged 80 and
older in the bottom graph. This is important because we might worry that the change
in home-based care coverage rates was offset by changes in institutionalized care, or that
individuals who are in need of care might move to municipalities that apply for grants
to improve care provision. Additionally, we compare pre-reform characteristics across
municipalities with high and low pre-reform coverage rates in Table A1, and conclude
that the municipalities are similar on most measures. One notable difference is the
tendency that municipalities with lower pre-reform coverage have larger populations.
The descriptive results discussed above confirm the government’s stated strategy of
emphasizing home-based care compared to nursing homes in combating coverage discrep-
ancies across municipalities (Daatland and Veenstra, 2012). However, Figure 1 captures
only the aspect of the reform associated with increasing the proportion of elderly re-
7The plan also included goals for quality improvements in the home-based care and existing properties.
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ceiving care. The reform may have affected other aspects, such as improved quality of
the care provided or more hours of care for those already receiving formal care.8 The
reduced-form effects of the care expansion, thus, are likely to work through all of these
channels.
4 Data
We define the baseline sample as adult daughters with no siblings and only one surviving
parent aged 80 years or older in each year of the time period 1995-2003.9 This particular
sample of daughters is a group expected to have a greater care burden for an elderly
parent, and thus, the group most likely to experience a reduction in care responsibilities
caused by the reform. The sample must be seen as repeated cross sections as new daugh-
ters enter every year as the remaining parent turns 80 years old, or as a parent becomes
a widow(er), provided he or she is 80 or older. Similarly, some daughters drop out of the
sample due to the death of the remaining parent.
4.1 Municipality-Level Data
To obtain information on the type and extent of formal care on the municipality level,
we use annual data on elder care from the regional database provided by the Norwegian
Social Science Data (NSD). These data provide information on the number of users of
different types of elder care in each municipality per annum in the time period 1993-
2014. Our treatment variable is the fraction of individuals aged 80 and older who receive
formal home-based care, i.e., home-based care provided by the municipality.10 From the
regional database, we also assess the fraction of individuals aged 80 or older living in
care institutions in each municipality each year. We link individuals to municipality data
based on their mother’s (or the living parent’s) municipality of residence in 1993.
4.2 Individual-Level Data
We apply rich, individual-level register data provided by Statistics Norway (SSB), which
covers the entire resident population over the period 1993-2014. These registers include
demographic information, such as year of birth, gender, immigration status, municipal-
ity of residence, and socioeconomic data, such as education and earnings. In addition,
we have information on every individual’s income and use of different welfare benefits,
including disability insurance benefits. Using unique identifiers, we are able to link sib-
8No data are available on quality or hours of care. Thus, we are not able to separate between differing
quality across municipalities.
9We define daughters with no siblings as daughters of mothers who have only one child.
10The data report only the number of individuals who receive care, not the amount of care each
individual receives.
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lings and parents to their children, and to link individuals to data from relevant health
registers, explained in more detail below.
4.2.1 Sickness Absence and Related Diagnoses
Following the National Insurance Act (Folketrygdloven, 1997), all employees are entitled
to sickness benefits to compensate for the loss of labor income due to illness or injury.
To assess the impact of caregiving on sickness absence and the underlying diagnoses, we
apply records of leaves of absence reported to the Norwegian Labor and Welfare Service
(NAV). These data contain every sickness absence spell certified by a physician and their
related diagnoses from 1995 to 2014. The absence spell is recorded from the first day
of a certified absence. A physician’s certification is required for all sickness absence
spells lasting longer than the allowed number of self-reported days.11 As a general rule,
workers are entitled to at least three self-reported absence days per leave, but in some
workplaces workers are entitled to up to eight days.12 Each sickness absence spell can last
for a maximum of 12 months with full wage compensation up to a certain ceiling. Our
measure of sickness absence is a binary indicator equal to one if a person has at least one
spell of certified absence during the year. We condition sickness absence on employment,
which means we drop individuals who are not eligible for reimbursed sickness absence.13
Being employed is defined as having a labor income exceeding the basic amount (G). The
G levels are administratively set and adjusted each quarter of the year, and used in the
national social security system to determine old-age pensions and eligibility for disability
and unemployment benefits.14
All absence certifications should be followed by at least one diagnosis reported by the
physician who issued the certificate.15 In addition to the indicator for sickness absence
at all, we construct separate indicators for absences related to the two largest diagnoses
categories following a sickness absence: namely musculoskeletal disorders (MSD), and
psychological disorders. We group all other diagnoses into a rest category, and finally, we
keep as a separate category all leaves of absence with a missing diagnosis.
4.2.2 Long-Term Health Outcomes
For the long-term health outcomes, we use detailed register data from the Control and Dis-
tribution of Health Reimbursement database (KUHR), available for the years 2006-2014.
These registers cover all Norwegian citizens’ utilization of primary health-care services
11There is no available national record of self-reported sickness absence days.
12Workers who are frequently absent may need certification from day one.
13Although this choice could potentially affect the results, we expect that it is of little importance as
Løken et al. (2017) estimate no effects of the care expansion on employment at the extensive margin.
14In 2006, 1 G represented approximately USD $10,000.
15Sickness absence diagnoses follow the International Classification of Primary Care system, 2nd Edi-
tion (ICPC-02).
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and entail administrative records of all reimbursements claimed by primary physicians.
All Norwegian citizens belong to a specific primary physician’s list, and each physician
is responsible for providing primary health care services to patients that belong to his or
her list. As a requirement in the physician’s payment scheme, the physician is obliged to
report to the national claims database (KUHR) on all services provided and actions taken
after every consultation, including the main symptom or diagnosis, referrals and certifi-
cation of sick leaves. Physicians are required to include at least one diagnosis code per
consultation to be reimbursed for the services provided (Sørensen et al., 2016). Classifica-
tion of main symptoms and diagnoses follow The International Classification of Primary
Care (ICPC-02). To assess long-term effects of caregiving on health, we lag the health
outcomes by 11 years. As the health data are available for nine years (2006-2014), lagging
the data by 11 years ensures that we have enough observations in the pre- and post-reform
periods.16 As illustrated in Figure A2 in the Appendix, this means that, for instance, for
individuals in the sample in year 1995 we measure long-term health outcomes in 2006.
For individuals in the sample in year 1996, long-term health outcomes are measured in
2007, and so on.
To measure utilization of primary health-care services, we record the yearly likelihood
of consulting a primary physician and the number of consultations per year. As primary
physician consultations, we include visits to the emergency room and the causality clin-
ics. As discussed in the literature review, caregiving has been linked to a range of health
outcomes, as well as to poor lifestyle choices, which can manifest in poor health. We
assess the likelihood of having a record of any of the following broad diagnosis categories:
MSD, psychological, and cardiovascular disorders. Further, we look at the more specific
diagnoses of hypertension and depression. Finally, we measure lifestyle related disorders
as having any of the following diagnoses: Non-insulin-dependent diabetes (type 2), over-
weight or obesity, or substance abuse, that being either alcohol, tobacco, medication or
drug abuse. The exact construction by ICPC-02 codes that go into each outcome is listed
in Table A2 in the Appendix.
5 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effects of the expansion in formal care for the elderly on health outcomes
for their adult children, we use a reduced form model that exploits the differential increase
in the allocation of federal funds across municipalities caused by the 1998 reform.17 We
compare individual outcomes across municipalities that experienced different levels of
expansion in formal care. As a predetermined indicator of the intensity of the municipal
16As a robustness check, we include an alternative where we lag the health outcomes by 10 years.
17Our empirical strategy follows the strategy applied in Løken et al. (2017).
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response to the reform, we use the average level of home care coverage measured before
the reform, more specifically, in the years 1993-1996. As noted in Section 3, municipalities
with lower pre-reform coverage rates experienced a larger expansion in home-based care
coverage from the pre- to the post-reform period. Importantly, we rely on informal care
responsibilities being related to the amount of formal care provided in the municipalities.18
We split the post-1998 period into a phase-in period, defined as the period 1998-
2000, and a post-reform period, defined as 2001-2003. In the phase-in period, we expect
smaller effects due to delays in the implementation of the reform, whereas in the post-
reform period, funding levels had increased, and home-based care coverage rates had
almost converged between treatment and control municipalities. We estimate the follow-
ing regression:
(1)









+ X′itδ + µit ,
where Y is the outcome of interest at time t for individual i. Phasein indicates the
transition period, defined as 1998-2000, while Post indicates the post-reform period, 2001
to 2003. PreCoverage represents the treatment intensity of the municipality in which
the elderly parent of individual i lived in 1993. Finally, X is a set of control variables
including municipality fixed effects, child age and education, parent age and gender, and
immigrant status for both parent and child.19
The coefficients of interest, α4 and α5, are interpreted as the intention to treat effect
of the policy change in the phase-in period and the post-reform period, respectively. In
addition to care expansion at the extensive margin, it is likely that the reform led to
care expansion at the intensive margin and to quality improvements, which we are not
able to observe. The key identifying assumption is that the change in outcomes from the
pre- to post-period would have been the same across municipalities with different levels
of pre-reform coverage rates in the absence of the reform. Our approach assumes a linear
relationship between pre-reform care coverage rates and the outcomes of interest. As the
linearity assumption is not supported for extreme values of pre-reform coverage levels,
we drop municipalities with extreme pre-reform coverage levels, defined as lower than the
10th percentile and higher than the 90th percentile.20
18This relationship, i.e., that individuals in municipalities with higher levels of formal care are less
inclined to provide informal care, is confirmed by Jakobsson et al. (2012).
19For some specifications in the robustness checks (where we estimate the effects for all daughters,
with and without siblings), we include the child’s birth order and the number of siblings as controls.
20The exclusion of these outliers is supported by Løken et al. (2017).
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5.1 Multiple Hypothesis Testing
When testing a number of outcomes that are potentially correlated, and are estimated
using the same source of variation, we may increase the risk of accepting an incorrect hy-
pothesis. Therefore, we test whether the estimated effects remain statistically significant
after we correct for multiple hypothesis testing. For each outcome in our main tables,
we include the p-value obtained using the stepwise procedure described in Romano and
Wolf (2005a,b, 2016). As outcomes occurring in the same table are conceptually similar,
we test the outcomes in the same table simultaneously.
5.2 Differences by Socioeconomic Status
When estimating the average effect on the entire group of daughters affected by the
expansion, difference in responses across important subgroups may be concealed. Of par-
ticular interest in this setting is the differences in response across groups with different
SES. We use education level as a proxy for SES, and investigate differences in the re-
sponse to the expansion of elder care across daughters with high and low education by
interacting both (PreCoveragei×Phaseint) and (PreCoveragei×Postt) in Equation 1
with an indicator equal to 1 if individual i had less than 10 years of education pre-reform
(measured in 1987).
5.3 Alternative Specifications and Robustness
To shed light on the robustness of our results, we perform a number of checks. As our
first robustness check, we assess the sensitivity of the estimates to various specification
checks. Specifically, we start by excluding large cities and the most rural municipalities
that might be very different from the rest of the sample. Further, we include alternative
ways of treating the year 1997 (the year before the reform), first by excluding 1997
altogether and second by including 1997 in the phase-in period. Moreover, we include a
specification where we split the municipalities into treatment and control groups based
on whether the municipalities fall above or below the median in the pre-reform coverage
distribution.
Additionally, we re-estimate the effects using an alternative approach where we ex-
clude the phase-in period and treat all years after the reform as post-years. This means
estimating the following equation:




+ X′itδ + µit ,
where post is defined as 1998-2003. Excluding the phase-in period gives us more post-
reform years; however, it also means that the treatment exposure is smaller, on average,
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as we include individuals from the phase-in years. Thus, we expect the estimates of α4
from Equation 2 to be smaller than the estimated post effects, α5, using Equation 1.
We further estimate the reform effects on alternative samples and run two placebo
tests. Specifically, for the alternative samples we consider all daughters and sons with no
siblings. These samples are assumed to have lower care burdens and thus, likely to be
less affected by the care expansion. For placebo tests, we estimate the effects on samples
we assume not to be affected by the care expansion. Here, we consider daughters with
no siblings where both parents are deceased and those with younger parents (age 60-72).
We exploit these various degrees of treatment exposure as a means to further ensure that
the estimated effects stem from the care expansion.
Finally, our choice for the number of lags for the long-term health outcomes is re-
stricted by the fact that only nine years of data are available, and that we need at least
some years both before and after the reform to estimate the effects. However, it is not
obvious by exactly how many years we should lag the outcomes, and this choice may
potentially affect the results. For the final robustness check, we therefore provide results
where the health outcomes have an alternative lag, namely, 10 years instead of 11 years.
6 Results
In the following sections, we present the results for the baseline sample of daughters
with no siblings and only one living parent aged 80 or older. All results are presented
graphically and in tables with the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimation results. For the
graphical presentation, we include figures where municipalities are split at the median of
the pre-reform coverage rate distribution.21 We start by presenting results for the short-
term effects of the coverage expansion on sickness absence, and assess whether the effect
on sickness absence is driven by a specific diagnosis group. We then assess the long-run
health outcomes for the same sample. Next, we discuss heterogeneity by education, and
finally, we discuss the robustness of the results.
6.1 Sickness Absence and Related Diagnoses
The results for sickness absence and the diagnoses underlying the absence are presented
graphically in Figure 2. The first graph shows the likelihood of having a sickness absence
at all. We see almost overlapping trends prior to the reform for municipalities with
21An alternative version of the figures is to graph the absolute change from the pre- to the post-
reform period in the outcome considered against the pre-reform coverage level. Although we do show
this continuous version for the first stage figure, to avoid including too many graphs, we show only the
binary version of the graphs, i.e., where we split municipalities into treatment and control groups, for
the rest of the outcomes. The binary figures have the advantage of a more intuitive representation of the
development of the outcomes, and the differences across municipalities with higher and lower pre-reform
coverage levels. Additionally, the figures give us a way of visually inspecting the pre-trends.
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pre-reform coverage rates above (control) and below (treatment) the median. The graphs
show a clear tendency toward divergence in the post-reform period. Figure 2 further shows
the probability of absences related to specific diagnosis groups, namely, the two largest
diagnosis groups: MSD, and psychological disorders, a rest category containing all other
diagnoses, as well as the group in which no diagnosis is specified. For these specific groups
of absence spells, we see a clear tendency toward a reduction in absence related to MSD,
and, although less clear, a tendency towards a reduction in spells related to psychological
disorders in the treatment municipalities compared to the control municipalities. For the
rest category and the spells with no specified diagnosis, there seems to be no effect of the
care expansion.
Table 2 provides the corresponding ITT estimates for the sickness absence outcomes.
The regression results confirm the tendencies observed in the graphs in Figure 2. The
phase-in ITT indicates the reform effect in the phase-in period, defined as 1998-2000,
while Post-ITT indicates the effect in the post period, defined as 2001-2003, i.e., where
we expect stronger effects as the expansion of formal home-based care has had time to
take effect. The estimated ITT effect on the likelihood of a sickness absence at all (the
first column) is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for both the phase-in period
and the post-reform period. Specifically, we estimate that a 10 percentage point lower pre-
reform coverage rate is related to a 14 percent reduction in the likelihood of a sickness
absence among adult single-child daughters (a 3.0 percentage points reduction from a
mean of around 21 percent).22 As expected, the estimates are larger for the Post-ITT
than for the Phase-in ITT effect.
As previously discussed, there are reasons to believe that a sickness absence is granted
both due to own health and to gain flexibility to provide care for a frail parent. In this
setting, it is therefore interesting to assess whether the reduction in sick leave is driven
by a specific underlying diagnosis. We investigate this question in the following four
columns of Table 2. Here, we find statistically significant reductions for the post-ITT in
the probability of absences related to both MSD and psychological disorders, but no effect
on absences related to other diagnoses (the rest category) or the groups of unspecified
diagnoses.23
22Although we use a slightly different sample and use sickness absence data from a different register,
these results are in line with the results on sickness absence found in Løken et al. (2017). We replicate
their result in Figure A5 and Table A14 applying the same source of sickness absence and the same
period of analysis, 1993-2005, as they did. However, to obtain data on the diagnoses connected to each
sickness absence spell, we need to use a different register for our analysis (the NAV Register). These
data are available only from 1995. Moreover, as our long-term health outcomes are available for only
nine years, we need to limit the period under analysis further compared to Løken et al. (2017), and are
left with the years 1995-2003.
23Testing for statistical differences in these estimates confirms that the estimate for MSD is not equal to
the unspecified diagnoses group and the rest category. For absences related to a psychological condition,
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As discussed in the literature section, MSD and psychological disorders are health
outcomes that are likely to be affected by caregiving. For the probability of having a
sickness absence related to MSD, the long-term ITT effects are estimated to be -2.5
percentage points from a mean of 9.2 percent, which translates into an effect of about 27
percent reduction in the likelihood of a sickness absence. Similarly, for the probability of
an absence related to a psychological condition, our estimates translate into a 37 percent
reduction (a 1.1 percentage points reduction from a mean of 2.95 percent). Finally, as
shown by the Romano-Wolf p-values provided in the table, the estimated effects on the
probability of an absence at all, as well as the probability of leaves related to MSD and
psychological disorders, are still statistically significant at conventional levels when the
p-values are corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.
We also investigated more specific diagnoses by splitting up the broad MSD and
psychological disorders categories into smaller groups but found no clear pattern of the
sickness absence reduction being driven by any of these smaller groups. These results are
shown in the Appendix Table A3.
6.2 Long-Term Health Outcomes
The graphical presentations of results for the long-term health outcomes are presented
in Figure 3. As previously explained, for this part of the analysis the health outcomes
are measured 11 years ahead.24 In general, the graphical presentation provides no clear
evidence of effects in any direction on the outcomes considered. However, we see some
tendencies toward a reduction in the risk of hypertension in the treatment municipalities
compared to the control municipalities.
The estimation results for the long-term outcomes are presented in Table 3. The
Phase-in and Post-ITT are defined as above. The first column presents the reform effects
on the probability of a primary care consultation. The point estimate shows an increase
of 2.4 percentage points from a mean of 79.7 percent, which translates into an effect
of 3 percent.25 In the remaining columns of Table 3, we investigate the likelihood of
the occurrence of specific diagnoses identified in the literature as potentially affected
by caregiving responsibilities. Overall, we find little evidence of long-term health being
affected by the care expansion. Specifically, we find no effects on the likelihood of the
however, we are not able to reject that the estimates are statistically different for the two categories.
24We retain the same baseline sample of adult daughters. However, the number of observations differs
slightly as we do not condition on employment, and we drop individuals who were dead in the years in
which health outcomes are measured in this part of the analysis.
25In Table A4, we show that we find no effects on employment, disability, and mortality. These long-
term outcomes are interesting in themselves, and important for this analysis as they are states that may
affect the likelihood and regularity of primary care consultations, e.g., as employed individuals need a
physician to certify sickness absences.
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broad groups of MSD, psychological disorders and cardiovascular diseases, or on the
more specific categories of depression and lifestyle related diseases. However, we find a
statistically significant negative impact of the care expansion on the likelihood of having a
hypertension diagnosis. The estimated effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level for the Phase-in ITT and at the 5 percent level for the Post-ITT. The effect is
also larger for the latter estimate. The Post-ITT shows a reduction in the likelihood
of hypertension of almost 11 percent, a 2 percentage point decrease from a mean of
19 percent. However, when correcting for multiple hypothesis testing the calculated
Romano-Wolf p-value becomes 0.235, and thus, the effect is not statistically significant
at any conventional level.
6.3 Heterogeneity by Education
We then assess heterogeneity in the outcomes among daughters with different levels of
education. In Tables 4 and 5, we present the effects estimated using Equation 1, where
we include interaction terms between the treatment variables and an indicator for low
education. The results for sickness absence and related diagnoses remains fairly similar
to those in the main analysis for both educational groups. The effect for the group with
high education is represented by the PostITT and the effect for the low educated group
is represented by the sum of the PostITT and the post× loweduc (the p-value represents
the joint statistical significance of the Post-ITT and the interaction term).
For the results for sickness absence the estimated reduction in the overall probability
of an absence and in the probability of leaves of absence related to MSD and psycho-
logical disorders remains and is statistically significant for both educational groups (the
p-value for the joint statistical significance of the Post-ITT and the interaction term is
0.095). The only statistically significant difference is that we estimate a slightly larger
decrease in leaves of absence related to psychological disorders for the group with low
education. While the estimated effect of 1 percentage point is still negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level for the group with high education, we estimate a
1.3 percentage point decrease for the group with low education.
The heterogeneity results for the long-term health outcomes are presented in Table
5. We estimate a slight decrease in the probability of a primary care consultation for
the group with low education, in contrast to the small increase for this outcome for
the full sample. However, this effect is very close to zero (-0.2 percentage points).26
The heterogeneity analysis further shows that the care expansion increased the risk of
developing a depression diagnosis, which is not revealed in the main analysis. Specifically,
26The table also shows a slight increase in the number of primary care consultations. Though this
increase of 0.02 consultations is statistically significant, it is also fairly close to zero considering the
average number of consultations is about 3.6.
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we estimate a 0.2 percentage point increase for the group with low education.27 Finally,
the heterogeneity analysis shows that the estimated effect on hypertension seems to be
driven by the group with higher education as we find an effect of 2 percentage points for
this group (the same as in the full sample), whereas the p-value for the joint significance
of the Post-ITT and the interaction term is 0.11 yielding a not statistically significant
effect for the low education group.
6.4 Robustness
The results from the robustness checks are presented in the Appendix in Tables A5 and
A6. In these tables, we include the baseline specification for comparison in the first
column, and we show only the results for the post-ITT. We first exclude large cities and
the most rural municipalities (in columns 2 and 3, respectively), and we then include
alternative ways of treating the year 1997 (the year before the reform), first by excluding
that year (column 4) and second by including 1997 as a phase-in year (column 5). Finally,
in column 6, we include a specification where we split the municipalities into treatment
and control groups based on whether the municipalities fall above or below the median
in the pre-reform coverage distribution.
The specification checks for sickness absence spells are shown in Table A5, and for the
long-term health outcomes, results are found in Table A6. The estimated decrease in the
probability of sickness absences remains relatively robust, except in column 2 where we
exclude large cities. Here, the estimate is smaller, but the direction of the effect remains
the same. The results are similar to the baseline specification for the other specification
checks. The diagnoses that seem to be driving the results on sickness absence, MSD and
psychological disorders remain robust throughout all specifications, while estimates for
the other categories remain close to zero and are not statistically significant. For the long-
term health outcomes, most specification checks show, as in the baseline specification,
non-statistically significant effects. The estimated small increase in the likelihood of a
primary health-care consultation is robust to most specifications, except when we split
the municipalities into treatment and control groups based on median pre-reform coverage
in column 6. Last, the estimated decrease in the likelihood of a hypertension diagnosis
remains statistically significant and about the same size throughout all the specification
checks.
Next, we estimate the reform effects on alternative samples: all daughters and sons
with no siblings. These samples are assumed to have lower or no care burdens, and thus,
are less likely to be affected by the care expansion. The results for these alternative
27Albeit rather small, this finding contrasts with the existing empirical evidence in the literature on
the health effects of having care responsibilities.
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samples are shown in Tables A7 and A8. We maintain the baseline results in the first
column, while the results for all daughters and for sons with no siblings are presented in
the following columns. Table A7 shows no effects on either sickness absence or on absence
related to specific diagnoses for any of the groups assumed to have fewer care responsibili-
ties. The results for the long-term health outcomes for the alternative samples, presented
in Table A8, provide the same picture. Here, too, we find no effects on the sample of
sons with no siblings. For all daughters, we estimate statistically significant, yet smaller,
effects of the care expansions on the likelihood of a primary health-care consultation and
on the likelihood of a hypertension diagnosis 11 years later.28 On average, this group of
daughters is likely to have a smaller care burden than the daughters with no siblings, i.e.,
lower treatment intensity. Thus, finding results that vary with the potential treatment
intensity reassures us that the observed effects stem from reduced caregiving.
We further perform placebo tests by estimating the effects on daughters with no
siblings where both parents are deceased and on those with younger parents (aged 60-
72). The results for the placebo tests are presented in Tables A9 and A10. As seen
in the first table, we find no statistically significant effects of the care expansion on
the probability of sickness absence. For the long-term outcomes, we estimate a slightly
significant increase in the risk of a cardiovascular disease and of a lifestyle-related disease
for the group of daughters with no living parents. As noted by Løken et al. (2017), the
group of daughters with no living parents may have care responsibilities for parents-in-
law, and thus be affected by the care expansion. However, the direction on the estimated
effect in the placebo test contradicts the direction we would expect given the findings in
the literature.
Finally, we re-estimate the main effects using two alternative approaches. First, we
exclude the intermediate period and treat all years after the reform as post-reform years.
Second, we lag the health outcomes by 10 years instead of 11. Results for the specification
excluding the intermediate period are presented in Tables A11 and A12. We see that
excluding the intermediate period does not alter the conclusions from the main analysis.
Though a little smaller, the point estimates for sickness absence, as well as for leaves of
absence related to underlying diagnoses, are still statistically significant for absence at all
and absences related to MSD and psychological disorders, and small and not statistically
significant for the groups of unspecified diagnoses and the rest category. For the long-
term health outcomes in Table A12, we no longer estimate the increase in the likelihood
of a primary care consultation, as in the main results, but we still find a reduction in the
28An estimated increase in the risk of MSD also turns up as statistically significant at the 10 percent
level for daughters with siblings. After correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, the effect is no longer
statistically significant.
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risk of a hypertension diagnosis.
Results from the specification where we apply different lags to the health outcomes
are shown in Table A13. Again, we find similar results as in the baseline specification.
Overall, there is not much evidence pointing toward long-term health effects of the care
expansion, except from a small increase in the probability of a primary care consultation
and a decrease in the likelihood of a hypertension diagnosis (here 10 years after).
In sum, the robustness analysis shows that the results found in the main analysis are
robust to various specifications and reassuringly, that when assessing the same outcomes
for samples less likely to be affected by the reform, apart from a few exceptions, we find
essentially no effects.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Summing up the main findings of this paper, we show that expanding formal care of the
elderly led to a decrease in the probability of sickness absence for single-child daughters
with only one surviving parent aged 80 or older. This finding is in line with the previous
findings in Løken et al. (2017). We expand this analysis and show that the decrease in
absences seems to be driven by leaves of absence related to MSD and psychological disor-
ders. These findings remain statistically significant at conventional levels when correcting
for multiple hypothesis testing, and they are robust to a range of specification checks. In
addition, results for the placebo tests as well as when estimated on alternative samples
increase our confidence in these results.
Although the results show that the reduction in leaves of absence is driven by MSD
and psychological disorders, this does not necessarily imply reduced own illness alone. An
early study of physicians’ certifying practice in Norway suggests that the diagnosis stated
on the absence certificate is a good reflection of a person’s health (Tellnes et al., 1989),
and the ICPC-2 coding of absence certifications conducted by Norwegian physicians has
been judged by Brage et al. (1996) to be of satisfactory quality. However, several studies
have documented that the sickness insurance system in Norway is used partly to insure
employees against a broad range of circumstances, other than own illness (Markussen
et al., 2011; Carlsen, 2008; Gautun, 2008). Moreover, in recent years there has been
a tendency toward increased sickness absence certifications based on more subjective
complaints and diffuse symptoms (Brage et al., 2013). The explanations provided include
assertions that may imply that the diagnoses related to a sickness spell do not necessarily
reflect individual health perfectly.29
29The explanations discussed by Brage et al. (2013) include that a diagnosis given by a physician may
have consequences for an individual, e.g., when purchasing health insurance, and that this makes physi-
cians more careful in their diagnostic practice. A further explanation is that at the initial consultation
the diagnosis given often relies primarily on the patients’ own complaints, and that some physicians do
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In the second part of the analysis, we assess the effects of expanding publicly pro-
vided elder care on long-term health outcomes among the sample of daughters. Overall,
we find little evidence of long-term health outcomes being affected by reducing the care
burden. We investigate long-term effects on primary care consultations and the likeli-
hood of having specific diagnoses detected in the literature as potentially affected by care
responsibilities. These diagnoses are MSD, psychological, or cardiovascular disorders,
depression, hypertension, and, finally, lifestyle related disorders. We find no statistically
significant effects of the care expansion on the long-term health outcomes, except hyper-
tension, where we estimate an 11 percent reduction in the risk of a hypertension diagnosis.
To the extent that we can rely on this finding, it can be explained by lower stress levels
following a reduced care burden.30 Despite the well-established link between caregiving
and health, we document no causal effects of caregiving on some of the most common
health outcomes in this literature, such as depression, psychological disorders, and MSD
in the longer term. As a closing comment, given that we estimate short-term effects
on sickness absence, an explanation for why we find essentially no effects on long-term
health outcomes could be that sickness absences have been used as a preventive measure
to avoid severe illness in the future.
not update the diagnoses later when the absence is expanded.
30The result on hypertension is robust to a range of specifications, but not to correcting for multiple
hypothesis testing, which means that this result needs to be interpreted with caution.
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Figure 1: Home Based Care – Coverage Rates
Note: Home based care is defined as care at home or in adapted facilities. In the first two fig-
ures, treatment is defined as falling below the median home based care coverage rate in the pre-
reform period, defined as 1993-1996. The dotted vertical lines represent the reform year 1998,
and the year 2001. The period 1998-2000 represents the phase-in period. Municipalities with
pre-reform home care coverage rates falling below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are ex-
cluded. The top left figure graphs the fraction of the 80+ population using home based care
in treated municipalities (solid line) and control municipalities (dashed line) over the period 1993-
2005. The top right figure shows the differences per year in the fraction of the 80+ population
using home based care in treated vs. control municipalities. The lower figure graphs the ab-
solute change in coverage rates against the pre-reform coverage rates. In this figure, the dotted
vertical lines indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles. Municipality list from the year 2000 (N=435).
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Figure 2: Probability of a Sickness Absence, 1995-2003
Note: The graphs show the probability of a sickness absence spell (cond. on employment), and spells realted to specific diagnoses for daughters with no siblings and with only
one living parent at least 80 years old. Municipalities are split into treatment and control groups based on whether they fall below or above the median home based care coverage
rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-1996. The vertical lines represent the reform year 1998, and the year 2001. The period 1998-2000 represents the phase-in period.
Municipalities with pre-reform home care coverage rates falling below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are excluded. Municipality list from the year 2000 (N=435).
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Figure 3: Long-Term Health Outcomes:
Utilization of Primary Health Care Services
Note: The graphs show the probability of a primary care consultation and consultations related to a specific diagnosis
(lagged by 11 years) for daughters with no siblings and with only one living parent at least 80 years old. Municipali-
ties are split into treatment and control groups based on whether they fall below or above the median home based care
coverage rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-1996. The vertical lines represent the reform year 1998, and the
year 2001. The period 1998-2000 represents the phase-in period. Municipalities with pre-reform home care coverage
rates falling below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are excluded. Municipality list from the year 2000 (N=435).47
Tables
Table 1: Post-Reform Growth in Home Care Coverage Rates
Abs change in home care cov. rates
(post - pre)
(1) (2)
(-) Homecare coverage rate, pop. 80+ (1993-1997)
(scaled by 10) 0.068*** 0.078***
(0.0070) (0.0042)
(-) Inst. based care coverage rate, pop. 80+ (1993-1997)
(scaled by 10) 0.001 0.003
(0.0075) (0.0069)
Share of pop 67yrs+ 0.070 0.032
(0.1999) (0.2013)
Share of pop 80yrs+ -0.056 0.040
(0.5544) (0.5572)
Munic. unrestricted budget per capita 0.000 -0.000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Exclude extremes Yes No
Observations 347 435
Note: The (-) in front of homebased and institution based care means that these controls enter with
negative values. Hence, the coefficients for these controls are interpreted as, e.g. in col. 2, that a
10 percentage points lower home care coverage rate in the pre-reform period is related to a 7.8 per-
cent increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. The pre-reform period
is defined as 1993-1996, while the post-reform period is defined as 2001-2003 (we define the period
1998-2000 as a phase-in period). Extremes are defined as municipalities with pre-reform home care
coverage rates falling below the 10th or above the 90th percentiles in the pre-reform homecare cov-
erage distribution. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2: Main Results: Sickness Absence – Specific Diagnosis Categories
Absence with specific diagnosis:
Sickness absence Musculoskeletal Psychological All other Unspecified
at all diag. diag. diag. diag.
Phasein ITT -0.023** -0.016* -0.004 -0.000 -0.004
(0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0050)
Post ITT -0.030** -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.001
(0.0146) (0.0090) (0.0040) (0.0073) (0.0048)
Mean [.214] [.0924] [.0295] [.0685] [.0368]
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.096 0.028 0.036 0.857 0.920
Obs. 57753 57753 57753 57753 57753
Note: Indicators for the Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003) period are interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by
10. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8
percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Romano-Wolf p-value relates to the Post ITT coefficient, and
is obtained using the Romano-Wolf stepwise procedure to correct for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3: Main Results: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Prim. care consultations: Specific diagnoses (groups):
Hyper- Life
Prob. No. MSD Psych. Cardio. Depr tension style
Phasein ITT 0.004 -0.037 0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.002 -0.015* 0.008
(0.0098) (0.0940) (0.0099) (0.0089) (0.0108) (0.0050) (0.0082) (0.0060)
Post ITT 0.024** 0.058 0.017 0.009 -0.014 0.005 -0.020** 0.001
(0.0110) (0.1019) (0.0121) (0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0055) (0.0100) (0.0066)
Mean [.797] [3.62] [.417] [.177] [.296] [.0478] [.19] [.0649]
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.235 0.924 0.745 0.892 0.745 0.892 0.235 0.924
Obs. 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963
Note: Health outcomes are lagged by 11 years. Indicators for the Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003) period are interacted with the negative
pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate,
which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform)
in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Romano-Wolf p-value relates
to the Post ITT coefficient, and is obtained using the Romano-Wolf stepwise procedure to correct for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity by Education: Sickness Absence – Main Categories
Prob. of sickness absence
At Rest Unspecified
all MSD Psych category diag.
Post ITT -0.031** -0.027*** -0.010** -0.004 -0.001
(0.0147) (0.0090) (0.0040) (0.0074) (0.0048)
post * low educ -0.002 0.004 -0.003** -0.000 -0.001
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Joint sign. p-value .0953 .00442 .00442 .831 .766
Obs. 57531 57531 57531 57531 57531
Note: In the first row an indicator for Post (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled
by 10. The second row shows the coefficients where we interact Post with the negative pre-reform coverage and an in-
dicator for low education, defined as education below 10 years. An interaction with the phase-in period (1999-2000) is
included, but not shown in the table. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower
pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the
pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 5: Heterogeneity by Education: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Prim care consultations: Specific diagnoses (groups):
Hyper- Life
Prob. No. MSD Psych Cardio. Depr. tension style
Post ITT 0.078 0.024** 0.018 0.009 -0.015 0.005 -0.020** -0.000
(0.1012) (0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0056) (0.0099) (0.0067)
post * low educ -0.080** 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.003** -0.002 0.002
(0.0379) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0021)
Joint sign. p-value .105 .0784 .286 .433 .459 .0614 .112 .561
Obs. 73647 73647 73647 73647 73647 73647 73647 73647
Note: In the first row an indicator for Post (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled
by 10. The second row shows the coefficients where we interact Post with the negative pre-reform coverage and an in-
dicator for low education, defined as education below 10 years. An interaction with the phase-in period (1999-2000) is
included, but not shown in the table. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower
pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the
pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Regional Variation in Pre-Reform Coverage Rates
Note: The map shows variation in pre-reform home care coverage rates across municipalities.
Municipalities not in the preferred sample are those with pre-reform home care coverage rates
falling below the 10th or above the 90th percentiles of the pre-reform coverage distribution.
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Table A1: Municipality Characteristics (1997 numbers)
Municipalities with pre-reform home based care coverage:
Below median Above median
Total population 12892 8849
(39619) (19397)
Share of pop 67yrs+ .159 .157
(.0334) (.0368)
Share of pop 80yrs+ .0483 .0486
(.0146) (.0156)
Share of males 16+ with compulsory schooling .374 .386
(.0764) (.0789)
Share of females 16+ with compulsory schooling .424 .435
(.0732) (.079)
Share of males 16+ with high school .47 .473
(.0507) (.0531)
Share of females 16+ with high school .413 .413
(.0462) (.0542)
Share of males 16+ with university degree .11 .103
(.0345) (.0323)
Share of females 16+ with university degree .14 .133
(.0367) (.0341)
Share of working age pop. employed 96.3 96.1
(1.9) (1.9)
Private income (100,000 NOK) 6967 5674
(5631) (5198)
Munic. unrestricted budget per capita 22641 23233
(7266) (6356)
Centrality index 3.94 3.58
(2.51) (2.54)
Population density 4.29 3.92
(2.75) (2.87)
Home based care coverage rate (pop. 80+) .362 .411
(.0661) (.0892)
- Pre reform coverage rate (1993-1997) .373 .459
(.0257) (.0334)
- Change from pre to post .00893 -.0478
(.0654) (.0649)
Inst. care coverage rate (pop. 80+) .193 .192
(.0659) (.0632)
- Pre reform coverage rate (1993-1997) .214 .205
(.0652) (.0588)
- Change from pre to post -.0422 -.0382
(.0415) (.0521)
Observations 173 174
Note: The table shows mean values and standard deviations of municipality characteristics measures in 1997
when no other year is specified. Municipalities are divided into groups based on whether they fall below or
above the median home based care coverage rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-1996. Municipali-
ties with pre-reform home care coverage rates falling below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are excluded.
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Table A2: ICPC-02 Classification
Diagnosis ICPC-2 Code ICPC-02 Titles
Musculoskeletal (MSD) Any code with prefix L Chapter L: Musculoskeletal
Psychological Any code with prefix P Chapter P: Psychological
Cardiovascular Any code with prefix K Chapter K: Cardiovascular
Depression P03 Feeling Depressed
P73 Depressive Disorder
Hypertension K85 Elevated blood pressure
K86 Hypertension uncomplicated
K87 Hypertension complicated
Life style T07 Weight gain
related diseases T82 Obesity
T83 Overweight
T90 Diabetes non-insulin dependent
P15 Chronic alcohol abuse




Note: The table shows the ICD-02 codes used to classify sickness absence spells
related to specific diagnoses, and to construct the long-term health outcomes.
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Figure A2: Illustration of the Long-Term Outcomes Design
Note: The figure is an illustration of how our long-term health outcomes are measured. In each
year in the period 1995-2003 our sample entails daughters with no siblings who have only one
living parent at least 80 years old in the particular year. Long-term health outcomes are mea-
sured 11 years later, e.g. for the 1995 sample, long-term outcomes are measured in 2006.
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Figure A3: Other Municipality Characteristics
Note: The figures show the development in coverage rates in institution based care, and
in the fraction of population aged 80 and above. Institution based care is defined as care
in nursing homes. Treatment is defined as falling below the median home based care cov-
erage rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-1996. The dotted vertical lines repre-
sent the reform year 1998, and the year 2001. The period 1998-2000 represents the phase-
in period. Municipalities with pre-reform home care coverage rates falling below the 10th
and above the 90th percentiles are excluded. Municipality list from the year 2000 (N=435).
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Table A3: Additional Results on Sickness Absence – Selected Diagnosis Categories
Sickness absence (selected diagnoses):
P01-P29 P70-P99 P03;P76 L01-L29. L83-L95;L98;L99 L72-L81;L96
Psych. symptoms Psych. diag. Depression MSD symptoms MSD diag. MSD injury
Phasein ITT -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007**
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0030)
Post ITT -0.006** -0.006** -0.005* -0.007* -0.014* -0.007**
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0074) (0.0033)
Mean [.00847] [.0215] [.0223] [.019] [.0615] [.0145]
Obs. 57753 57753 57753 57753 57753 57753
Note: The table show estimated effects of expanding formal eldercare on sickness absence spells related to diagnoses broken down to more specific categories than in the main
results. Indicators for the Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003) period are interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates are in-
terpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from
the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A4: Additional Long-Term Outcomes
Work, disability, and mortality
Note: The graphs show results on long-term outcomes for daughters with no siblings and with only
one living parent at least 80 years old. Treatment is defined as falling below the median home
based care coverage rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-1997. The vertical line repre-
sent the reform year 1998. Municipalities with pre-reform home care coverage rates falling below
the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are excluded. Municipality list from year 2000 (N=435).
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Table A4: Additional Long-Term Outcomes – Employment, Disability, and
Mortality
Probability of:
Dying Disability insurance Employment Full time employment
Phasein ITT -0.007 -0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.0049) (0.0104) (0.0081) (0.0091)
Post ITT -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001
(0.0067) (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0122)
Mean [.0539] [.337] [.458] [.262]
Obs. 78225 73963 73963 73963
Note: The table show estimated effects of expanding formal eldercare on long-term labor market outcomes. The out-
comes are lagged by 11 years. Indicators for the Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003) period are interacted
with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10
percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the
coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clus-
tered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A5: Specification Checks: Sickness Absence - Main Diagnosis Categories
Daughters, no siblings
Baseline Excl. large cities Excl. rural munic. Drop 1997 Incl. 1997 as post Split at median coverage
Sickness absence at all -0.030** -0.024 -0.036** -0.033* -0.030** -0.031***
(0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0146) (0.0110)
Related Diagnoses:
Musculoskeletal -0.025*** -0.021** -0.027*** -0.026** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0090) (0.0064)
Psychological -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.008**
(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0037)
All other diagnoses -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0064)
No specified diagnosis -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0038)
Obs. 57753 43292 52770 51878 57753 57753
Note: Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded
in this table. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points
increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis,
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A6: Specification Checks: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Daughters, no siblings
Baseline Excl. large cities Excl. rural munic. Drop 1997 Incl. 1997 as post Split at median coverage
Primary health care cons.:
Prob. of cons. 0.024** 0.029** 0.023* 0.029** 0.024** 0.012
(0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0101)
No. of cons. 0.058 0.116 0.028 0.065 0.058 -0.040
(0.1019) (0.1032) (0.1084) (0.1116) (0.1019) (0.0973)
Prim. health care cons. related to specific diagnosis groups:
MSD 0.017 0.023* 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.002
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0121) (0.0110)
Psych. 0.009 0.013 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.006
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.0096)
Cardiovascular -0.014 -0.014 -0.018 -0.020 -0.014 -0.013
(0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0105)
Depression 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.004
(0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0049)
Hypertension -0.020** -0.022** -0.021** -0.025** -0.020** -0.016*
(0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0084)
Life style related 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.004
(0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0054)
Obs. 73963 56474 67372 66427 73963 73963
Note: Health outcomes are lagged by 11 years. Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates
of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded in this table. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which
corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A7: Alternative Samples: Sickness Absence – Main Categories
Daughters Sons
No siblings All No siblings




Musculoskeletal -0.025*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.0090) (0.0046) (0.0058)
[.0924] [.0935] [.0643]
Psychological -0.011*** -0.002 0.001
(0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0031)
[.0295] [.0287] [.0162]
All other diagnoses -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(0.0073) (0.0030) (0.0054)
[.0685] [.0684] [.0538]
No specified diagnosis -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.0048) (0.0022) (0.0034)
[.0368] [.0356] [.027]
Obs. 57753 290863 89576
Note: Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10.
The estimates of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded in this table. The estimates are interpreted as the ef-
fect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage
points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and
standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A8: Alternative Samples: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Daughters Sons
No siblings All No siblings
Primary health care cons.:
Prob. of cons. 0.024** 0.013* -0.002
(0.0110) (0.0078) (0.0104)
[.797] [.793] [.715]
Number of cons. 0.058 0.032 -0.060
(0.1019) (0.0534) (0.1103)
[3.62] [3.51] [3.06]
Prim. health care cons. related to specific diagnosis groups:
MSD 0.017 0.011* -0.003
(0.0121) (0.0057) (0.0095)
[.417] [.412] [.297]
Psych. 0.009 0.001 0.000
(0.0106) (0.0050) (0.0071)
[.177] [.169] [.111]
Cardiovascular -0.014 -0.002 -0.012
(0.0118) (0.0060) (0.0112)
[.296] [.283] [.343]
Depression 0.005 0.002 -0.000
(0.0055) (0.0028) (0.0033)
[.0478] [.047] [.0273]
Hypertension -0.020** -0.011** -0.005
(0.0100) (0.0048) (0.0089)
[.19] [.177] [.187]
Life style related 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.0066) (0.0027) (0.0061)
[.0649] [.0586] [.0877]
Obs. 73963 357934 97186
Note: Health outcomes are lagged by 11 years. Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the nega-
tive pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded in this table.
The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which
corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period.
Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A9: Placebos: Sickness Absence – Main Categories
Daughters, no siblings
No living parents Younger parents










All other diagnoses -0.010 0.014
(0.0079) (0.0210)
[.0777] [.0797]




Note: Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10.
The estimates of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded in this table. The estimates are interpreted as the ef-
fect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage
points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and
standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A10: Placebos: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Daughters, no siblings
No living parents Younger parents
Primary health care cons.:
Prob. of cons. 0.006 -0.033
(0.0114) (0.0346)
[.809] [.781]
Number of cons. 0.044 -0.122
(0.1113) (0.3896)
[3.93] [3.64]




















Note: Health outcomes are lagged by 11 years. Indicator for the Post period (2001-2003) is interacted with the nega-
tive pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates of the effect in the Phase-in period is excluded in this table.
The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which
corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period.
Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A11: No Intermediate Period: Sickness Absence – Main Categories
Absence with specific diagnosis:
Sickness absence Musculoskeletal Psychological All other Unspecified
at all diag. diag. diag. diag.
Post ITT -0.027** -0.021*** -0.007** -0.002 -0.002
(0.0113) (0.0071) (0.0034) (0.0063) (0.0042)
Mean [.214] [.0924] [.0295] [.0685] [.0368]
Obs. 57753 57753 57753 57753 57753
Note: Post covers the entire post-reform period, 1998-2003, and is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of
having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform
period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table A12: No Intermediate Period: Long-Term Health Outcomes
Prim. care consultations: Specific diagnoses (groups):
Hyper- Life
Prob. No. MSD Psych. Cardio. Depr tension style
Post ITT 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.018** 0.005
(0.0098) (0.0921) (0.0098) (0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0048) (0.0081) (0.0057)
Mean [.797] [3.62] [.417] [.177] [.296] [.0478] [.19] [.0649]
Obs. 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963 73963
Note: Health outcomes are lagged by 11 years. Post covers the entire post-reform period, 1998-2003, and is interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10.
The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the
coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A13: Alternative Lags: Long-Term Health Outcomes – Primary Health Care Services
Prim. care consultations: Specific diagnoses (groups):
Hyper- Life
Prob. No. MSD Psych. Cardio. Depr tension style
Phasein ITT 0.013 -0.033 0.002 -0.010 -0.015 0.001 -0.007 0.002
(0.0100) (0.0884) (0.0105) (0.0094) (0.0121) (0.0051) (0.0094) (0.0059)
Post ITT 0.027** 0.029 0.016 0.007 -0.019 0.008 -0.017* -0.001
(0.0120) (0.1112) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0056) (0.0101) (0.0070)
Mean [.791] [3.56] [.41] [.174] [.279] [.0477] [.179] [.0644]
Obs. 77324 77324 77324 77324 77324 77324 77324 77324
Note: The table show estimated effects on long-term health outcomes when outcomes are lagged by 10 years (we lag by 11 years in the main specification). Indicators for the
Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003) period are interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. The estimates are interpreted as the effect of
having a 10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform
period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A5: Replication Results on Sickness Absence (16 days+)
Note: The graph shows the replication of the sickness absence result for daughters with no siblings
and with only one living parent at least 80 years old from Løken et al. (2017). Treatment is defined
as falling below the median home based care coverage rate in the pre-reform period, defined as 1993-
1996. The vertical lines represent the reform year 1998, and the year 2001. The period 1998-2001
represents the expansion period. Municipalities with pre-reform home care coverage rates falling be-
low the 10th and above the 90th percentiles are excluded. Municipality list from year 2000 (N=435).
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Table A14: Replication Results on Sickness Absence (16 days+)
Probability of Probability of Number of
sickness absence sickness absence sick days
(cond. on work) (cond. on work)
Main sample
Daughters, no siblings
Phasein ITT -0.011 -0.020 -2.609
(0.0101) (0.0128) (1.8557)
Post ITT -0.024** -0.028** -2.695
(0.0105) (0.0139) (2.0629)
[.146] [.194] [20.4]
Obs. 101785 70948 70948
Note: Sickness absence from the FD-trygd register. Indicators for the Phase-in (1998-2000) and the Post (2001-2003)
period are interacted with the negative pre-reform coverage rate, scaled by 10. Note that the period indicators are
called "short-term" and "long-term" in Løken et al. (2017). The estimates are interpreted as the effect of having a
10 percentage points lower pre-reform coverage rate, which corresponds to having a 7.8 percentage points increase in
the coverage rate from the pre- to the post-reform period. Mean values (pre-reform) in brackets and standard errors
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1 Introduction
With increasing life expectancy, the number of retired individuals as a share of the total
population is rising in most OECD countries. This has led to concerns about the fiscal
sustainability of public pension systems, and to policy initiatives that aim to prolong
working lives and increase retirement age. An important issue that seems to be over-
looked in policy debates over these reforms is the impact that prolonged working lives
has on health, and especially if there are heterogeneous retirement effects by socioeco-
nomic status (SES).
Findings in the empirical literature regarding the health effects of retirement are
mixed. Some studies report positive effects (Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Eibich, 2015),
whereas others report negative effects (Behncke, 2012; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2017) or
no effects (Hernæs et al., 2013; Heller-Sahlgren, 2017). Although some studies highlight
the importance of (SES) in these health effects (Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Eibich, 2015),
there is limited evidence from formal tests assessing whether effects differ by SES. Another
limitation in the literature is that most studies assess retirement effects in the early 60s,
an age threshold that is substantially lower than proposed policies to postpone retirement
toward age 70. Finally, most studies rely on survey data or administrative records (of
sub-samples of the population), which often imply subjectivity in the health outcomes or
small sample issues.
In this paper, we investigate the health effects of retirement across socioeconomic
status and gender in Norway by applying both survey and register data, where the latter
cover the entire population. We assess the health effects of retirement at age 67, which
was the statutory retirement age in 2007. This is a higher age threshold than what
has previously been studied. To control for individuals self-selecting into retirement, we
exploit that the statutory retirement age causes a discontinuous change in the likelihood
of retiring at the exact timing of eligibility. This implies a local randomization around the
retirement eligibility age threshold, and makes a regression discontinuity (RD) framework
suitable. RD entails comparing the health outcomes for those right above the statutory
retirement age threshold (i.e. the treatment group) to those right below (i.e. the control
group). This allows for identification of the causal short-term effects of retirement on
health.
Most studies in this field rely on survey data with the well-known limitations related
to non-response and recall bias. Furthermore, while measures of subjective health pro-
vide important insights into how individuals experience and rate their own health, such
measures have been criticized for being contextual, and can suffer from justification bias
(see e.g. McGarry (2004) for a thorough discussion). Another possible concern is that
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survey data of older adults is especially prone to health related selection, as poor health
correlates with non-response.
The Norwegian register data is attractive with respect to overcoming some of these
concerns. In particular, the register data covers the entire population and contain health
records that can be considered objective. Still, measures of health from public registers are
often extreme outcomes in the sense that they measure very poor health, such as mortality
and acute hospital admissions, and hence unsuited for studying moderate health effects.
In addition to records of mortality and acute hospital admissions from public registers, we
include a composite measurement of self-assessed health from a representative sample of
Norwegian older adults (The NorLAG Panel Survey (Slagsvold et al., 2012). This measure
is the physical component of the short form-12 (SF-12) health survey (see (Ware Jr et al.,
1996). We assess both the overall physical score and the specific components that goes
into the SF-12.
We believe that our health measures, collectively, will provide important insight into
the multidimensional effects of retirement on health. Moreover, both data sources (the
register data and the NorLAG data) contain exact birth month and retirement date from
public registers, ruling out recollection bias. Finally, having monthly records allows for a
more precise estimation of the effects of retirement on health, as it enables a more local
estimation around the timing of retirement compared to analyses using data on the year
level.1
Socioeconomic status is important in the analysis of health effects of retirement be-
cause it determines the kind of work situation an individual retires from. Higher ed-
ucation and white collar jobs are often less physically demanding and associated with
greater autonomy and control over the work situation, compared to low SES jobs (Case
and Deaton, 2005; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012). Moreover, Case and Deaton (2005)
argue that manual labor jobs, associated with low education and low income, are more
"wear and tear" types of jobs, in which health deteriorates at a more rapid pace than for
individuals in "non-manual" professions.
According to the (Grossman, 1972) model of health demand, individuals with low
education or low financial capital (low SES) will have to rely more heavily on their
health as an input in the labor market, compared to individuals with higher SES, as the
different sources of capital are substitutes in the labor market. This is typically manifested
through strenuous manual labor for the low SES groups. Moreover, individuals with
higher education are assumed to be more efficient in promoting their own health. In
sum, the two mechanisms make it more costly for low SES groups to continue working.
1See Dong (2015) and Lee and Card (2008) for a discussion of why age in years might yield inconsistent
results unless properly accounted for.
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Retirement can therefore be seen as a mechanism that levels health inequalities between
SES groups. As SES can be an important factor in analyses of retirement and health, we
systematically assess how the health effects differ by socioeconomic status.
The RD application in this study identifies the short term health effects of retirement.
On the one hand, we can expect to see short term effects on health as the relief from
strenuous physical work or the relief from working in a stressful environment is an instan-
taneous change of circumstance. On the other hand, retirement may lead to a reduced
sense of purpose before new routines has been developed (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010).
Our results show that retirement yields a sizeable and positive effect on physical
health. This effect is especially strong for the low SES group, whereas we find no effects
for the high SES group. We find no effects on mortality or acute hospitalizations in
general. However, for the low SES group, we find that retirement leads to a reduction
in the likelihood of acute hospitalizations. Our results show that SES is important when
studying the effect of retirement on health, but we find no gender differences. Moreover,
we find that the reason why retirement leads to better physical health is due to reduced
pain and a lower likelihood of reporting that physical health is a limitation in completing
both “daily” tasks and “specific tasks profoundly”. The results for physical health and
mortality are robust to a wide range of robustness and specification checks, whereas the
results for hospital admissions are less robust, and must therefore be interpreted with
some caution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of previous research and
describes the institutional structure of the Norwegian pension system. Section 4 describes
our empirical strategy. In Section 3, we present the data, outcome variables, and some
basic summary statistics. Our main results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Earlier Literature and Institutional Setting
Our paper is related to a growing body of economic research about the effect of retirement
on health. Given the important aspect of this issue and the amount of literature on
the topic, there is a surprising lack of consensus across studies. One reason for this
is that a large fraction of the existing evidence reports correlations rather than well-
identified causal effects. Lately, there has been an increasing amount of well-identified
studies, most of which apply exogenous variation in the retirement eligibility as sources
of identification. As the majority of these studies apply survey data or administrative
records for subsamples of the population, we contribute to the literature by providing
objective health outcomes for the entire Norwegian population.
One of the most cited related studies is Coe and Zamarro (2011). They study the ex-
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tent to which retirement affects measures of self-reported health and a composite health
index across several European countries using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE) data. They find that retirement reduces the likelihood of
reporting bad self-rated health and leads to an improvement in a composite measure of
subjective health.
From the US setting, Neuman (2008) uses age-specific retirement incentives as in-
struments for retirement. Applying data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
he provides evidence of retirement being both preserving and improving for self-rated
health. He argues that since retirement removes the time constraint induced by labor
market participation, more time can be devoted to activities that both preserve and
enhance individuals’ health. This is in line with Grossman’s model of health demand,
where it can be shown that especially time-intensive workouts may be more attractive
after retirement, when the opportunity cost of participating in such activities drops.
Insler (2014) uses data from HRS, and apply workers’ self- reported probabilities of
working past ages 62 and 65 as instruments. He finds that retirees experience positive
effects on a health index, which consists of both objective and subjective measures of
health. Moreover, he finds that retirees tend to reduce smoking and participate more in
health-enhancing activities.
However, not all studies have shown retirement to have such a positive impact. Using
data from the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA), Behncke (2012) reports that
retirement actually increases the risk of being diagnosed with a cardiovascular disease2
and cancer. Also contradictory to the findings of the aforementioned studies, she finds
that retirement increases the probability of reporting poor health, and the risk of being
diagnosed with a chronic condition.
Bound and Waidmann (2007) apply measures of self-assessed and objective health
from the ELSA study, and find that retirement leads to a small, but significant positive
effect on physical health for men. Physical health entails self-assessed health, physical
functioning and biomarkers. Moreover, they show that these results are highly sensitive
to job characteristics and differences in socioeconomic status. As these differences ar-
guably play an important role in determining the effect of retirement on health, there has
recently been a growing interest in tackling these heterogeneity issues. To the best of our
knowledge, only a small number of studies have investigated the presence of heterogeneity
across SES or gender in the effects of retirement on health.
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) stress the importance of heterogeneity in the health
effect of retirement, and argue that the previous literature have failed to detect the
2Retirement is also found to have an impact on increased obesity (Godard, 2016; Rohwedder and
Willis, 2010).
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potential heterogeneity. Using the SHARE data, they find that for people working in
more physically demanding jobs, retirement has an immediate beneficial effect on both
a health index of self-reported measures and cognition. For the rest of the workforce,
however, retirement has negative long-term effects on health and cognition.
In the paper closest to our study, Eibich (2015) applies a regression discontinuity
framework, to study the effect of retirement on several subjective measures of health in
Germany. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of effect-heterogeneity by socioe-
conomic status. Whereas he uncovered no effect of retirement on health for individuals
with higher education, individuals who retire from strenuous jobs seem to experience a
large and positive change in physical health.
From the Norwegian setting, Hernæs et al. (2013) employ a stepwise introduction of
early retirement ages in Norway in the 1990s as instruments to assess whether retirement
age matters for mortality. They find no relationship between lowering early retirement
age and mortality up through age 77.3 Moreover, they question whether retirement has
a causal impact on mortality.
Based on the relevant literature, it is unclear to what extent and in what direction re-
tirement affects health. Previous findings are characterized by differences in methodology,
be it an instrumental variable approach, regression discontinuity approach, or difference-
in-difference approach. Another aspect of the literature is the different outcomes of
health. While self-rated physical health often is positively associated with retirement,
others document a decline in mental health and cognitive abilities.
2.1 Institutional Setting in Norway
This section provides background information on the institutional setting in Norway in
2007/2008.4 We start with a brief description of the pension system, as this is the main
focus of our study. An individual can start claiming retirement pension the first month
after reaching the statutory retirement age of 67, and is, in our analysis, considered retired
once this claim is made. The main provider of retirement pension is the mandatory public
National Insurance System (NIS). This is a pay-as-you-go defined benefit system, and all
individuals with a minimum number of years of residence are covered. Once retired, the
pension consists of a mix between fixed earnings-independent basic pension and pension
contributions based on previous labor market income. Replacement rates from annual
earnings have been found to be around 72% on average (Røed and Haugen, 2003).
In theory, the statutory retirement age did not force individuals to retire. However,
3Early retirement in Norway was introduced at age 65, but later reduced in a stepwise matter to age
62. The authors exploits this stepwise reduction as a source of exogenous variation.
4The pension system was reformed in 2011, but none of the new rules was in place throughout our
study-period.
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most companies had contracted retirement upon reaching the statutory retirement, and
the norm was that people retired once they hit this age threshold. Moreover, for most of
the workforce there was little economic incentive to prolong working life once eligible for
old age pension. There was a full earnings test in place for individuals aged between 67
and 69 for earnings above 2 basic amounts,5 resulting in a 40% reduction of the old age
pension for each dollar earned.6
Besides the statutory retirement age, there are two other commonly-used exit routes
from the labor market: disability insurance (DI) and the Early Retirement Program
(ER). These are early exits routes that are temporarily available until the statutory
retirement age. Eligibility for DI is based on health status and must be certified by a
physician based on a permanent reduced ability to work. DI can also be graded in a
way that allows individuals to combine work and DI. ER was available for all public and
about half of private sector workers from age 62.7 At 67, recipients of DI and ER are
automatically transferred to retirement pension.
Table 1 summarizes the labor market status for individuals aged 56-79 in 2007. This
table shows the fraction of individuals who are either working, on ER, DI, or claiming
retirement pensions. The shares do not summarize to unity because it is possible for the
same individual to be in two states, e.g. by combining partial uptake of DI and working.
Table 1 shows two important preconditions for our empirical analysis: labor market
participation rate remains relatively high for older workers in Norway, and most individ-
uals start claiming pensions as soon as they reach the age of 67. Provided the strong link
between retirement pension uptake and exit from employment, we argue that claiming
retirement pension in practice means withdrawing from the labor market. Strictly speak-
ing, in this analysis, we are estimating the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects of offering
retirement pension at age 67. Because uptake of pension in practice means withdrawal
from the workforce for the majority of the population, we assume that the health effects
to a large degree will stem from the relief from work related tasks. We refer to claiming
retirement pension as retirement in the remainder of this article.
3 Data
3.1 Data
We use data from two separate sources in our analysis. The first is a survey carried out
on a representative sample of Norwegian older adults, and the second is comprised of
administrative health and population registers covering the entire population. Unfortu-
5One basic amount is the lowest earnings required to accrue pension points.
6This was lifted in 2008 for 67 year-olds.
7See Hernæs et al. (2013) or Kudrna (2017) for more details about the ER system.
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nately, individuals from the two sources cannot be connected, as the first data source has
been anonymized.
The NorLAG Survey Data
The first datasource is a survey carried out on a representative sample of Norwegian
older adults, the Norwegian Study on Life-Course, Aging and Generation (NorLAG)
panel study. 8 The data was collected in 2002 and 2007. NorLAG contains individual
data on a range of health outcomes, as well as information about socioeconomic status.
Data collection was carried out by Statistics Norway with computer-assisted telephone
interviews (CATI).
All respondents to the survey are merged with administrative registers for the period
2002-2012. The registers contain information on year and month of birth and of retire-
ment. Furthermore, the registers contain various sociodemographic background informa-
tion such as labor income, social insurance take-up, and educational attainment. We are
thus able to construct detailed information for each individual regarding attachment to
the labor market, retirement status and social security take-up, enabling identification of
the exact timing of retirement, and whether the individual retired directly from the labor
force or transitioned from disability insurance or other welfare programs.
Currently, the panel consists of two waves. For the main analyses, we use the second
wave as this contains a larger sample than the first wave.9 However, for some specifications
in the sensitivity analysis, we rely on data from the first wave to obtain information about
past labor market performance. This is outlined in more detail in Section 3.2.
Our measure of health from the NorLAG data is a composite measure of physical
health, namely the physical component of the Short Form 12 (SF12) scale (Ware Jr
et al., 1996). Self-rated health (SRH) is one of the components that go into the SF12.
Other factors are measures of the degree to which an individual is able to perform tasks
like vacuuming, moving a table or climbing stairs, whether there are certain tasks that
could not be performed due to health limitations, or whether pain limits daily activities.
The score is standardized on a scale from 0-100 with a mean of 50 and standard deviation
of 10 using the US population as a reference. SF12 has been found to be a strong predictor
of hospitalization, future health care expenditures, and mortality (see e.g. Ware Jr et al.
(1996); DeSalvo et al. (2009); Lacson et al. (2010). Occupational status in the NorLAG
data is coded in accordance with the ISCO-88 scale. This has been re-coded into two
occupational groups: manual and professional workers, following the classical division
8See Slagsvold et al. (2012) for a thorough description.
9The first wave contains 5,559 observations (response rate 67%), whereas the second wave contains
15,149 observations (response rate 60%).
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into blue and white collar workers of higher and lower skills.10 Professional workers are
defined as high skilled white collar workers, the term "manual workers" refers to three
categories: high and low skilled blue collar workers and low skilled white collar workers.
We apply this categorization of manual workers, because the latter three groups are more
similar based on observable characteristics.
Register Data
Our second data source is comprised of administrative registers that covers the entire
Norwegian population. All residents are assigned to a unique personal identification
number, which enables them to link information from various administrative registers,
such as health registers, income and social insurance registers, and population registers.
These registers contain information on year and month of birth, death and retirement,
as well as educational attainment, income, and social security uptake.
We apply two measures of health from the register data. The first is a binary indicator
of whether a person has been acutely hospitalized in a particular month. This information
comes from the national patient register (NPR), which contains records of all inpatient
and outpatient stays at Norwegian hospitals from 2008 through 2014. Admissions are
coded by whether the hospitalization is a result of a planned or unplanned admission. The
latter can be thought of as acute in the sense that treatment has been deemed necessary,
typically as a result of an accident, stroke, or severe heart condition.11 The second health
outcome is a binary indicator of whether a person passed away in a particular month. This
information comes from the Norwegian cause-of-death registry, and contains all recorded
deaths in Norway from 1992 through 2014. Both outcomes thus yield the likelihood of
the particular outcome at a specific age-in-month.
Importantly, these measures of health are not correlated with the time cost to consult
medical expertise. As individuals have more time at their disposal after retirement, the
opportunity cost of seeking medical help is reduced once retired compared to when work-
ing. It is therefore likely that the prevalence of a diagnosis or a medical treatment that is
not acute increases after retirement, when the opportunity cost of seeing a physician has
fallen. Applying a health outcome that is correlated with the opportunity cost of medical
consultations can therefore erroneously lead to the conclusion that retirement caused the
increased prevalence of the health outcome.
10Coded according to NACE Rev.1.1.
11All admissions are coded in accordance with the International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems, ICD-10, (see WHO (1992)).
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3.2 Sample Selection
We restrict our attention to individuals aged 56-79 in 2007 and 2008 in both data-sources.
From the administrative records, we use data from 2008.12 This leaves 4,619 individuals
in the NorLAG sample and 892,908 individuals in the register sample. The register data
in our analysis is a panel data set, with monthly records of hospitalization, mortality,
retirement, and age in months. As such, month by month, the treatment variable is
determined according to age in months exceeding the retirement age threshold. Including
fixed effects is unnecessary for identification in an RD design. Moreover, as the source
of identification is a comparison between those just below and just above the threshold,
which can be carried out with a single cross-section, imposing a specific dynamic structure
introduces more restrictions without any gain in identification (see Lee and Lemieux
(2010)). We therefore treat the sample from the register panel data as repeated cross-
sections and pool all months together, treating each observation as an individual. This
also makes the register data more comparable to the NorLAG data.
In order to maintain the intention to treat in the RD design and to ensure that we
have enough data for inference, we place no further restrictions on the sample for the
main analysis. This means that our analytical sample will include individuals on DI or
individuals who are not working for other reasons. Individuals on DI are automatically
classified as retired once they hit the age threshold. In theory, we should expect no
retirement effects for this group, as their work status remains unchanged when they
retire. This would bias our results towards zero. However, the health outcomes in the
survey data can suffer from justification bias. Being on disability insurance might make
an individual, consciously or subconsciously, under-report their health in order to justify
their status as disabled. The need for this justification is no longer present once they are
transferred to retirement pension. In this case, the estimates would be biased upwards
and we might worry that the positive effect on health was driven by these individuals.
As a sensitivity analysis, we therefore run the whole analysis including only individuals
who were gainfully employed or working until retirement.
Ideally, we want to compare individuals working up to retirement age to individuals
who retired from working. In the NorLAG data, this is done by adjusting the sample by
two rules. The first rule implies including only individuals who had income from labor the
previous year in the analysis; the second rule implies including only individuals who have
stated that they are working or were working before they became retired. Some caveats
are worth mentioning: the first rule results in a substantial reduction in the sample size,
as we need to use the balanced panel from both waves of the NorLAG study to identify
12This is the earliest year in which data on hospitalizations are available.
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labor income in 2006. A potential concern with the second rule is that the formulation
of the question to the working and retired part of the population differs slightly in the
NorLAG data. To maintain continuity across the retirement threshold, it is crucial that
we apply exactly the same selection rule on either side of the threshold when identifying
the sub-samples for the sensitivity analyses. In the register data, we define individuals
as working if they currently have positive income or if they had positive income before
retirement. We find that these sensitivity analyses does not alter our conclusions.13
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the sample from both the NorLAG data and the
register data. These are men and women aged 56-79 in 2007 and 2008 respectively.
The first two columns are summary statistics for the whole sample, whereas the next
two columns show the summary statistics for those within the bandwidth of 10 months
below and 10 months above the retirement threshold of 805 months (age 67). These
are the observations within the bandwidth used for estimating the short-term retirement
effects in the regression analysis. It is important that the two groups are balanced with
respect to the covariates. T-tests (not shown) confirm that individuals on either side of
the threshold are similar with respect to education, living arrangements and occupation.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
We investigate the impact of retirement along several dimensions of health. Ideally, we
seek to investigate the following linear relationship between health and retirement:
Healthi = β0 + β1Retirementi +X
′
iβ2 + εi, (1)
where Retirementi is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has retired and zero
otherwise and Xi is a vector of relevant covariates. If retirement were to be considered
a random event, Equation (1) would provide us with an unbiased estimate of the effect
of retirement on health. However, people typically decide themselves when to retire.
Moreover, unobservable factors such as knowledge about own longevity or other factors
that correlate with both health and the retirement decision remain unaccounted for in
Equation (1). This cause omitted variable bias in β1. Importantly, own health is likely
to affect retirement, causing bias in β1 due to reverse causation. In order to circumvent
these issues in the OLS specification, we apply regression discontinuity design (RD).
13The results from the sensitivity analysis are shown in the Appendix.
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RD exploits institutional settings that determine access to a treatment. The idea is
that treatment (retirement) is determined by a running variable (age), reaching a known
threshold (the statutory retirement age). Units above the threshold receive the treatment
and units below the threshold do not receive the treatment. This means that we use age as
an allocation mechanism that determines retirement, rather than using actual retirement
behaviour. The RD design relies on local identification by comparing individuals’ right
above and right below the retirement age cut-off. The discontinuity gap in health at this
point identifies the treatment effect. Since the probability of retirement is discontinuous
at the cut-off age 67, we assume that reaching this age limit is what causes individuals
to retire. Importantly, this assumption only holds for individuals close to the cut-off on
the age distribution.
As described in Section 2, the general rule was that individuals started claiming
retirement pensions at the statutory retirement age of 67. However, about 16 percent of
men and 13 percent of women within the eligible age groups chose to retire early through
ER, and a small fraction retired later. This is a setting of imperfect compliance. The
Fuzzy RD (FRD) design is therefore more appropriate. Unlike in the Sharp RD, where
all treated units are compliers, i.e. the likelihood of treatment goes from zero to one
at the threshold, the fuzzy RD allows for a smaller discontinuity in the probability of
retirement at the threshold.14
4.2 Estimation
The FRD design resembles a setting with instrumental variables, with retirement co-
efficients consistently estimated by using two stage least squares (2SLS) (Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008). The treatment effect is to be interpreted as a local average treatment
effect (LATE), i.e. the estimated treatment effect of retirement on health, for individuals
induced by the age threshold to retire (Hahn et al., 2001). In the setting of imperfect
compliance with the treatment, the intention-to-treat (ITT) is as if randomized, which
implies a causal interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The estimated effects are
interpreted as the health effects of offering retirement pension at age 67.
Formally, we instrument for retirement using age equal to, or above the retirement
threshold at 805 months, the month after which an individual turn 67 years of age.
Specifically, we estimate the following two equations:
Retirementi = γ0 + γ11[Agei ≥ c] + γ2AgeBi + γ3AgeAi + ui, (2)
14The difference between sharp and fuzzy RD is parallel to the difference between a randomized
experiment with perfect compliance and a randomized experiment with imperfect compliance, when
only the intention to treat is randomized.
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where the endogenous regressor Retirementi is a binary variable equal to one if the
individual is retired, i.e. is claiming retirement pension. 1[•] is an indicator function
taking the value one if the condition inside the brackets is true, and zero otherwise. c
represents the retirement eligibility threshold at 805 months (age 67). Age is measured
in months, and we include continuous age controls. These are allowed to have different
slopes at either side of the threshold. Superscript B refers to ages below the retirement
threshold at age 67, and superscript A refers to ages above the threshold.
The first stage in this 2SLS set-up is actual retirement predicted by age exceeding the
threshold, controlled for the general effect of age on retirement. We apply retirement as
predicted in the first stage, and the second stage is given by:
Healthi = β0 + τ ̂Retirement+ β1AgeBi + β2AgeAi + ei, (3)
here, Healthi represents the different health measures for individual i. Our parameter
of interest is τ , and its estimate is the jump in the outcome variable at the threshold,
divided by the fraction induced to take up treatment at the threshold. This is the
estimated treatment effect of retirement on health, for individuals induced by the age
threshold to retire.
As the health effects in the RD design is only identified close to the retirement thresh-
old, the estimations are done locally around the threshold. We choose the optimal
bandwidth, i.e. how many months on either sides of the age cut-off to include in the
estimation,15 in a cross-validation procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). This is designed to minimize the mean squared error, and provides a trade-off
between bias and variance. Based on this bandwidth selector, we choose a bandwidth
of 10 months.16 This means that only individuals in the age range 795 months to 815
months (10 months before and 10 months after the retirement age threshold) are included
in the estimations.17 In the sensitivity analysis, we assess different bandwidths to check
the sensitivity of the results with respect to choice of bandwidth. In addition to assessing
different bandwidths, we perform a range of robustness checks. Here we follow the guide
to practice by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for robustness checks using the RD design.
15Dong (2015) show that using regression discontinuity design calls for careful consideration of the unit
of measurement when age is the forcing variable, as age in years, as opposed to age in months, might
lead to inconsistent results.
16The optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) varies by SES-group. The
suggested bandwidth is in the range 8-12 months for all the groups. For simplicity, we apply a bandwidth
of 10 months in all estimations. Choosing different bandwidths within this interval has little influence on
the estimated effects. See the robustness checks in the appendix for more on sensitivity of bandwidths.
17Due to the small sample size left in the survey data when we apply the 10 months bandwidths, we
also ran the entire analysis using a bandwidth of 20 months. This does not change the results from the
survey data in any substantial way.
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These results are presented in the appendix, but we discuss them briefly in Section 5
(Results).
Finally, in the cross-sectional survey data, we follow Lee and Card (2008) and cluster
at the age group level. As noted by Lee and Card (2008), for RD applications where the
running variable is discrete, estimating a parametric function away from the discontinuity
point can be seen as a form of random specification error. This implies a common
component of variance for all the observations at any given value of the running variable.
Thus, they suggest clustering at the age group level to account for this imperfect fit, as
clustering leads to wider confidence intervals. In the panel data from the administrative
records, we cluster at the individual level to account for the within-person correlation in




To motivate the use of the FRD design, Figure 1 displays the share of retired individuals
from age 55 until age 79. The two upper graphs are constructed using the survey data,
whereas the two lower graphs are constructed using the register data. The age span in
the four graphs are the same (55-79), but the x-axis on the two left graphs depicts age
in years, whereas the x-axis on the two right graphs depicts age in months. The latter is
to show that the discontinuity in retirement coincides with the first month after turning
67 (the first month of retirement eligibility).
In all of the four figures, the patterns are very similar.18 There is a substantial
discontinuity in the likelihood of being retired at age 67 (805 months). Since some workers
chose to retire early, we also see a small discontinuity at age 62, the lowest eligible age for
early retirement. Only a negligible share of individuals chose to retire later than age 67.
The graphical evidence thus show a clear response in terms of retirement at the statutory
retirement age. We build our empirical analysis on the discontinuity at age 67.
Figure 2 presents graphical evidence on the relationships between health and age for
the three outcomes used in our study: physical health, acute hospital admissions, and
mortality. The age range spans from 55 to 79 years, and the x-axes are depicted as age-
in-months relative to the retirement age threshold at 805 months, normalized to zero.
The lines are fitted on either side of the threshold using a second order polynomial global
18In the graphs, retirement refers only to those who have actually retired, either through the early
pension program or at the retirement age of 67. This means that individuals on DI are not considered
retired. If we remove all individuals that are currently on DI or who were on DI before they retired from
our sample, the picture looks the same.
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fit.
The upper graph (a) in Figure 2 shows the observed health pattern for physical health
for all individuals aged 56-79 in the NorLAG sample. Physical health declines with in-
creasing age, but there is a substantial jump at the retirement threshold. At this thresh-
old, the trajectory shifts up to a level of someone 80 months younger, which amounts to
6.5 years.
For acute hospitalizations and mortality, the two lower graphs, (b) and (c) respectively,
we see that the incidence rate increases across the age-span 56-79, but there does not seem
to be any substantial discontinuities in the outcomes reflected in the graphs. For acute
hospitalizations, we see a small, possible negligible, downward shift at the threshold.
There is an ongoing debate as to whether it is the cumulative or contemporaneous
effects of retirement that are the largest (see Coe and Zamarro (2011); Mazzonna and
Peracchi (2017)). As mentioned above, the effects estimated using RD are only identified
close to the threshold, so any prolonged retirement effects becomes mere speculation in
this setting. However, by visual inspection of the graph for physical health, (a) in Figure
2, there is suggestive evidence of a prolonged effect of retirement on physical health, as
retirement shifts individuals to a higher health trajectory, where they seem to stay as age
increases.
5.2 Regression Results
We present the 2SLS regression results for all three health dimensions in Table 3 - Table
6. The effects are estimated using a bandwidth of +/− 10 months around the threshold,
which is the optimal bandwidth using the selector suggested by Imbens and Kalyanara-
man (2012). We estimate the effects for each gender and for the different SES-groups
separately. In Table 7, we present results from a formal test of heterogeneous retirement
effects in which the instrument is interacted with indicators of the different SES-groups.
In Table 3, we present the first stage of the 2SLS regression results. This is the es-
timated effect of crossing the statutory retirement age on the probability of retirement,
i.e. τ from Equation (2). The results in Table 3 show that crossing the statutory retire-
ment age significantly increases the probability of retirement, thus indicating a strong
first stage. These results are in line with the graphical results presented in Figure 1.
5.2.1 The Effect on Physical Health
Table 4 displays the results of the short-term retirement effects on physical health. We
find that retirement leads to a 5.7 points increase in physical health for the population
as a whole. This is a substantial effect given that the mean and standard deviation for
this health outcome is 47 and 10 points, respectively. We find a strong and positive effect
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for men (8 points), and a positive (4 points), but not statistically significant, effect for
women. Our findings are in line with evidence from Coe and Zamarro (2011) and Eibich
(2015), who suggest that, in general, retirement leads to an increase in physical health
in both the USA and Germany. Although our estimates are short-term effects, previous
findings suggest that retirement also has a cumulative effect on physical health through
increased physical activity (e.g., Eibich (2015)).
Based on the discussion in the introduction, we can expect different health effects of
retirement depending on education and occupation. The four latter columns in Table 4
show the effects for the different SES-groups. For the manual workers and low educated
groups, the effects are large (13.2 and 8.4 points respectively) at about one standard
deviation, and significant at the 1 percent level. For the high SES groups, we find no
statistically significant effects, and the coefficients are closer to zero.
These results are in line with the findings of Eibich (2015). He shows that highly edu-
cated individuals benefit less from retirement in terms of self-reported health, compared
to individuals with low SES. Moreover, Insler (2014) suggests that wealthy people have
more time to invest in their health while working.
Power calculations show that a sample of at least 90 is needed to ensure a power of
0.8. Allthough well above this threshold, the sub-group samples are fairly small. It could
be argued that this should lead to the application of wider bandwidths. However, wider
bandwidths also imply more bias (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We did, however, run the
whole analysis using a bandwidth of 20 months. This about doubles the observations in
each sub-group, but the effects sizes and significance levels remains fairly the same.
To sum up, the results are clear in that retirement leads to better physical health
for men, and for the low SES groups. For women, the results are similar in effects size,
yet statistically not significant. We find no health effects of retirement for the high SES
group. Based on this analysis, there does not seem to be substantial differences by gender,
but both the gender difference and the differences by SES will be formally assessed in
Section 5.2.5.
5.2.2 The Effect on Acute Hospitalization
We now turn to our estimates from the register data. Acute hospitalization is based on
a dummy for inpatient care in which treatment is deemed necessary. The results are
presented in Table 5.
First, we explore how retirement affects acute unscheduled hospitalizations for the
population on average and by gender. For all sub-groups the effect size is about -0.4
percentage points, but not significant. When we divide by SES, we find that retirement
leads to a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of acute hospitalization for the
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low SES group. As the incidence of acute hospitalizations is 14 percent, this amounts to
a 4 percent reduction in the likelihood of acute hospitalizations. The effect is significant
at the 5 percent level. For the high SES group, we find an effect of 0.3, yet this is not
significantly different from zero.
One way to think of these results is that retirement for the population in general
leads to no short-term change in serious health-conditions. Hallberg et al. (2015) studied
a targeted early retirement offer to workers in the military at age 55 and find that the
number of days in inpatient care is significantly reduced at ages 61-70. One possible
drawback with our method is that the regression discontinuity design only captures the
short-term effect of retirement, and any potential gain of retirement is possibly not found
in the subsequent months after retirement. For instance, Hallberg et al. (2015) find a 4.7
days reduction in inpatient care 6-10 years after early retirement, whereas the estimated
effect is 2 days in the first years after early retirement.
To some extent, the same intuition can be found in Behncke (2012). She shows
that retirement increases the risk of being diagnosed with a chronic condition in the
subsequent years after retirement. However, assessments applying less acute diagnoses
can be confounded for two reasons. First, the opportunity cost of seeking medical help
is greatly reduced after retirement, hence increasing the likelihood of detecting such
conditions. Second, the reason for seeking medical help can differ for individuals who are
working and individuals who are retired. In Norway, for example, sickness absence from
work for longer than the self certified absence period19 must be certified by a physician,
which means that retirees and employers most likely visit the doctor for different reasons.
5.2.3 The Effect on Mortality
The results described in the previous sections suggests that retirement leads to a short-
term positive effect on subjective measures of health, whereas we find no or small effects
on the number of acute hospitalizations. Given the latter findings, a-priori, we expect to
see little or no short-term effect on mortality. In the lower panel of Table 5, we display
the estimation results on mortality.
We find no short-term effect of retirement on mortality. Regardless of gender and
subgroup, the estimates remain statistical indistinguishable from zero.
The question remains whether a short-term effect of retirement on relatively serious
outcomes, such as mortality, is implausible in the short run. Hallberg et al. (2015) use cox-
regression models to form hazard ratios and find that early retirement at age 55 reduces
the risk of dying at age 70 by around 26 percent. Studying the first five years after an
19A medical certificate is required for spells of absence of more than three days or eight days, depending
on whether the employer has signed the "IA-agreement" or not.
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early retirement window in Holland, Bloemen et al. (2017) find a drop in the probability
of dying of around 2.6 percent. The same effect is found in Blake and Garrouste (2013)
and Kuhn et al. (2010), albeit the latter only for male blue-collar workers. However,
studying the introduction of early retirement in Norway, Hernæs et al. (2013) find no
effect of early retirement on mortality. They follow workers for a maximum up to 77
years of age, with eligibility for early retirement varying between 62 and 65 years of age.
They conclude that early retirement in itself has no effect on mortality.
Taken together, our results show that in general there are no effects of retirement
on serious health outcomes. However, as this study and several other studies show,
retirement affects subjective health. What is it about these outcomes that actually makes
people feel better? In the next section, we look further into the subjective physical health
measure (SF-12) to assess which aspects of health that are improved by retirement.
5.2.4 Looking Further into the Effect on Physical Health
SF-12 is composed by survey responses to the following 20: rate your health on a scale from
1-5 (self-rated health); is your health of such a character that it limits you in doing tasks
like moving a table, vacuuming, hiking or gardening; is your health of such a character
that it limits you from climbing several flights of stairs; has your physical health limited
you in doing your daily tasks so that you have accomplished less than you wished for;
has your physical health limited you from completing specific tasks; has psychological
problems limited you from doing daily tasks so that you have accomplished less than you
which for; has psychological problems limited you from doing these tasks as profoundly
as usually; has pain limited you from doing your daily tasks; have you been feeling calm
and harmonious, energized or sad during the last four weeks; and, finally, has physical or
mental health limited you from socializing as much as you wanted.
Out of the 12 components that go into the SF-12, five were significantly impacted
by retirement. These are the following: is your health of such a character that it limits
you in doing tasks like moving a table, vacuuming, hiking or gardening (Functional); has
your physical health limited you in doing your daily tasks so that you have accomplished
less than you wished for (Daily); has your physical health limited you from completing
specific tasks (Specific); has psychological problems limited you from doing these tasks as
profoundly as usually (Mental); has pain limited you from doing your daily tasks (Pain).
Each question is coded as a binary variable, where one means that health or pain is
experienced as limiting. In Table 6, we present the results for these four components.
Retirement was found to reduce the experience that physical health is a limiting factor
in accomplishing as much as one would like, and as a limiting factor in doing specific tasks.
20Translated from Norwegian by the authors.
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The former holds for both men and women, whereas the latter holds for men. We find
particularly strong effects on reduced pain, especially for women. Furthermore, we find
that, in general, retirement reduced the limitations in doing tasks profoundly experienced
due to mental health.
When we assess the different SES-groups we find that it is manual workers or lower-
educated individuals who experience reduced pain and limitations from physical and
mental health. We find no effects for the high SES groups. Moreover, when we divide
the groups by SES, we also find that, for the low SES group, retirement reduced the
limitation caused by health in doing functional tasks such as vacuuming, moving a table,
hiking, or gardening. These effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for
manual workers and at the 10 percent level for the low-educated group.
5.2.5 A Formal Test of Effect Heterogeneity
Table 7 presents the results from the formal test of heterogeneity. These are the results
of a reduced form of Equation (3), where the instrument is interacted with SES groups
and gender. We estimate the following:
Healthi = β0 + γ1[Agei ≥ c]× SESi + β11[Agei ≥ c] + β2AgeBi + β3AgeAi + ei, (4)
where γ is the coefficient of interest and 1[Agei ≥ c] is the instrument indicating whether
age in months is equal to or exceeds the threshold. SES is a binary indicator of either
manual workers, low education or women. We apply the same +/- 10 months bandwidth
in these estimations.
We see that the effects of retirement are statistically different from each other when
SES is measured by occupation. Although the estimated effects differ quite substantially
by educational group as shown in Table 4, the differences are not statistically significant
when SES is proxied by education. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in the retirement effect by gender. Hence, we show that accounting for differences
by socioeconomic status can be important in analyses of retirement effects on health.
5.3 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis
The results from the robustness checks are presented in the Appendix, but we provide
a brief overview here. First, we show that our results on physical health and mortal-
ity are robust to different bandwidths, whereas increasing the bandwidth from 10 to 15
months yields significant, negative effects on the likelihood of having an acute hospital-
ization. The effects are still small, ranging from 0.7 to 1 percentage points, yielding a
5-7 percent reduction in the likelihood of an acute hospitalization. Increasing the band-
width increases the likelihood of factors, other than retirement, affecting acute hospital
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admissions. Another explanation can be that it takes some time for retirement to take
effect on health issues such as stroke and acute heart conditions, thus including more
post-retirement months increases the likelihood of finding significant effects.21
We then look for discontinuities at the retirement age threshold in a covariate that is
not affected by the treatment, in this case marital status. Although, retirement can affect
the likelihood of being married, it is highly unlikely in the immediate aftermath (within
10 months) of retirement. We find no retirement effects on the likelihood of living with
a partner or spouse (the NorLAG data) or on being married (the register data).
Next, we perform placebo tests by checking for discontinuities in the health outcomes
at values of the forcing variable and age where there should be no discontinuities. We find
no discontinuities in the health outcomes at the placebo thresholds of age 61 and 73 for
physical health or mortality, but we find some inconsistencies at these thresholds for acute
hospitalizations. The effects are smaller than at the retirement threshold, yet significant,
thus we might worry that this outcome is prone to be discontinuous at arbitrary age-
thresholds.
We then test for discontinuities in the conditional density of the forcing variable to
avoid self-selection or sorting into treatment or control groups. The RD design may be
invalid if individuals just above the threshold are more likely to answer a survey than
those just below the threshold, i.e. violating the RD assumption that the running variable
is continuous at the threshold. In the Appendix, we provide histograms that display the
age-in-months-distribution in the NorLAG data. There is no apparent discontinuity at
the threshold in these histograms. Moreover, we applied the local polynomial density
estimator for testing the null of continuous density of the forcing variable at the threshold
proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016). The p-value under this test is 0.3251.
Finally, the results for physical health and mortality are robust to the different sub-
samples that are conditioned upon working or working until retirement, as described in
Section 3.2. For acute hospitalizations, we find the same results as in the main analysis for
all sub-groups, except for the lower SES group, where the negative impact of retirement
on the likelihood of acute hospitalization is no longer found when we condition on working
or working until the retirement age.
6 Conclusion
Whether retirement has a causal effect on health is a difficult question to answer because
of selection into retirement. In this paper, we study the short-term health effect of
21When we run the entire analysis using a bandwidth of 20, we find larger and (negative) significant
effects for the population as a whole, for men, and for the low educated group for this outcome. Effects
sizes range from 1 to 1.5 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. Using this bandwidth, we
still find no significant effects of retirement on mortality.
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retirement using the statutory retirement age at 67 in a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design. We exploit the fact that once individuals reach the statutory retirement age, the
probability of claiming retirement pension drastically increase. We apply both subjective
measures of health from survey data and objective health outcomes from register data,
where the latter covers the entire Norwegian population.
We find that, on average, in the population, retirement has a positive effect on self-
assessed physical health, but no effects on the objective measures of health: acute hos-
pitalizations and mortality. When we assess the effects by different SES groups, we find
that retirement has a large, positive impact on physical health and leads to reduced like-
lihood of acute hospitalization among the low SES groups. We find no significant effects
for the high SES groups for any of these outcomes. For mortality, we find no significant
effects for any group.
We thus confirm what has been found in several studies, namely that retirement has a
positive effect on health for subjective health outcomes. How this manifests to objective
outcomes is less clear as there exist little evidence using objective health outcomes, es-
pecially on the full population. In general, we find no effects on the objective outcomes,
besides suggestive evidence of a retirement effect on reduced likelihood of hospitalizations
for the low SES group. However, this result does not pass the robustness tests, and must
therefore be interpreted with care.
We thus conclude that retirement mainly impacts subjective outcomes, not objective
ones. However, we have only assessed extreme objective outcomes such as acute hospi-
talizations and mortality. When we assess the factors that go into the physical health
measure, SF-12, we find that the positive health effect was driven by a few different
factors. On the one hand, finding that retirement leads to reduced likelihood of report-
ing that health is limiting in managing in daily chores and in conducting specific chores
profoundly, can be due to the fact that work (a possible health consuming chore), is no
longer present, so health feels less limiting. This implies that the underlying health has
not changed, but the presence of health consuming activities has. On the other hand,
we also found that retirement reduced the presence of pain and reduced the likelihood of
reporting difficulties with activities such as vacuuming, moving a table, hiking, or gar-
dening. This indicates that retirement affects health in a more fundamental way. Future
research should thus assess objective measures of health that are less extreme. In doing
so, it is key to recognize that retirement necessarily coincides with reduced opportunity
cost of time.
This study accentuates the importance of assessing the potential heterogeniety in
the effects for individuals in different circumstances. Occupation, more than education,
determines social differences in the effects of retirement on health. Our findings indicate
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that the retirement reforms aimed at prolonging working life can be socially distortive
due to the differential effects based on SES. We find that retirement at age 67 has positive
health implications for low SES groups, but we find no effects for high SES groups. A
formal test of these differences confirms that occupation matters for the health effects of
retirement.
Finally, our study contributes to generalizing the positive physical health effect of
retirement found in the literature across a larger age span. The current literature has
mainly assessed retirement ages from late the 50s to about 65. Here, we confirm that the
positive effects still hold for individuals retiring at age 67. This implies that retirements
affects health also when we assess those who are healthy enough to stay in the labor force
until the late 60s. Assessments of higher age thresholds are valuable for policymakers as
current retirement reforms typically aim at increasing the retirement age. These reforms
will likely affect relatively healthy individuals, i.e. workers who remain employed until
these higher retirement ages.
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Figures
Figure 1: Discontinuity in Retirement at the Retirement Age Threshold
(a) NorLAG Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Years (b) NorLAG Data: Fraction Retired - Age in
Months
(c) Adm. Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Years (d) Adm. Data: Fraction Retired - Age in Months
Note: The graphs show the fraction retired by age from the two datasets. The upper
graphs are based on the survey data, whereas the two lower graphs are based on admin-
istrative data. All graphs depicts the fraction retired across the age span 55-79. The x-
axis on the left two graphs depicts age in years, whereas the x-axis in the graphs to the
right depicts age in months, relative to the retirement eligibility age-in-months (805 months).
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Figure 2: Discontinuity in Health at the Retirement Age Threshold
(a) NorLAG Data: Physical Health (SF-12) (b) Administrative Data: Acute Hospitalizations
(c) Administrative Data: Mortality
Note: The graphs present the age-health relationship for physical health, acute hospital ad-
missions and mortality. The scale for physical health are points on the SF-12 scale and the
scale of acute hospital admissions and mortality corresponds to the incidence in the popula-
tion. The x-axis displays age-in-months relative to the retirement age threshold at 805 months.
97
Tables
Table 1: Labor Market Participation for Individuals Aged 56-79 in 2007
Working Retired ER DI
Age Group Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
56 - 61 79% 79 % - - - - 19 % 28 %
62 - 66 59% 49 % - - 16 % 13 % 31 % 41 %
67 - 69 17% 9 % 89 % 92 % - - - -
70 - 79 18% 2 % 98 % 98 % - - - -
Note: The numbers are based on own calculations using the administrative data which covers the
entire population of Norway (See Section 4 for a description). Work is defined as having earnings
larger than zero. The states will not sum to unity because individuals can be in two states at the
same time, e.g. by combining work and partial uptake of DI.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample Above Threshold Below Threshold
Source: NorLAG
SF12 46.93 45.73 47.55
(10.78) (12.03) (10.12)
Age 65.34 66.15 67.00
(6.58) (0.36) (0.0)
Retired 0.44 0.18 0.96
Elementary education 0.23 0.25 0.25
High school degree 0.51 0.45 0.51
Any college 0.27 0.30 0.25
Professional 0.48 0.47 0.50
Manual 0.43 0.40 0.41
Living with partner 0.71 0.75 0.72
Female 0.48 0.47 0.50
Observations 4619 190 200
Source: Admin. Data
Acute Hospital Admissions 0.142 0.140 0.141
Mortality 0.019 0.017 0.018
Age 64.92 66.19 67.00
(6.67) (0.38) (0.00)
Retired 0.40 0.29 0.95
Elementary education 0.31 0.32 0.34
High school degree 0.45 0.46 0.45
Any college 0.24 0.23 0.21
Married 0.63 0.64 0.64
Female 0.51 0.51 0.51
Observations 1,071,068 31,751 33,752
Note: This table displays descriptive statistics for the two data sources, the NorLAG data (above)
and the administrative data (below). Column (1) presents means for the entire sample, whereas
the other two columns display means for the sub-sample of individuals included in the estimations
(we use a bandwidth of ten months for the estimations). Column (2) displays the means for the
sub-samples aged 795-804 months (control group) and Column (3) for those aged 805-814 months
(treatment group). Standard deviations in square brackets.
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Table 3: First-Stage Regressions
All Men Women
Source: NorLAG
Retired 0.954*** 0.941*** 0.961***
(0.0362) (0.0587) (0.0431)
Observations 371 190 181
Source: Admin. Data
Retired 0.720*** 0.683*** 0.756***
(0.00264) (0.00389) (0.0356)
Observations 825605 407386 418219
Note: This table show the first-stage regressions specified in Equation (2). The reported coefficient
is γ from Equation (2). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the age-in-months level for the NorLAG data and at the individual level
for the administrative data. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 4: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Physical Health
All Men Women Manual Professional Lower Higher
Retired 5.689*** 8.036*** 4.053 13.16*** -0.333 8.358*** -1.952
(1.979) (3.026) (3.465) (3.508) (3.761) (2.415) (5.449)
Observations 361 185 176 126 123 261 99
Note: This table displays the impact of retirement on physical health (SF12). All refers to the sam-
ple as a whole, Professional and Manual to type of occupation and Lower and Higher to levels of
education. The reported coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth
of ten months. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age-in-month level. *=p<0.10,
**=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Table 5: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Hospitalizations and Mortality
All Men Women Lower Higher
Hospitalizations
Retired -.00419 -.00417 -.00440 -.00589** .00255
(.00258) (.00395) (.00339) (.00292) (.00535)
Observations 825605 407386 418219 643441 182164
Mortality
Retired -.000123 -.0000355 -.000266 -.0000895 -.000299
(.000204) (.000343) (.000236) (.000233) (.000399)
Observations 840239 416611 423628 655743 184496
Note: This table displays the impact of retirement on acute hospitalizations and mortality. All refers
to the sample as a whole and Lower and Higher to levels of education. The reported coefficient is τ
from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered at the individual level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
100
Table 6: Short-Term Retirement Effects on Health by SF12 Components
Functional Daily Specific Mental Pain
All -0.0741 -0.171** -0.229** 0.0754** -0.232***
(0.0791) (0.0776) (0.0934) (0.0377) (0.0783)
Observations 371 368 369 368 371
Men -0.0344 -0.325*** -0.401** 0.0953 -0.180*
(0.140) (0.123) (0.168) (0.0803) (0.100)
Observations 190 189 189 188 190
Women -0.126 -0.0378 -0.0693 0.0562 -0.328***
(0.105) (0.128) (0.152) (0.0419) (0.117)
Observations 181 179 180 180 181
Manual -0.258** -0.558*** -0.551*** 0.0703 -0.503***
(0.125) (0.128) (0.132) (0.123) (0.135)
Observations 127 126 127 127 127
Professional -0.0110 0.0937 0.0160 -0.0455 0.0342
(0.166) (0.123) (0.157) (0.0486) (0.178)
Observations 123 123 123 123 123
Low Education -0.158* -0.284*** -0.292*** 0.121*** -0.314***
(0.0864) (0.110) (0.0971) (0.0441) (0.103)
Observations 270 267 268 267 270
High education 0.124 0.104 -0.0597 -0.0215 0.0183
(0.200) (0.156) (0.194) (0.0723) (0.159)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
Note: This table presents the impact of retirement on selected components of the physical health out-
come (SF-12). The reported coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth
of ten months. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age-in-month level.*=p<0.10,
**=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 7: Formal Test of Differences by Socioeconomic Status
Education Gender Occupation
Retired 4.975 3.696 6.858*
(3.115) (2.549) (3.305)









Note: This table displays the interaction between retirement eligibility and SES (education and occu-
pation (only for the NorLAG)) and gender. The first column presents the results for physical health
from the NorLAG data and the second and third columns presents the results for acute hospital-
izations and mortality, respectively, for the Administrative data. The reported coefficient is γ from
Equation (4). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered at the age-in-month level for the NorLAG data and at the individual level for the
Administrative data. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Appendix - Sensitivity and Robustness
A.1 Disabled Individuals - Past Labor Income and Self-Reported
Work Status
People on disability insurance are mechanically transferred from disability pension to
retirement pension at age 805 months. We need to make sure that the positive physical
health effects we found are not driven by these individuals. Initially, there is no reason to
believe that there should be an effect for these individuals as they were not working before
retirement, and should therefore have no change in circumstances. However, as the health
measure contains elements of self-assessed health, one could imagine that someone who
is disabled may need to justify their status as disabled, consciously or subconsciously. In
this case, poor health prior to the statutory retirement age may be under-reported. Post
retirement, when they are no longer in a situation where poor health is defining their
labor market status, they might feel healthier, or no longer have the need to report poor
health. If this scenario is plausible, we need to rule out that the results found in Section
5 are driven by this group.
The first two rows of Table A.1 displays the results on two sub-samples of the survey
data (labeled “Working” and “Income”), each aimed at running the analysis only on
the sub-sample that was recorded as working until the statutory retirement age. The
working sub-samples are defined in Section 3.2. Finding coefficients of the same sign
and magnitude, especially for the rule based on self-assessed work status, ensures us that
these effects are not driven by the disability justification hypothesis. The estimations
based on the income-rule yields large and insignificant coefficients, both a consequence
of the small sample sizes. Yet, the direction of the effects are similar to what was found
in the main analysis.
For the outcomes from the administrative data, as these are not subject to the po-
tential justification bias, we should expect that individuals who retire formally at 67,
but without any actual change in circumstances, should water down the effects. We can
therefore expect that this assessment can uncover significant effect, not detected in the
gross sample. The first row of Table A.2 and Table A.3 presents the estimations re-
stricted to “workers” for acute hospitalizations and mortality, respectively. Here, we find
no significant results for any of the sub-groups, besides a significant effect on mortality
for women (0.2 percentage points significant at the 5 percent level). The significant result
on hospitalizations found for men with low education in the main analysis, is no longer
present.
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A.2 Robustness Checks and Validity of the Regression Disconti-
nuity Design
Below we assess the sensitivity of the results for different bandwidth selections; we check
for discontinuities in the forcing variable, age, at the cutoff; we test for discontinuities in
other outcomes that should not have been effected by the threshold; and, we check for
discontinuities in the outcomes of interest at points in the age distribution where there
should not be any discontinuities. This robusness assessment follows the suggestions in
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) closely.
A.2.1 Bandwidth Selection
The worry in an RD application is that using a bandwidth that is too wide, allows for
other things than the intervention of interest to drive differences in outcomes for those
right above compared to those right below the threshold. In Table A.1 we display the
results using bandwidths of 7 and 15 months for physical health. Using a bandwidth
of 7 months does not alter the results, whereas increasing the bandwidths to 15 months
somewhat reduces the effects. This is not surprising given the downward slope of the
health trajectory across age and the upward shift in this trajectory at the retirement
eligibility threshold.
The results for hospitalizations and mortality are displayed in Table A.2 and Table
A.3. For acute hospital admissions, we find that increasing the bandwidth to 15 months
yields significant, negative effects. The effects are still small ranging from 0.7 to 1 per-
centage points. As the incidence is 14 percent, this entails a 5-7 percent reduction in the
likelihood of an acute hospitalization. Increasing the bandwidth increases the likelihood
of factors, other than retirement, affecting acute hospital admissions. Another explana-
tion can be that it takes some time for retirement to take effect on health issues such as
stroke and acute heart conditions, thus including more post-retirement months increase
the likelihood of finding significant effects. As in the main analysis, we find no effects of
retirement on mortality at any of these bandwidths.
A.2.2 Continuity of the Forcing Variable
Vital to any RD application is the individual’s incapability of manipulating the forcing
variable. In this case, the forcing variable is age (reported by public registers), which
individuals cannot manipulate in any way. It could however be the case that retired
individuals are more likely to respond to the survey due to the reduced opportunity cost
of time. Figure A.1 shows two histograms of age-in-months assessing potential bunching
at the threshold. There is no evidence of any discontinuity in the forcing variable at the
threshold. We also did a more formal test proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016), a local
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polynomial density estimator for testing the null of continuous density of the forcing
variable at the threshold. The p-value under this test is 0.3251. For the population
level data, this holds by construction, as people cannot manipulate their age and as all
individuals in the population are represented in the data.
A.2.3 Placebo Tests
The placebo tests entails testing for discontinuities in the three health outcomes at points
in the age distribution where there should be no discontinuities. A common practice is
to conduct placebo tests at the median age of the two sub-samples below and above the
actual cut-off. In this case, the median age below the threshold is age 62. However,
some individuals can retire at this age, thus making is an unsuited placebo threshold.
Consequently, we use age 61 for the lower placebo. For the upper placebo, we use age
73. No discontinuities or significant effects were found at these placebo thresholds for
physical health (Table A.1). For acute hospital admissions (Table A.2), we find significant
effects for both the upper and lower placebo. For the lower placebo, this could be due
to some occupations having special age-limits for retirement at 61. However, we find no
explanations for why the upper placebo yields significant, and even positive effects. This
finding reduce the credibility of the effects found in the main analysis for this outcome.
The placebo results for mortality is presented in Table A.3. There are no significant
effects and the coefficients are close to zero for all sub-group at both placebo thresholds.
A.2.4 Discontinuity in Other Outcomes
Finally, we look for discontinuities in an outcome that should not be affected by re-
tirement, at least not in the short-term. Here, we assess the likelihood of living with
a partner or spouse (NorLAG) or being married (administrative data). The regression
results shown in Table A.1 and Table A.4 confirm that there are no retirement effect on
these outcomes.
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Appendix Graphs and Tables
Figure A.1: Discontinuity of the Forcing Variable
(a) (b)
Note: The histograms show the distribution of age in months for the age-range 56-79 using the
bin-width suggested by STATA (left histogram) and using one bin for each age-in-months (right
histogram).
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Table A.1: Robustness Checks Survey Data: Physical Health
All Men Women
Conditional on income 16.42*** 15.83 -1.553
(2.966) (10.88) (7.264)
Observations 82 53 39
Conditional on working 6.274*** 9.741*** 2.523
(2.089) (3.758) (7.312)
Observations 247 142 105
Bandwidth 7 9.472*** 14.69*** 2.623
(2.019) (5.206) (4.245)
Observations 275 142 133
Bandwidth 15 5.801*** 9.391*** 2.623
(2.130) (3.109) (6.628)
Observations 540 278 262
Placebo at 61 -1.441 .971 -5.752
(3.665) (4.220) (6.628)
Observations 454 242 212
Placebo at 73 -1.111 -1.264 .628
(1.685) (4.786) (2.213)
Observations 251 127 124
Living with a partner -0.106 -0.0413 -0.162
(0.0931) (0.108) (0.176)
Observations 371 190 181
Note: This table displays the various robustness checks described in the Appendix, for the physical
health outcome and the NorLAG data. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age-in-
month level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table A.2: Robustness Checks Administrative Data: Acute Hospitalizations
All Men Women Low Educ. High Educ.
Conditional on working 0.00212 0.00266 0.00133 0.000309 0.00687
(0.00295) (0.00426) (0.00397) (0.00345) (0.00566)
Observations 362,857 203,212 159,645 259,427 103,430
Bandwidth 7 -0.00246 -0.00117 -0.00374 -0.00343 0.00231
(0.00227) (0.00343) (0.00303) (0.00258) (0.00459)
Observations 583,686 287,791 295,895 455,797 127,889
Bandwidth 15 -0.00722* -0.00977* -0.00520 -0.0101** 0.00321
(0.00377) (0.00584) (0.00487) (0.00427) (0.00773)
Observations 1,241,687 612,603 629,084 965,278 276,409
Placebo at 61 -0.000587 -0.0000883 -0.00105* -0.00155** 0.00199*
(0.000510) (0.000610) (0.000541) (0.000705) (0.00104)
Observations 1,311,705 667,661 644,044 962,159 349,546
Placebo at 73 0.00106 0.00284* -0.000557 0.00194** -0.00321**
(0.000676) (0.00162) (0.000861) (0.000699) (0.00153)
Observations 634,319 294,672 339,647 527,740 106,579
Note: This table displays the various robustness checks described in the Appendix, for Acute hospital admissions. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the age-in-month level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table A.3: Robustness Checks Administrative Data: Mortality
All Men Women Low Educ. High Educ.
Conditional on working 0.00212 0.00266 0.00133 0.000309 0.00687
(0.00295) (0.00426) (0.00397) (0.00345) (0.00566)
Observations 362,857 203,212 159,645 259,427 103,430
Bandwidth 7 -0.00246 -0.00117 -0.00374 -0.00343 0.00231
(0.00227) (0.00343) (0.00303) (0.00258) (0.00459)
Observations 583,686 287,791 295,895 455,797 127,889
Bandwidth 15 -0.00722* -0.00977* -0.00520 -0.0101** 0.00321
(0.00377) (0.00584) (0.00487) (0.00427) (0.00773)
Observations 1,241,687 612,603 629,084 965,278 276,409
Placebo at 61 -0.000587 -0.0000883 -0.00105* -0.00155** 0.00199*
(0.000510) (0.000610) (0.000541) (0.000705) (0.00104)
Observations 1,311,705 667,661 644,044 962,159 349,546
Placebo at 73 0.00106 0.00284* -0.000557 0.00194** -0.00321**
(0.000676) (0.00162) (0.000861) (0.000699) (0.00153)
Observations 634,319 294,672 339,647 527,740 106,579
Note: This table displays the various robustness checks described in the Appendix, for Mortality. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
age-in-month level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the age individual level. *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table A.4: Robustness Checks Administrative Data: Discontinuity in Mar-
ital Status
All Men Women Low Educ. High Educ.
Married 0.00233 0.00324 0.00104 0.00156 0.00654
(0.00229) (0.00336) (0.00311) (0.00249) (0.00576)
Observations 825,605 407,386 418,219 643,441 182,164
Note: This table displays the impact of retirement on the likelihood of being married. The reported
coefficient is τ from Equation (3). Estimation is done using a bandwidth of ten months. Standard
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1 Introduction
The impact of sample selection in analyses of survey data is an old question that has
been extensively assessed. Sample selection can lead to serious bias, unless properly
accounted for, if the non-response correlates with outcomes of interest for the empirical
analysis in question. The problem arises because an individual’s willingness and ability
to participate in a survey depend not only on daily life circumstances but also on a wide
range of personal characteristics, including health and well-being. The potential for bias
from sample selection is particularly prominent in studies of health, and even more so in
studies of health and aging.
Sample selection applies to cross-sectional and longitudinal samples, and it can be
characterized as either initial selection, in which case the survey sample is not represen-
tative of the population the sample represents, or selective attrition (data loss) across
waves in a longitudinal survey, in which case the sample composition changes over time
in a way that is related to variables of interest. The initial non-response is usually larger
than the attrition across waves, because respondents in the first wave tend, on average,
to be more willing to cooperate than the target populations as a whole.
The majority of the empirical literature that assesses the impact of sample selection,
has focused on attrition across waves in longitudinal surveys. Whether representability is
compromised across waves in longitudinal data is an important question. Strong evidence
of health-related attrition has been documented across several well-known household
surveys, but is found to cause little bias (Becketti et al., 1988; Fitzgerald et al., 1998;
Contoyannis et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2006). However, empirical evidence of the impact
of initial selection is limited. Although it is likely that the initial and subsequent non-
response are based on the same mechanism, we cannot rule out that the patterns of non-
response differ. In addition, as initial non-response typically is larger than non-response
at subsequent waves, initial selection can still be an important source of bias.
Empirical approaches, such as weighting, to control for initial non-response exist.
How well these methods work depends on the pre-sampling information at hand. This
information is often limited with respect to how well it captures the underlying mech-
anisms behind the non-response. Although age and variables expressing socioeconomic
status (SES) usually correlate with health, uncertainty remains about how well weights
based on such variables re-establish a distribution of health in the sample that mirrors
the distribution of health in the population. Ideally, to investigate the bias from initial
non-response, individual-level health data on the full population that the survey sample
is intended to represent is needed. However, the availability of this type of data is limited,
which is one reason bias from initial non-response rarely has been assessed.
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In this paper, I assess the bias from health-related non-response in a typical survey
sample by comparing the results based on survey data with corresponding results from
register data covering the full population. A novelty of this analysis is access to sufficient
individual-level health information collected from register data on services provided in
primary health care to compose a generic health measure for each individual in the
population. As the register data are not hampered by non-response, the registers can
uncover the true age pattern in health in the population.1
As a case study, I apply an empirical problem that is especially prone to bias from
health-related sample selection: social inequalities in health across age. This is an appli-
cation in which the problem of health-related sample selection is especially salient, as the
outcome of interest, health, and the explanatory variables, age and socioeconomic status
(SES), are likely to correlate with non-response. To respond to a survey, health above a
minimum level is usually required. Moreover, as age increases, health deteriorates, and
the likelihood of response declines. This implies that those who respond at older ages are
more selected with respect to health. This process applies to all SES groups. However,
it is more prominent in low SES groups. As individuals in the lower SES groups have
worse health outcomes and higher mortality for a given age, they are more likely to never
respond to or to drop out of the sample across time or age, compared to higher order
SES groups. As a result, across time or age, the remaining sub-sample in the low SES
group becomes increasingly less representative of that group as a whole. Unless properly
accounted for, the consequence of this sort of sample selection is empirical evidence of
reduced social inequalities in health in later life. In fact, evidence of converging health
inequalities in old age is a common empirical result in the social gerontological literature,
which is where the health-SES-age relationship has been most widely studied (Ross and
Wu, 1996; Chandola et al., 2007; Kim and Durden, 2007; Mirowsky and Ross, 2008).
Whether the convergence is due to reduced social inequalities or merely is due to sample
selection, is largely unresolved as the bias from sample selection has been inadequately
assessed in much of this literature.
The distinction between non-response and data loss due to mortality is important in
general, and for this analysis in particular. Those who fall out of a sample across time
may do so because they are deceased or because they are prevented from or unwilling to
participate in the survey. The first differ substantially from the latter because those who
1Age pattern is a rude simplification as the main empirical appliciation in this study is a cross-
sectional representation of health across age; thus, the age pattern in health applied here is therefore a
combination of age and cohort effects. In this paper, I also assess the age pattern in health using panel
register data. For this part of the analysis, the estimated age pattern in health is a combination of age,
cohort, and time effects. There are several issues with disentangling time, cohort, and age effects, despite
having access to large scale panel register data, but that is a discussion that is beyond the scope of this
paper. See e.g. Biørn et al. (2013) for a discussion.
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are deceased are no longer in the survey’s reference population, unlike the non-responders
who are in the population but not in the sample. A sample can therefore be selected com-
pared to the population the sample is drawn from (initial selection), or it can be selected
across waves (selective attrition). The latter can be caused by either non-response or
mortality that is non-random across subsequent waves in longitudinal surveys (selective
attrition). Either way, selective attrition makes subsequent waves unrepresentative com-
pared to the first wave. Finally, in analyses of trajectories across age, any dataset, either
sample or full population data, can be selected if people in different subgroups of interest
have different mortality rates for a given age (selective mortality).
Whether or not sample selection or selective mortality leads to bias, ultimately, de-
pends on the empirical question at hand. If interest lies in describing a cross-sectional
relationship as it currently is in the population, then the initial selection is the relevant
dimension to correct for. If, however, the interest lies in describing a longitudinal rela-
tionship, then non-response and mortality that is non-random can lead to bias. In this
paper, the primary interest lies in assessing whether the non-response in a typical health
survey sample leads to bias compared with the population the sample represents. There-
fore, selective mortality is of secondary importance as this happens at the population
level, as well as in the sample. However, at the end of the analysis, I show how selective
mortality (healthy survivor bias) can bias the empirical relationship between health, SES,
and age–even in a dataset that has no non-response.
This study uses a combination of survey and register data. The survey data are the
Norwegian Study on Life Course, Ageing, and Generation (NorLAG). This is a panel
survey of Norwegian older adults that corresponds to well-known surveys such as the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA), and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the US.2
The NorLAG currently consists of two waves (collected in 2002 (T1) and 2007 (T2)).
Among the 8,298 persons initially invited to participate in this survey in 2002, 67 percent
responded. In the second wave, the response rate was 60 percent among the gross sample
invited to participate at T13 and 68 percent among those who also participated at T1.
Population weights, derived by Statistics Norway, are available for each wave. These
weights are based on individual-level data for measures such as education, age, gender,
region, and centrality, that are known for the entire population.
The second data source consists of full population individual-level register panel data
(2006 to 2014). This is the reference population on which the NorLAG sample is based.
2Other examples include Berlin Aging Study (BASE), Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (LASA),
and Swedish National Study on Aging and Care (SNAP).
3In addition, 737 of the initial non-responders participated in the second wave.
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To compare whether the NorLAG reproduce the relationship between health, SES, and
aging in the population, a measure of health from the registers that is comparable to the
health measure applied from the survey data is needed. From the NorLAG data, I apply
the Short Form 12 (SF12) which is a generic health measure often applied in survey
analyses. From the registers, I propose the following measure of health: the annual
reimbursements claimed by primary care physicians (PCPs) for patients. In Norway,
practically all citizens are associated with a PCP of their choice through a patient list
system.4 PCPs are responsible for all initial assessments and treatments. In addition,
treatments in secondary care are via PCP referral. Except for a small fixed patient charge,
consultations are free of charge for the patient, and the PCP is reimbursed by the state
per consultation based on the duration of the consultation and the specific treatment
given. I argue that the reimbursements claimed by the physician (PCPR) can be seen as
a generic health measure because it is a general expression of health and functional ability,
as with the SF12. In addition, as a PCP consultation often is initiated by the patient as
a response to self-assessed health, PCPR contains an element of self-assessment as well.
I show that PCPR have the same patterns of distribution as the SF12 across dimensions
that are central to this analysis, and thus, can arguably be used as a benchmark for how
the SF12 would be distributed in the population across the variables that are of interest
in this study: gender, age, and education.
In addition to comparing results using survey data to results using register data, I
employ more conventional sample selection correction methods, such as weights and se-
lection models. This implies assessing attrition from one wave to the next in the NorLAG
sample which enables comparisons with the previous literature. In addition, it is likely
that attrition and initial non-response are based on similar non-response mechanisms;
thus, comparing selection corrections due to attrition and due to the initial selection is
interesting on its own. Because the true nature of the pattern of health-related non-
response (the selection mechanism) in the data is unobserved, it is not clear what the
best method to correct for sample selection is. Therefore, I make various assumptions
about the selection mechanism and assess how estimates are affected by the corresponding
selection correction method. The selection correction methods are those most common
in the applied microeconometrics literature such as population weights, Inverse probabil-
ity weights (IPW), and the Heckman selection model (hereafter, Heckman; (Heckman,
1979)). In addition, I apply the more recently developed Copula selection model (here-
after, Copula; (Smith, 2003)).
The aim of the study is to shed new light on the potential bias from sample selection
4Only 0.5 percent of Norwegian citizens were not on a PCP list in 2007 (The Norwegian Directorate
of Health, 2009).
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in analyses of health and aging, and the study makes two contributions to the existing
literature. First, a novel feature of this paper is the presentation of a register-based
generic measure of health, available for the full population. This measure serves as
base for evaluating health-related non-response in the survey data. Second, although
IPWs have commonly been used in similar settings, few examples use selection models in
analyses of the bias from health-related sample selection. This is especially true for the
Copula selection model.
In the first part of the analysis, I document the presence of sample selection in the
NorLAG data. Then, I establish the familiar pattern of converging health inequalities
across age in later life. Suspecting that health-related non-response could be a driver of
this result, I apply the various sample selection correction methods. Analyses based on
the register data confirm the convergence in health inequalities across age. Moreover, the
two weighting approaches, the Heckman, and the Copula provide trajectories similar to
a baseline of no selection correction. However, unlike the Heckman, the Copula provides
evidence of selection bias. Despite this, the bias from selection is small as the pattern
and sizes of the educational differences in health across age are similar across models and
specifications. Finally, using the full panel of the register data, I show that although
there is no non-response in the register data, there is a strong case for mortality selection
driving the convergence in health inequalities in later life in these analyses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature
review, and Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 provides an assessment of the selection
mechanism in the survey data, and Section 5 presents the case study and the different
selection correction approaches applied. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature
In this section, I present the literature on sample selection, before I present the liter-
ature on social inequalities in health in later life. The latter is primarily based on social
gerontology literature.
2.1 Controlling for Sample Selection
A large body of literature proposes alternative solutions for handling sample selection, and
a common approach has been to weight the data by IPWs (Wooldridge, 2002; Fitzgerald
et al., 1998; Jones et al., 2006). IPWs are derived by estimating the likelihood of response
based on observable characteristics and then weighting each observation by the inverse of
the likelihood of response. The selection correction entails giving more weight to observa-
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tions with a small likelihood of appearing in the data, based on observable characteristics.
The implicit assumption is that responders who are similar to non-responders in terms
of observable characteristics also have similar values of the missing outcome variable.
Another group of selection correction methods are selection models (Hausman and
Wise, 1979; Heckman, 1979). Selection models imply modeling the selection process
explicitly and controlling for this in the main outcome equation. Here, sample selection is
considered an omitted variable bias problem. Thus, including a control for being selected
into the sample in the main health equation is assumed to restore the population-level
conditional health distribution. Selection models have been widely applied in the context
of labor market outcomes (Vella, 1998). In particular, the Heckman has been popular in
applied work (Puhani, 2000).
The assumption about the selection mechanism in the data is less strong in the se-
lection model approaches compared to in the weighting approaches, as the selection is
allowed to be based on unobservable factors. However, selection models typically rely on
multivariate normality for consistent estimates. Moreover, these models are particularly
sensitive to these distributional assumptions (Smith, 2003). A growing number of ap-
proaches relax the joint normality assumption.5 One example is the Copula, which can
be estimated by maximum likelihood while the assumption of joint normality is relaxed
(Smith, 2003).
Among empirical assessments of the bias from, or impact of, sample selection, IPWs
have been more commonly applied than selection models. Several studies analyze the
impact of sample selection in survey data on estimates of the realtion between health
and socioeconomic status by using IPW (Becketti et al., 1988; Fitzgerald et al., 1998;
Contoyannis et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2006; Michaud et al., 2011). Although these
studies find evidence of health-related attrition in several well-known surveys, such as the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Contoyannis et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2006),
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Becketti et al., 1988; Fitzgerald et al.,
1998), and European Community Household Panel (ECHP) (Jones et al., 2006), selective
attrition is found to cause no or little bias when IPWs are used as to correct for sample
selection. Similar findings have been reported in studies assessing income dynamics and
other labor market outcomes (Lillard and Panis, 1998; Zabel, 1998; Ziliak and Kniesner,
1998).6 Also using IPWs, Michaud et al. (2011) show that bringing respondents who have
not responded to a particular wave back into the sample in later waves can substantially
5An extensive body of research has developed non- and semi-parametric methods for relaxing the
distributional assumptions. These methods are not applied here, but several are covered in the review
by Vella (1998).
6See the special issue of Journal of Human Resources on Attrition in Longitudinal Surveys (Manski
and Altonji, 1998).
119
reduce selection bias in analyses of wealth, home ownership, and labor force participation.
For selection models, there is limited evidence of the impact of health-related non-
reponse in survey data. However, the results in Zweifel et al. (1999), showing that health
care expenditures do not increase with age if proximity to death is controlled for, sparked
a debate about the identifying assumptions in selection models applied to health care
expenditures (Salas and Raftery, 2001; Seshamani and Gray, 2004; Zweifel et al., 2004).7
Cheng and Trivedi (2015) apply a copula-based selection model to assess the impact of
selective attrition in a survey on medical practitioners’ income. They find that selection
correction by the Copula has little impact on the empirical assessments of income for
general practitioners but some impact on the earnings of specialists, thus indicating
selection bias in the latter.
Finally, a related approach is by Heiss et al. (2014). They assess how selective mortal-
ity across waves in the HRS affects health trajectories for different ethnic groups. Missing
data due to mortality is different from other forms of non-response. An important dis-
tinction is that the deceased has no health level, unlike other non-responders for whom
the health level exists but is unobserved. Careful consideration as to what the selection
correction implies about the health levels for deceased observations is therefore impor-
tant. Heiss et al. (2014) apply a model that allows estimation of health and mortality
jointly, to correct for mortality selection in the health-age trajectories, without having to
define the health level for those who are deceased. They show that mortality selection is
what causes the observed convergence in health between ethnic groups. Moreover, when
they correct for mortality selection, they find that the health gap between ethnic groups
are in fact increasing across age.
In general, the literature on sample selection has found little bias from sample selection
when standard models of selection correction have been applied. One reason can be that
the selective non-response simply does not bias the estimates. Another reason can be
insufficient data or that the assumptions needed for consistent estimates are violated. In
addition, as shown by Heiss et al. (2014), mortality selection can produce large biases in
longitudinal estimates of health trajectories across age.
2.2 Social Inequalities in Health
The relationship between SES and health across age has been scarcely assessed in eco-
nomics, but a comprehensive body of research, primarily in social gerontology, documents
this relationship. How these studies deal with sample selection varies greatly. Although
most studies acknowledge the likely presence of health selection in the data applied, it is
7In addition to poor identification of the selection equation, the critique of the Zweifel et al. (1999)
paper concerns endogeneity issues with the explanatory variables.
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commonly ignored (Ross and Wu, 1996), or resolved using ad hoc solutions, such as giving
the deceased a health score of zero (Benzeval et al., 2011) or the lowest observed value
Herd (2006). Another approach entails simply including binary controls for attrition or
mortality in longitudinal analysis (Xu et al., 2014). Among more complex approaches
are latent growth curve modeling (Kim and Durden, 2007; Brown et al., 2012) or random
effects models (Herd, 2006).
In this field of research, there are generally two opposing theories of how the rela-
tionship between SES and health changes across age. The Cumulative advantage (CAD)
theory predicts diverging inequalities with age due to the socially stratified accumula-
tion of possibilities and risks over the life span (Ross and Wu, 1996). In contrast, the
Age-as-Leveler (AAL) theory predicts converging inequalities in later life. The conver-
gence is assumed to be caused by four mechanisms: the existence of a biological ceiling,
after which good health can no longer be maintained causing health to deteriorate at a
higher rate for the high SES group in old age; more egalitarian public policies among
older individuals such as pensions and Medicaid; the fading out of past experiences that
were causing health inequalities, such as work conditions in old age; and, finally, selec-
tive mortality (Hoffmann, 2011).8 Most empirical evidence supports the CAD theory
for early until mid-adult life (Mirowsky and Ross, 2008). Whereas for later life, there
is no consensus. Although the majority of empirical evidence supports the AAL theory
in old age, poor correction of the bias from sample selection makes definite conclusions
about what drives the convergence hard to reach; that is, the sample selection caused by
non-response as well as selective mortality could be driving the results.
3 Data
3.1 The NorLAG Survey Data
The survey data applied in this study are from the NorLAG panel study9. This is a
survey carried out on a representative sample of Norwegian older adults. The NorLAG
contains individual-level data on a range of health outcomes, as well as information about
SES. Data collection was carried out by Statistics Norway,10 and the first two waves were
collected in 2002 (age 40–80) and 2007 (age 45–85).11 All survey responses are merged
with administrative records of birth year and education from the population database
and national education database, as well as data on welfare transfers and income from
8If selective mortality is the cause of reduced inequalities in health, then this is, in reality, support for
the CAD theory; that is, the health inequalities have gotten so large that people in the low SES group
have higher mortality rates than people in the high SES groups for a given age.
9See Slagsvold et al. (2012) for a thorough description.
10Using computer-assisted telephone interviews.
11An updated sample of individuals aged 40–44 is also available in 2007 but is not included here.
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the social security and income registers. The panel contains 10,057 observations divided
by 6,307 individuals, of whom 3,765 responded to both waves. The response rates are
presented in more detail in Figure 1 below. Statistics Norway provided population weights
based on individual-level register data for gender, age, educational level, province, and
centrality.
Health status is measured as the physical component of the SF12 (Ware Jr et al., 1996).
Among the components of the SF12 are self-rated health, measures of the degree to which
an individual is able to perform tasks like vacuuming, moving a table, or climbing stairs,
whether there are certain tasks that could not be performed due to health limitations,
or whether pain limits daily activities. Thus, the SF12 is an expression of general health
comprising both self-rated health and health limitations in daily life. Moreover, the SF12
has been found to be a strong predictor of hospitalization, job loss due to health, future
use of medical health services, and depression (Jenkinson and Layte, 1997; Ware Jr et al.,
1996; Brazier and Roberts, 2004). The SF12 score is standardized on a scale from 0 to
100 with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 using the U.S. population as a
reference.
3.2 The Register Data
The second data source consists of individual-level register data provided by Statistics
Norway that covers the entire resident population over the period 2006–2014. These
registers include the same demographic information that was used to construct population
weights for the NorLAG sample in addition to variables such as cohabitation status, date
of birth and death, and various health registers. Individuals can be linked across all
registers by unique identifiers.
The measure of health status from the registers is acquired from detailed information
about PCP consultations. The payment to a PCP for a consultations is a combination of
a fixed patient charge and per-consultation reimbursement from the state based on the
duration of the consultation and the specific treatment given. All reimbursements are
recorded by the Control and Distribution of Health Reimbursement database (KUHR)
and available for the years 2006–2014.
In this analysis, health status is measured by the sum of the reimbursements for all
PCP consultations for an individual on a yearly basis. The sum of the reimbursements
can arguably be interpreted as the presence and extent of health limitations in a given
year. In addition, I provide an ad hoc solution for individuals living in nursing homes.
Because these care facilities usually have in-house physicians, the resident’s consultations
are not registered in the KUHR. Therefore, I provide all individuals living in nursing
homes in the current year with the average of the reimbursements claimed by individuals
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who show up in a nursing home the next year.12
I do not include utilization of the specialist health care services in the health measure
as specialist services are less suited as a measure of health in this setting because it has
been shown to be endogenous to SES. Individuals with higher SES are found to get better
access to and more treatment in the specialist services for, provided the same levels of
health (Grasdal and Monstad, 2011; Syse et al., 2012; Elstad, 2018). One explanation
could be that communication is better within the SES groups; that is that the PCP
and higher educated individuals understand each other better, thus making the PCP
more likely to refer the high SES patient to a specialist than a patient from a lower SES
group. Another explanation could be that gaining better access to specialist care services
demands skills more common among people with high SES, such as navigating heavy
bureaucracy. The worry is that educational differences in health measured as utilization
of specialist care services will be biased toward zero as individuals with high SES are
better at accessing this type of care.
As the PCP system covers the entire population (privately funded primary health
care services were uncommon in 2007), I argue that, overall, PCPR provides a credible
measure of the extent of individual health problems around a given age, and thus, is
an indicator of an individual’s health level. In tables 2 through 4 below, I explore how
PCPR are distributed across SES, gender, and age, compared to the distribution of the
SF12 from the NorLAG along these dimensions.
3.3 Other Variables
Records of education, which is the measure for SES in this analysis, and age, are based on
the same administrative records in the survey and register data (the population register
and the national education database). Age is divided into 5-year age groups: “40–44”,
“45–49”,..., “80–84”, while education is divided into three levels: “lower secondary edu-
cation” (8–10 years), “upper secondary education” (11–14 years), and “higher education”
(14+ years). Cohabitation, defined as being married or living with a registered partner, is
based on the population register and the survey response in the NorLAG data and on the
population register in the register data. Summary statistics for the second wave (2007)
of the NorLAG data and the register data in 2007 are presented in Tables 1 through 4
below in Section 4.
12As a sensitivity analysis, I perform the main analysis using reimbursements excluding those who are
institutionalized to see how much this ad hoc solution affects the outcome. The results are presented in
Graph A2 in the Appendix.
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4 Sample Selection in the NorLAG Survey Data
The aim in this section is to uncover as much information about the sample selection
mechanism in the NorLAG data as possible with the data available. I start by describing
the response rates, before I compare relevant observable characteristics in the NorLAG
and register data. I then compare the patterns of distribution of the two health measures,
SF12 and PCPR, and mortality across the same observable characteristics. Finally, I
assess what observable characteristics at T1 predict non-response at T2 and whether there
is a correlation between the number of waves responded to and health, after controlling
for variables such as age and education.
The response rates in the NorLAG are 66.9 percent at T1 and 60.6 percent at T2.
Among those who responded at T1, 67.5 percent responded at T2 (the conditional re-
sponse rate). The main reason for non-response at both waves was refusal to participate,
whereas a small fraction was prevented from responding or contact was not established
(Koløen et al., 2013; Bjørshol et al., 2010). Figure 1 provides an overview of the response
rates and sample sizes. The gross sample invited to participate at T1 was also invited
to participate at T2, and about 30 percent of the non-responders at T1 responded at
T2. This implies that the full T2 sample of responders can be seen as a cross-sectional
sample of the population. Thus, we can assess the non-response at T2 either compared
to the full population (initial selection) or compared to at T1 (attrition). This is illus-
trated by arrow B and arrow C in Figure 1, respectively. The health registers are not
available in 2002 for comparison with the T1 sample. In addition, as this study implies
comparing estimates across a range of selection correction methods, including comparing
estimates based on the survey sample to estimates based on full population registers, it
is convenient for the purpose of the comparisons to base all estimates on the same wave
of data.
Throughout this analysis, two different sub-samples of the T2 are applied: an unbal-
anced sample and a balanced sample. The unbalanced sample consists of all responders
at T2. That includes those who responded at both T1 and T2, in addition to those
who were invited to participate at T1 but responded only at T2. The balanced sample
consists of only those who responded at T2 who also responded at T1. The balanced
sample is assumed to be more selected than the unbalanced sample as these individuals
have agreed to, or been able to, participate twice. Because the unbalanced sample can be
seen as a cross-sectional survey sample, it is interesting to compare results based on this
sample with results from the register data. However, for some of the selection correction
approaches, data on observable characteristics are needed, also for the non-responders at
T2, for example to make IPWs or estimate Heckman’s lambda. For these approaches,
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the balanced sample must be applied.
The summary tables 1 to 4 show some important preconditions for this analysis.
Table 1 compares the distribution of central covariates in the NorLAG to the underlying
population of interest: all Norwegian adults aged 45–85 in 2007 measured by the register
data. Table 2 and Table 3 show how the distribution of the health measure from the
register data compares with the distribution of the health measure from the NorLAG
survey. Finally, Table 4 shows how mortality from 2002 to 2007 compares across central
covariates in the two data sources.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the unbalanced and the balanced T2 samples,
as well as the means weighted by population weights for the unbalanced sample and
by IPWs (derived below) for the balanced sample. The final row contains summary
statistics for the population-level register data. Table 1 shows that praimarily those
with low education are under-represented in the NorLAG sample.13 The fraction of low
educated for the unweighted means of the unbalanced and balanced samples compared
to the actual fraction in the population are 8–9 percentage points lower for men and
9–10 percentage points lower for women. Accordingly, among the higher educated, the
pattern is reversed with an over-representation of the higher educated by 6–7 percentage
points for men and 9–11 percentage points for women. The balanced sample is more
selected than the unbalanced sample, as the educational means differ more for this sub-
sample. The population weights and the IPWs do a fairly good job at correcting for this
education-based selection.
The NorLAG sample is more representative when it comes to the age distribution.
There is a slight under-representation of the younger age groups and the weights correct
for the under-representation. For the oldest group (age 80+), the means by the population
weights correspond less with the population mean than the other means. On the one
hand, the older age groups are oversampled to have enough individuals in the NorLAG
sample at these higher ages. On the other, the oldest age group has a poorer response
rate compared to the younger groups. In sum, the fraction of older adults in the sample
becomes fairly representative compared to the underlying population. For this group, the
weights provide a poor correction.
How well the NorLAG sample compares to the full population regarding health has
not previously been assessed. This is in part because there are no overlapping measures
of health in the two data sources.14 Here, I show that the PCPR is comparable to the
13This was also shown by Lappegård and Veenstra (2010).
14There is a measure of mortality in both data sources, but unfortunately, mortality measured by the
NorLAG is limited to information about mortality at any point in time between T1 and T2, conditional
on responding at T1. Thus this measure is too limited to provide a meaningful basis for regression
analysis.
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SF12 along the dimensions that are important for this study.
Table 2 shows that similar to the SF12 (scales are in the opposite direction), health
measured by PCPR deteriorates with age. In addition, men have higher health levels than
women, higher educated individuals are more healthy than lower educated individuals,
and those in single households are less healthy than those who live with a partner or
spouse. Thus, PCPR and the SF12 have the same pattern of distribution across these
explanatory variables. This gives reason to believe that PCPR captures several of the
same underlying health dimensions as the SF12 in relation to the explanatory variables of
interest in this study, and that PCPR therefore can be used to assess how the SES–health
relationship changes across age in a way that is comparable to the SF12.
In addition, the SF12 and the PCPR are both generic health measures, as they con-
tain elements of functional ability and general health, unlike more disease-specific register
health measures. The PCPR and the SF12 contain some element of self-assessed health
because the initiative to visit a PCP is based on how health is experienced by the individ-
ual, whereas for the SF12, the survey respondents are asked about how they experience
health in several settings. In addition, both measures contain some elements that are
more concrete expressions of health, such as the PCP’s assessment of the patient’s health
and thus, the services provided. In the SF12, this is incorporated by the questions of
a more technical nature that include the respondent’s ability to climb stairs, vacuum,
go hiking, or garden. Importantly, the PCPR and the SF12 are also very different and,
therefore, unsuited to compare health levels across measures, or to assess whether the
educational or gender differences in health are larger or smaller in either data source.
These differences imply that we cannot use the PCPR to assess the magnitude of health
selection in the NorLAG sample. In Table 3, I present standardized means to further
facilitate comparisons between the two health measures.
Finally, a measure of health that is available in both data sets is mortality. Unfor-
tunately, the year of death is not available in the NorLAG data; therefore, comparing
mortality hazard rates is not an option. However, in Table 4, I show how mortality from
2002 to 2007 is allocated across age, education, and cohabitation status in the two data
sources.
Mortality in the NorLAG sample is defined as the fraction deceased at T2 (2007) of
those who responded at T1 (2002). In the register data, mortality is defined as the fraction
deceased in 2007, contingent on being alive in 2002. Overall, mortality corresponds fairly
well in the two data sources. However, the fraction who died between 2002 and 2007 is
somewhat larger in general, compared to the NorLAG, indicating that those who respond
at T1 are likely to be selected on good health, as they have a lower likelihood of dying
within the next five years. In addition, the lower educated in the NorLAG sample have
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lower rates of mortality indicating that the NorLAG respondents in the lowest educational
group are more selected with respect to good health compared to this group in the
population.
In sum, Tables 1 to 4 provide evidence supporting that the NorLAG survey is fairly
representative compared to the underlying population, except for education, in which case
the weights do a good job of correcting the means. Moreover, the health measures from
the two data sources follow the same distribution over age, education, and cohabitation
status. Finally, the mortality patterns in the two data sources suggest that the NorLAG
sample is positively selected with respect to health, especially for the lower educated
group.
The previous results assessed the initial non-response in the NorLAG, that is, selection
compared to the underlying population. I now turn to assessing attrition across waves
in the NorLAG data. This is interesting for three reasons. First, assessing whether
the data loss happening across time correlates with health is important for longitudinal
analyses. Second, the data loss across waves is a combination of time gone by and of
aging of the sample. Thus, the data loss occurring across waves can be indicative of the
selection mechanism occurring across age in a cross-sectional sample. Finally, the data
loss from one period to the next potentially occurs along the same dimensions as the initial
non-response. Provided this is true, it implies that the selective attrition mechanism
(partially) corresponds to the initial sample selection mechanism. Thus, finding evidence
of selective attrition is indicative not only of potential bias in longitudinal analyses using
the survey data but also of sample selection across age compared to the full population.
To assess the magnitude of selective attrition in the NorLAG survey, I perform two
exercises: probability models of non-response at T2 based on relevant observable charac-
teristics at T1 and the variable-added test suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) in
line with Jones et al. (2006).
First, to assess how non-response at T2 correlates with covariates of interest, in par-
ticular past health, the following linear probability model is estimated:
P (ai = 1|xi) = xiβ, (1)
where ai = 1 if individual i fell out of the sample from T1 to T2. The dependent variable,
thus, is the likelihood of non-response at T2, conditional on responding at T1. xi is a
vector of explanatory variables. I employ three versions of xi. In the first model “Simple”,
I include no controls besides the age and educational dummies. In the second model “P.
Weights”, I employ the same controls as those applied by Statistics Norway to make
the population weights. This implies that xi includes centrality and region of residence
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in addition to the age and educational dummies. Finally, the model “Health” adds the
SF12 to the xi. This provides a systematic overview of what predicts non-response at T2
(conditional on response at T1). The results are presented in Table 5.15
Table 5 shows that age and education are strong predictors of attrition. Those who
are older and have less education are more likely to fall out of the sample. The other
variables that go into making the population weights, centrality and region, do not predict
attrition. This does not necessarily mean that these variables do not predict initial non-
response. Lappegård and Veenstra (2010) show that region and centrality do predict
initial non-response, however, only slightly. Finally, those with worse health at T1 are
less likely to respond at T2, thus indicating that there is health-related sample selection
in the NorLAG data.16 However, according to the adjusted R2, including health adds
some explanatory power in predicting attrition between the waves for men, but none for
women.
In the second test of selective attrition, the variable “number of waves responded to”
is added to the model of the main outcome (derived in Equation 2 below) according
to Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Jones et al. (2006) by using a pooled sample of
all responders at T1 and T2, thus, providing a test of whether the number of waves
an individual responded to (one or two) is associated with health after controlling for
relevant variables, in this case, the age and education dummies. The assumption is that
those who respond to more waves have better health than those who respond to fewer
waves, thus showing that health-related attrition across waves is a potential problem.
The results from the variables added-test are presented in Table 6. The coefficients
“No. of waves” are significant for both men and women, meaning that there is a correla-
tion between health and the number of waves responded to, even when age, education, and
their interactions are controlled for. Moreover, this correlation persists when those who
fell out of the sample at T2 due to mortality are excluded, ensuring that the correlation
between health and non-response is not driven by mortality.
5 Case Study and Sample Selection Bias Corrections
In this section, I present the empirical case study applied to test the selection bias, and
the various selection correction methods that are applied in this analysis. Despite the
large amount of literature on sample selection, no method is considered superior. This
15A fuller probit model, based on the derivation of the IPWs described below, and a simpler probit,
which is the first stage of the Heckman, are presented in Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix.
16As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, there is larger selection based on past self-rated health
compared to past SF12. For this reason, as a robustness check, the main analysis (outlined in the next
section) was conducted using self-rated health as the health outcome. These results does not change the
main conclusions reached and are presented in the Appendix.
128
is in part because the impact of the sample selection depends on the question at hand
and the available data, and thus, the correct method for selection correction corresponds
to the selection mechanism in the data and the empirical question. The exact nature
of the sample selection in the NorLAG data is unobserved. Therefore, I make various
assumptions about the selection mechanism and assess how the estimates in a regression
of SES and age on health are affected by the corresponding selection correction. For
comparability, I assess the sample selection at T2 across all specifications.
I start by assuming that the selection is based on observable factors. Under this as-
sumption, consistent estimates can be obtained by applying weights (Fitzgerald et al.,
1998; Wooldridge, 2002). Then, by assuming that the sample selection is based on unob-
servable factors, I apply the Heckman and Copula selection models. Finally, I compare
the results from the survey data to the results using data without non-response, namely
full population register data. This implies that we can assess the impact of initial non-
response, not just attrition, in the NorLAG data. It is plausible that the initial selection
is stronger than the selection that takes place across waves, and finding that the bias
caused by the latter is small does not necessarily mean that the former sort of selection
is not problematic. The register data approach can thus uncover some implications of
initial selection for analyses of health in old age. None of these approaches are without
problems, but the idea is that the sum of selection corrections will bring us closer to
definite answers about whether non-response in survey data causes bias in estimates of
health inequalities in later life using a typical sample of older adults.
5.1 Case Study: Social Inequalities in Health across Age
To assess the bias from health-related sample selection established above, an empirical
application is needed. Here, I employ the relationship between health and education
across age. This is a case study particularly prone to bias from health-related non-
response as health, education, and age correlate with survey non-response. I assume the
following relationship:











γjkAgeij × SESik + ui, (2)
for k=1–3 and j=1–8. Healthi is the health outcome for individual i. Age include
j − 1 age group indicators (50–54, 55–59, .., 80–84, with the age group 45–49 serving
as the reference category, and SES are education level indicators (upper secondary and
higher education, respectively, with lower secondary education serving as the reference
level). Ageij ∗ SESik are interaction terms that allow the health–education relationship
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to vary across age. This specification does not include any controls as this is merely a
descriptive analysis of differences in patterns of health across age for different educational
groups. Moreover, this is a cross-sectional representation of health across age, and not a
representation of an individual’s health trajectory across the life-course in later life.
The measure of interest is the marginal effect of education on health, evaluated at
different age groups, and is given by:
∂Health
∂SESk
= βk + γkjAgej, (3)
for k=2–3 and j=1–8.
Importantly, as non-response was shown to correlate with age, education, and health
(even after conditioning on education and age), there is a correlation between ui and Ageij
and SESik in Equation 2, and therefore, omitted variable bias. Hence, the coefficients in
Equation 2 and 3 cannot be identified unless sample selection is properly accounted for.
5.2 Correcting for Sample Selection Bias
5.2.1 Selection on Observables
To formalize, let ri be response in a given wave, hi the health level, and xi the observable
controls for individual i. If we have P (ri = 1|hi, xi) = P (ri = 1), then the likelihood of
response does not vary systematically with the health level (or controls), and the non-
response can be ignored.17 OLS estimation of Equation 2 will yield unbiased coefficients.
This is the assumption for the “baseline” approach.
If, instead, we have that:
P (ri = 1|hi, xi, zi) = P (ri = 1|xi, zi), (4)
then, conditional on xi and zi, ri and hi do not vary systematically.18 For Equation 4 to
hold, the conditional independence condition (CIC) must be satisfied. The CIC requires
that there exists some variable, zi, that predicts ri and is endogenous to hi (must correlate
with hi after controlling for xi). In addition, zi must be left out of the main equation. If
the CIC hold, Equation 2 can be consistently estimated by weighted least squares (WLS)
(Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Jones et al., 2006; Wooldridge, 2002). This approach is referred
to as selection on observables (Fitzgerald et al., 1998).
In practice, weighting entails giving more weight to observations that are less likely
to be in the sample, based on their observable characteristics. Weighting applies to both
initial selection and to attrition. In the first case, population weights are appropriate. In
17This is often referred to as data missing completely at random (MCAR) (Fitzgerald et al., 1998).
18This is often referred to as data missing at random (MAR) (Fitzgerald et al., 1998)
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the latter, IPWs are appropriate. IPWs imply calculating the likelihood of responding,
based on the observable characteristics from past waves, and weighting the data by the
inverse of these probabilities (Wooldridge, 2002; Michaud et al., 2011).
In this study, I estimate inverse probability weights based on the probability of re-
sponse in the second wave of the NorLAG, given observable characteristics. The following
probit is estimated:
P (ri = 1|xi, zi) = Φ(xiβ + ziγ), (5)
where ri = 1 if individual i responded at T2. Thus, the dependent variable is the
likelihood of response at T2, conditional on responding at T1. xi includes age group
indicators (50–54, 55–59, .., 80–84) and education indicators (upper secondary and higher
education, respectively). The zi vector comprises past health (the SF12, indicators for
each level of self-rated health, an indicator for physical health limitations, and an indicator
for recently severely reduced health), an indicator for manual occupation, if one’s mother
is alive, being retired, living with a partner, income by quartiles, and an indicator for
whether the individual was working or had worked before retirement. The models are
estimated separately for men and women.
What have been suggested as good instruments for zi are lagged variables of the
dependent variable and intermediary factors on the pathway from xi to hi (Fitzgerald
et al., 1998). In this case, the first is past health, and the latter is occupation, income,
retirement, disability, and work status. Clearly, the latter correlates with education (and
age) and health. This approach is therefore primarily applicable to structural problems.
That being problems where the interest lies in a theoretical relationship between hi and
xi, rather than a reduced form problem as the exclusion of zi would create bias in the
latter. In this study, I claim no causal relations as I merely assess average health by
education and age group. Thus, leaving the zi out of the main equation (Equation 2)
does not cause bias. Finally, this approach controls only for health risks that are in the
history of the individual, not for idiosyncratic shocks to health that cause someone to
drop out of the sample.
Whereas the IPWs correct for attrition from the first to the second wave, the pop-
ulation weights derived by Statistics Norway can be applied to assess initial selection.
Population weights account for the sample’s lack of representativeness compared to the
population of interest, in this case, the entire Norwegian population aged 45–85 in 2007.
The population weights are based on observable characteristics that are known in the en-
tire population. In short, all individuals are initially given the same weight and then the
weights are calibrated based on gender, age, education, region, and centrality to match
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the observed shares in the population.19 These weights are not derived to control for
health-related sample selection in particular. Instead, they are derived with the purpose
of making the sample averages comparable to the underlying population of interest. The
assumption needed for this analysis is that these variables correlate with health; thus,
applying the population weights will partially correct for the health-related non-response.
Estimation by the population weights provides insight into how sensitive the esti-
mates are to initial non-response, whereas the IPW estimation can provide some insight
into whether the attrition happening over time affects the estimates. In both weighting
approaches, Equation 2 is estimated using weighted least squares. For the weighting ap-
proach to provide consistent estimates of Equation 2, the CIC must be satisfied. For the
population weights, this implies that region and centrality are endogenous to health and
correlate with selection (as these weights are already created by Statisticts Norway, and
education, age, and gender are a part of xi). The latter is barely satisfied. As Lappegård
and Veenstra (2010) show, region and centrality only slightly predict non-response. The
IPWs, on the other hand, are derived with the purpose of satisfying the CIC.
Finally, as the IPWs imply selection correction of the balanced sample and the popu-
lation weights imply correction for the unbalanced sample, I provide the marginal effects
(Equation 3) derived by the OLS estimates of Equation 2 based on each of these samples.
In addition, comparing the OLS estimates based on these sub-samples provides a test of
sample selection bias (Jones et al., 2006), under the assumption that those who respond
to both (all) waves are more selected, in this case with respect to health, than those who
respond only to one. If the estimates differ, it is likely that the non-response will cause
omitted variable bias.
Moreover, comparing the WLS estimates to the OLS estimates is a test of selection
bias–provided the selection is based on observables. The assumption that the sample
selection is based only on observables is strong. We cannot exclude that the selection
mechanism is based on unobservable factors, in which case Equation 4 does not hold. In
this case, selection models are more appropriate.
5.2.2 Selection on Unobservables
Selection models rely on assumptions about the conditional underlying health distribution
(latent health) and about the sample selection mechanism, and are given by the two
equations:
h∗i = x1iβ1 + u1i, (6)
19The weights are calculated by Statistics Norway using CLAN. As Statistics Norway has individual-
level register data covering these variables for the entire Norwegian population, these weights are of very
high quality.
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where h∗i is the underlying health distribution in the population, x1i are the controls
(education and age group dummies), and u1i is the error. As we observe health only for
those who answer the survey, h∗i is unobserved (latent). Instead, we observe hi according
to the selection equation:
ri = x2iβ2 + u2i, (7)
where ri is the likelihood of response, which takes the value 1 if i responded at T2, x2i
are the controls, and u2i is the error, possibly correlated with u1i. x1i is nested within
x2i.
The conditional expectation function is
E[h∗i |x1i] = E[hi|x1i, ri ≥ 0] = x1iβ1 + E[u1i|u2i ≥ −x2iβ2], (8)
which is the conditional mean for the survey responders. If there is no health-related
selection, that is, if the errors, u1i and u2i, are uncorrelated, Equation 8 can be estimated
by OLS without the non-response causing bias. However, as shown above, there is cor-
relation between health and non-response, conditional on the controls (Table 5), which
implies that the sample selection can be seen as an omitted variables bias problem. The
insight by Heckman (1979) was that as such, Equation 8 can be consistently estimated by
a linear regression of hi on x1i and an additive non-linear function of x2i, where the latter
is estimated by the inverse of Mill’s ratio, given by λ(x2iβ2) = φ(x2iβ2)/(1 − Φ(x2iβ2))
Accordingly, we have
E[h∗i |x1i] = E[hi|x1i, ri ≥ 0] = x1iβ1 + σλ(−x2iβ2) (9)
which is an estimable equation. Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step estimator that
separately estimates the selection equation in a probit to obtain estimates of the inverse
Mill’s ratio, before controlling for this in an OLS regression of x1i on hi.20
Identification of the sample selection, estimated by σλ(−x2iβ2), hinges on the non-
normality of the λ, which is approximately linear over a large range of its argument. If
x1i and x2i contain the same variables, the selection equation is poorly identified due to
multicollinearity problems. Therefore, it is common to include an exclusion restriction to
increase the robustness of the identification. This involves finding a variable that predicts
non-response but is uncorrelated with the error in the main equation.21 Here, I propose
20The standard errors must be corrected accordingly, but this is typically implemented in the statistical
software.
21Unlike in the case of selection on observables where the CIC was satisfied by a variable that is
correlated with selection and health but is excluded from the main equation.
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the year in which the interview took place at T1. Respondents who were interviewed in
2003 are substantially less likely to respond at T2 compared to respondents interviewed
in 2002. The reason is that those who responded in 2003 were less inclined to respond to
the survey and had to be contacted several times before a response was obtained. They
are marginal responders. The year of the survey response, however, is not correlated with
health at T1. I show this in a regression of the year of response at T1, education, and
age, on health. The results are presented in Table 7. This table also includes results
showing the coefficients for how the year of response at T1 correlates with the likelihood
of responding at T2, holding age and education constant. Estimation is done separately
for men and women.
All though the Heckman model has been criticized, it is widely applied in empirical
work (Puhani, 2000). Moreover, it is considered the textbook example of sample selection
models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010), and is therefore included in this
study. A central critique is that the Heckman two-step estimator is less efficient than
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Nelson et al., 1984; Puhani, 2000). Thus, I
include results estimated by maximum likelihood in addition to the two-step estimates.
Moreover, the MLE estimates are appropriate for comparing estimates derived by the




(Pr(ri < 0))1−ri(f(hi|ri > 0)Pr(ri > 0))ri (10)
For consistent estimates, the errors (u1i, u2i) must be bivariate normal and independent
of x2i, with correlation ρ, and variances σ2 and 1, respectively.22
A central critique of the Heckman is the bivariate normality assumption. If the er-
rors are not bivariate normal, then the model does not sufficiently control for selection,
leading to inconsistent estimates. The Copula is a Heckman type of selection model es-
timated by maximum likelihood and where the joint normality assumption is relaxed.
The copula approach implies replacing the bivariate distribution by two marginal distri-
butions bound together by a copula function.23 This implies specifying the marginal se-
lection distribution, f(r|x2), and the marginal outcome distribution, f(h|x1), separately,
and a copula function that describes the relationship between the two distributions,
C[f(r|x2), f(h|x1), θ], where θ is the dependence parameter in the copula that governs
the degree of dependence.
According to Sklar’s theorem, all multivariate distributions have a copula representa-
22Assuming unity for the variance of u2i can be done without loss of generality, as the selection equation
is without scale in the estimations.
23This is due to Sklar’s theorem which states that any multivariate distribution can be described by
its underlying marginal distributions bound together by a copula function (Smith, 2003).
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tion. A few families of couplas has been identified by Smith (2003) as particularly well
suited for selection models due to their mathematical properties, such as joint asymmetry
and excess joint skewness.24 These families of couplas, and a few others, have been imple-
mented in statistical software. To estimate the Copula model, I use the heckmancopula25
command developed by Hasebe et al. (2013).26
The limitations of the copula approach lies in the ability of the copula to describe
the dependence pattern between the marginal distributions of the selection and the main
outcome. Choosing the right copula, requires some a priori insight into the dependence
between the two. If the dependence between these two marginal distributions is unknown,
then a proposed solution is to apply various copulas and choose the copula associated
with the largest log-likelihood according to the Baysian Information Criteria (BIC), pre-
supposing that the number of parameters does not differ across models (Smith, 2003;
Hasebe et al., 2013).
Here, the actual dependence between health and the likelihood of responding at T2 is
unobserved, as is common in selection models due to the latent structure of the dependent
variable. Therefore, I apply the various families of copulas that are currently developed for
selection models and available in the statistical software. These copula families include the
Product, Gaussian, Ali-Mikhail-Haq, Gumbal, Plackett, Clayton, Frank, Joe, and Fairlie-
Gumbel-Morgenstern (Hasebe et al., 2013). The Gaussian, Plackett, Frank, and Fairlie-
Gumbel-Morgenstern exhibit various degrees of symmetric tail dependence, whereas the
Ali-Mikhail-Haq, Gumbal, Clayton, and Joe exhibit various degrees of asymmetric tail
dependence. The Product assumes independence between the two marginal distributions.
The copula that is best suited according to the BIC is then included in the main analysis.
In addition, I assess whether the best-fitting copula is an improvement compared to the
Heckman MLE by applying the Vuoung test (Hasebe et al., 2013). This is described in
more detail in Section 6.1.1 below.
5.2.3 Comparing Results Based on Survey Data to Results Based on Register
Data
The final part of the bias assessment entails comparing the marginal effects (Equation 3)
using the NorLAG data to the results using the full population register data. Therefore,
having a measure of health from the registers that is comparable to the SF12 is essential.
As the register data contain only administrative records of health care utilization (and
24These include the Ali-Mikhail-Haq, Clayton, Frank, Gumbel, and Joe.
25Copula estimation using the gaussian copula and assuming that the marginal distributions of health
and selection are normal is the same as estimation by heckman MLE.
26See Smith (2003) for more about copula selection models in general and Hasebe et al. (2013) for
copula estimation in Stata.
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mortality), no perfect counterpart to the SF12 exists in the registers. For the purpose of
this analysis, I argue that the sum of reimbursements for all PCP consultations in a given
year can be applied. First, similar to the SF12, PCPR is a generic measure of health.
Second, reimbursements are shown to have patterns of distribution across age, SES, and
gender that are comparable to those of the SF12 (Table 2). As, the register data do
not have non-response issues, the distribution of PCPR reflects the actual distribution of
health in the population and therefore, can serve as an unbiased distribution of health
with which we can compare to the SF12. If SES and health are shown to have the same
relationship across age in the survey as in the register data, then we have an indication
that selective non-response is not what is causing the observed convergence in health in
later life. Rather, this is something that happens at the population level as well.
As explained in Section 3, secondary health care utilization is excluded because of the
worry that the expression of utilization reflects not only health but also SES. However,
as a robustness check, I provide results using hospital admissions as the main health
outcome. Hospitalization is a sub-group of the specialist care services that arguably
has smaller bias because admission to the hospital is not granted unless the patient is
severely ill. However, hospitalizations, either acute or planned, are granted based on
the medical staff’s assessment of need. Therefore, hospitalizations are likely to reflect
differences in utilization due to SES in addition to the presence and extent of severe health
problems. This implies a downward bias in the educational differences in hospitalizations.
In addition, being hospitalized is a non-generic and extreme health outcome in that it
reflects very poor health, and therefore, is not well suited for a comparison with the SF12.
Results for hospitalizations are shown in Appendix Graph A1.
6 Results
6.1 Sample Selection Correction in the Survey Data
The results from the different approaches using the NorLAG survey data are presented
in Figure 2 (men) and Figure3 (women). The estimation tables for all specifications
are shown in Appendix Tables A3 through A5. All graphs show the marginal effects
(Equation 3) of education on health across 5-year interval age groups. The graphs show
the difference in health for upper secondary (solid line) and higher (dotted line) education
compared to lower secondary education (reference), respectively, as the aim here is to
study convergence in health between educational groups across age.27
Graph A. Unbalanced Sample, in Figure 2, shows the estimation results using OLS
27In addition, I ran the whole analysis excluding individuals who fell out of the sample due to mortality.
This had no impact on the estimates. Only 265 individuals (4.8 percent) of the responders at T1 died
between T1 and T2.
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on the gross sample of responders at T2 for men. In general, a pattern of converging
health inequalities, consistent with the AAL theory, is found. Inequalities are largest for
the 60- to 64-year-old age group, after which they decrease across the older age groups,
except a spike for the 75- to 79-year-old age group for the highest educated group.
Graph B. Balanced sample, shows the OLS estimation results using only the sub-
sample who responded to both waves at T2. These results confirm the AAL for the
“more selected” sub-sample. The educational differences in health range from about 7
points (on the SF12 scale) for the 60- to 64-year-old group, to almost zero for the oldest
age groups. Assuming that the balanced sample is more selected than the unbalanced
sample, we would expect smaller educational differences in Graph B compared to Graph
A. In general, this is not the case. However, there is an apparent faster convergence of
the inequalities for the age groups 60- to 64-year-old and 65- to 69-year-old age groups
in Graph B.
In this application, sample selection is assumed to bias the estimates of the educational
differences toward zero, and this bias is assumed to increase with age. This implies
that we would expect larger educational differences and weaker convergence in the bias-
corrected estimates, provided the proposed selection correction methods are appropriate.
Specifically, assuming that the AAL pattern is caused by sample selection the selection
correction would imply a smaller or no convergence in the educational differences in health
for the older age groups.
The two weighting approaches are shown in Graph C. Pop. Weights and Graph D.
IPW. The coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares, as outlined in Section
5. Importantly, the population weights are derived with respect to the gross sample at
T2, whereas the IPWs are derived with respect to the balanced sample at T2, as we need
the information at T1 to allocate the weights to each observation at T2. The weighted
estimates do not differ substantially from the OLS estimates, except a smaller convergence
for the oldest age group for the higher educated using the population weights. However,
this does not change the empirical support for the AAL theory.
The two lower graphs, E. Heckman and F. Copula, show the marginal effects estimated
by the Heckman and the Copula (more about the choice of copula in Section 6.1.1 below).
Because data on the explanatory variables are needed for the estimation of both selection
models, the selection models are based on responders and non-responders at T2, provided
information about age and education was obtained at T1.28
The inequalities estimated by the Heckman are marginally larger for all age groups
28In this application, educational group is based on the education reported at T1. It is unlikely that
someone in these cohorts undertake an amount of education that would change education from one
category to another.
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compared with the OLS estimates of the balanced sample. This results is consistent with
the assumption that selection causes the estimates to be biased toward zero. Despite
larger inequalities in all age groups, the Heckman estimates still provide evidence of
converging inequalities for the older age groups. The effects estimated by the Copula
are slightly larger than those by the Heckman, and there is still evidence of convergence,
albeit less clear. The choice of copula is not important for the pattern of convergence.
The results for women (Figure 3) provides fairly similar conclusions. Except for the
highest educated in the oldest age group. The results for this group should be handled
with care as very few of these women have higher education (this group contain only 96
observations for the unbalanced sample and 51 for the balanced sample). The convergence
in health inequalities across age is visually stronger for women than for men, particularly
due to the large differences between both higher and upper secondary education and
lower secondary education for the age group 55-59. As for men, the Copula results for
women display a slightly weaker convergence compared to the other models.
6.1.1 The Choice of Copula
The main difference between the copulas is how they capture the dependence between
health and non-response. The copula that provided the best fit according to the BIC (the
largest log-likelihood) was the Joe, and thus, this is the copula shown in Figure 2 and
Figure 3. This copula exhibits asymmetric, right tail joint dependence, which complies
with the assumption that those with higher levels of health have a higher likelihood of
responding.
Moreover, according to the Vuoung test, the Copula using the Joe copula is a statisti-
cally significant improvement compared to the Heckman MLE. The Vuoung test implies
calculating the contribution to the log-likelihood function of each observation in the
Heckman MLE and in the Coupla MLE, and then testing whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the contributions to the log-likelihood in these two mod-
els. As shown in Table 8, the log-likelihood of the Joe copula estimation compared to
the Heckman was -8048.569 compared to -8128.966 for men and -8859.473 compared to
-8813.156 for women. The OLS test of the difference between the contribution of each ob-
servation to the log-likelihood function is statistically significant with a t-value of -16.67
for men and -14.07 for women. The results for this test are presented in Table A6 in the
Appendix.
In addition, unlike in the Heckman, the Copula provides evidence of sample selection.
The p-value under the test of independence between u1i and u2i is below 0.001 for men
and women. In contrast, the p-values based on the Heckman are 0.499 and 0.831 for men
and women, respectively. This is also evident by the statistical significance of the θs,
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whereas the λs are not statistically significance.
6.2 Comparing Results Based on Survey Data to Results Based
on Register Data
The results for men and women using the panel data are displayed in Figure 4. The
figure presents the marginal effects in Equation 3 estimated by OLS using the register
data in 2007. The dotted line represents higher education, and the solid line represents
upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference category. As
the outcome here (PCPR) is expressed in monetary terms, higher values indicate worse
health outcomes. The higher educated have better health outcomes at all age groups, but
these differences decrease across age. Thus, the results from the register data supports
the finding in the survey data and contradict the hypothesis that bias due to selective
non-response drives the convergence in later life health in studies using survey data. This
result is also supported by the analysis using hospitalizations (shown in the Appendix).
A few cautions are worth mentioning at this point. First, the estimated trajectories
cannot necessarily be ascribed to an age effect on health due to the cross-sectional nature
of the data. Rather, the observed health-age relationship is a combination of age and
cohort effects. Second, the results do not provide identification of whether social inequal-
ities in health are diverging or converging across age in later life due to the cross-sectional
and descriptive nature of the estimated health trajectories. Finally, it is possible that
neither of the selection approaches fully controls for sample selection bias in the empirical
example provided, as they all rely on assumptions that are not necessarily satisfied. The
weighting approach hinges on selection being based on the observable factors that go into
making the weights, and the Heckman on joint normality of the errors, both of which
are strong assumptions. The results from the Copula show that there is a correlation
between the errors in the selection and the main outcome equations, thus indicating that
selection is based on unobservables and contrasting the results from the Heckman. The
results from the Heckman and the weighting approaches, therefore, are likely to suffer
from selection bias due to insufficient selection correction. Despite this, the bias from
sample selection is small as the pattern and sizes of the educational differences in health
are similar across models, including the Copula. In addition, the register approach hinges
on the comparability of the SF12 and the PCPR. Without having access to exactly the
same measure of health in the register and survey data, it is difficult to be specific about
the selection bias.
Although register data do not suffer from non-response, there is the possibility that the
convergence in health results from mortality selection. Individuals with poor health have
a higher likelihood of premature death and are concentrated among the low educated.
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This causes the remaining survivors in the low educated group to be less representative
of that group as a whole compared to the higher order SES groups. Those alive at older
ages are likely to have had higher health levels compared to the whole group of low SES
being alive, at any past age, thus causing healthy survivor bias. This assumption is tested
in Figure 5.
In these graphs, I exploit the full panel of the register data and create health tra-
jectories across 2007–2014 for the cohorts born in 1927, 1937, and 1947. This entails
trajectories of average health across the age spans 80–88, 70–78, and 60–68, respectively.
For ease of presentation, I include only the results for the educational groups higher edu-
cation and lower secondary education (upper secondary education is excluded). I divide
each group into two groups where one group contains all individuals in the respective
cohort alive at each age (the gross sample in each year 2007–2014), and the other group
contains only those who are alive across the whole age span (those who are alive until at
least 2014). The latter group contains only those who are healthy enough to survive the
whole period, that is only the healthy survivors.29
As evident in Figure 5, those who survive the whole period have better health at all
ages compared to the gross sample. The curves for the low educated survivors (Surv. Low
Edu) and the higher educated survivors (Surv. High Edu) are lower than the curves for
the gross sample at each age group for the low educated group (All Low Edu) and higher
educated group(All High Edu), respectively. The difference is largest in the beginning of
the panel, 2007, and falls across age/time as those with poor health falls out of the gross
sample (out of the “All” groups). In the final year, 2014, the health levels between the
two groups have leveled, as only those alive throughout the panel are left in the gross
sample. The difference between the survivors and “all” is largest for the oldest age groups
and for the lowest educated group. Whereas there are practically no differences between
the survivors and “all” for the highest educated group born in 1947, the difference is
larger for the lowest educated group of this cohort. Moreover, for the oldest cohort, born
in 1927, there are larger differences also among the high educated.
Finally, the differences between the educational groups are larger for the younger
cohorts compared to the older cohorts, supporting the AAL theory. However, this result
can also be due to cohort effects. For the cohort born in 1947, the educational differences
are large, both between the surviving and the gross samples. For the cohort born in 1927,
however, the group of (healthy) survivors in the lowest educated group have better health
than the gross sample with high education. This is evident by the line for “All High Edu”,
lying above the line for “Surv. Low Edu”. Although there is a strong tendency towards
reduced health inequalities across age across the graphs (cohorts), within each cohort,
29Of course, idiosyncratic shocks to health can also cause someone to drop out.
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there is little evidence of convergence besides for the oldest cohort. Therefore, whether
the convergence is related to increasing age or a result of cohort effects, remains an open
question.
7 Conclusion
Statistical inference about health is typically based on survey data. This is due to the
limited availability of population-level data containing information about health and the
feasibility of obtaining generic measures of health in surveys (compared to, e.g., admin-
istrative registers). Health might be a particularly important predictor of non-response
in survey samples, and health-related non-response becomes even more pronounced in
samples of older individuals. Studies of health and aging based on survey data, therefore,
are particularly prone to bias due to selective non-response.
In this paper, I assess the bias from health-related sample selection in a survey of
health in the second half of life. Specifically, I assess whether the (well-established)
pattern of converging inequalities in health in old age is caused by sample selection.
Bias from selective non-response in the second wave of the NorLAG survey is assessed
compared to the survey’s reference population using full population register data and
population weights, and compared to those who responded to the first wave (attrition)
using more conventional sample selection methods such as IPWs and selection models.
I find that the health trajectories estimated by the different weighting and selection
models do not differ substantially from the trajectories estimated by OLS. This result
corresponds to the literature on sample selection, where, despite evidence of selective non-
response in the data, the bias is found to be small or negligible. For all specifications, I find
that the educational differences in health are falling across age in later life, as is a common
result in the social gerontological literature referred to as the AAL theory. Moreover, the
analysis using the full population register data confirms the pattern of converging health
inequalities in old age. Thus, the survey and the full population register data lead to the
same conclusion.
Taken together, these results suggest that selective non-response in the survey data
does not cause the empirical evidence of converging health inequalities in later life. Due
to the cross-sectional and descriptive nature of the age trajectories, the results in this
analysis do not provide identification of whether social inequalities in health are diverging
or converging across age in later life. This analysis suggests that survey data are well
suited to describe patterns of health inequalities as they are manifested in the population,
as the bias due to selective non-response does not change the observed patterns. However,
as suggested by the analyses using the full panel register data, selective mortality leads to
stronger healthy survivor bias in the lower SES groups compared to higher SES groups.
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An important issue in analyses of health and aging, is that the population alive at older
ages provides a poor representation of the population alive at younger ages. Mortality
selection, present even in the most perfect dataset, is a concern in analyses attempting
to measure the relationship between groups with different mortality rates across time or
age, or in analyses of later life outcomes in general, provided mortality is correlated with
the outcome of interest.
The impact and magnitude of health-related initial non-response in survey data are
still largely unresolved. This paper highlights the importance of allowing survey data to
be combined with outcomes from health registers that are available for the full popula-
tion. This would not only allow assessing the bias from health-related non-response more
explicitly, as the exact health distribution in the population compared to in the survey
data would be known. This would also allow assessing whether those in low SES groups
and/or older age groups have lower response rates because these groups also have worse
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Survey and Register Data
Unbalanced Pop. weights Balanced IPW Register
Men:
Age 61.32 59.55 61.63 62.59 60.31
Age 45-49 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.18
Age 50-59 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.34
Age 60-69 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.27
Age 70-79 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.15
Age 80+ 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.06
Low. sec. educ 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.26
Upp. sec. educ 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.50
Higher educ 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.24
Cohabitation 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.75
Observations 2227 2107 1832 1774 819418
Women:
Age 61.50 60.88 61.28 62.56 61.63
Age 45-49 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16
Age 50-59 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.32
Age 60-69 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.26
Age 70-79 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.17
Age 80+ 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.09
Low. sec. educ 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.33
Upp. sec. educ 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46
Higher educ 0.30 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.21
Cohabitation 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.64
Observations 2367 2227 1933 1872 868506
Note: Mean values for covariates of interest in the NorLAG sample and register data in 2007. Columns
1–4 present results for the NorLAG, where the column “unbalanced” presents means for all T2 respon-
ders. Column “Pop. weights” presents unbalanced sample means weighted by population weights.
Column “Balanced” presents unweighted means for the responders at T2 who also responded at T1,
and columns “IPW” presents balanced sample means weighted by IPW. Column “Register” presents
means for the register data.
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Table 2: Mean Health Outcomes across SES, Age, and Gender
SF12 PCPR
Men Women Men Women
All 48.70 46.49 678 840
(9.86) (11.41) (1258) (1335)
Age 45-49 51.50 49.70 421 648
(8.14) (9.88) (1156) (1307)
Age 50-59 50.05 48.05 520 723
(9.33) (10.84) (1114) (1234)
Age 60-69 47.58 45.91 698 805
(10.33) (11.53) (1174) (1245)
Age 70-70 47.13 44.38 1039 1049
(9.89) (11.57) (1458) (1434)
Age 80+ 44.42 39.65 1330 1295
(11.07) (12.30) (1644) (1602)
Low. sec. educ 45.51 43.23 864 1003
(11.37) (12.21) (1502) (1502)
Upp. sec. educ 48.61 46.26 668 818
(9.82) (11.43) (1212) (1280)
Higher educ 50.80 49.47 494 635
(8.32) (9.86) (1003) (1126)
Single 47.87 45.03 789 1034
(10.65) (12.11) (1517) (1543)
Cohabitation 48.94 47.39 640 732
(9.61) (10.86) (1154) (1192)
Observations 2195 2314 819418 868506
Note: Mean values (unweighted) for the health outcomes in the NorLAG unbalanced sample at T2
(SF12) and register data (PCPR) in 2007 at different values of the covariates of interest. For the
SF12 (scale: 0-100), higher values indicates better health. Reimbursements (scale: 0-50000, extreme
outliers are dropped) are measured in inflation adjusted Norwegian Kroner. Lower numbers indicate
better health. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: Standardized Mean Health Outcomes
SF12 PCPR
Men Women Men Women
All -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 45-49 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.14
Age 50-59 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.09
Age 60-69 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.03
Age 70-79 -0.16 -0.18 -0.29 -0.16
Age 80+ -0.43 -0.60 -0.52 -0.34
Low. sec. educ -0.32 -0.29 -0.15 -0.12
Upp. sec. educ -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02
Higher educ 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.15
Single -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.15
Cohabitation 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08
Observations 2195 2314 819418 868506
Note: Standardized mean values for the SF12 (NorLAG unbalanced sample at T2) and PCPR (regis-
ter data in 2007) at different values of the covariates of interest. Standardization is done separately
for men and women.
Table 4: Mortality from 2002 to 2007 across SES, Gender, and Age
NorLAG Register
Men Women Men Women
All 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05
Age 45-49 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Age 50-59 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Age 60-69 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
Age 70-79 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.08
Age 80+ 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.18
Low. sec. educ 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.08
Upp. sec. educ 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04
Higher educ 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Single 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04
Cohabitation 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
Observations 2,699 2,856 898,252 925,463
Note: Mortality between 2002 and 2007 in the NorLAG panel and the register data at different values
of the covariates of interest. For the NorLAG data, mortality in 2007 is conditional on response in
2002. For the register data, mortality in 2007 is conditional on being alive in 2002.
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Table 5: Attrition between the Waves
Men Women
Simple P. Weights Health Simple P. Weights Health
45-49 0.003 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.014
(0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0309)
50-54 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014
(0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0309)
55-59 -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.109*** -0.021 -0.019 -0.031
(0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0316)
60-64 -0.049 -0.050 -0.077** 0.012 0.013 -0.006
(0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0333)
65-69 0.027 0.022 -0.004 0.024 0.026 0.003
(0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0365)
70-74 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.141*** 0.092** 0.093** 0.069*
(0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0372)
75-79 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.177*** 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.215***
(0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0405)
80+ 0.263*** 0.261*** 0.208** 0.378*** 0.373*** 0.330***
(0.0908) (0.0909) (0.0921) (0.0763) (0.0781) (0.0811)
Upp. sec. ed. -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.130*** -0.107*** -0.101*** -0.088***
(0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0223)
Higher ed. -0.267*** -0.264*** -0.225*** -0.229*** -0.218*** -0.200***
(0.0245) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0230) (0.0238) (0.0243)
Centrality 0.005 0.003 -0.017 -0.019
(0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Region 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038)
SF12 -0.006*** -0.003***
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Constant 0.436*** 0.423*** 0.734*** 0.393*** 0.377*** 0.516***
(0.0300) (0.0390) (0.0593) (0.0278) (0.0391) (0.0534)
Observations 2668 2654 2639 2844 2828 2804
Adj. R2 0.089 0.088 0.105 0.074 0.074 0.078
Mean 0.317 0.317 0.316 0.321 0.321 0.318
Note: The likelihood of non-response at T2, conditional on responding at T1. Column “Simple” in-
cludes only the explanatory variables of main interest in this study. Column “P. Weights” includes
the variables that go into making the population weights. Column “Health” adds controls for health.
Coefficients are probit estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Variables-Added Test
Men All Women All Men Alive Women Alive
No. of waves 3.168*** 2.028*** 1.991*** 1.618***
(0.4667) (0.5067) (0.4737) (0.5135)
Observations 2653 2820 2494 2722
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.103 0.082 0.092
Mean 48.287 45.862 48.910 46.188
Note: The correlation between “number of waves responded to” and health at T1, when age, educa-
tion, and their interactions are controlled for, i.e. coefficient is based on OLS estimation of Equation
2 (derived below) adding “number of waves responded to” as a covariate. The sample includes all
those who responded to T1, T2, or both. To save space, the table displays only the coefficients for
the number of waves. The first two columns include all respondents at T1, whereas the latter two
exclude those who died between T1 and T2. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Table 7: Exclusion Restriction for the Heckman Selection Model
SF12 at T1 Response at T2
Men Women Men Women
Survey year T1 0.468 0.644 -0.191*** -0.185***
(0.5971) (0.6920) (0.0264) (0.0267)
Observations 2667 2829 2668 2844
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.098 0.106 0.089
Mean 48.292 45.846 0.683 0.679
Note: This table shows the coefficients of the variable "Year of interview at T1" from an OLS regres-
sion on health at T1 and on the likelihood of responding at T2. Age and educational dummies are
also included in the regressions but are suppressed in the table to save space. Standard errors in
parentheses. Mean implies the mean of the outcome variables. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: Model Characteristics
Heckman MLE Copula
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Lambda 4.243 1.434 0.709 0.309
(2.7651) (3.1899) (0.9487) (1.3774)
Theta 2.644*** 2.242***
(0.1280) (0.1199)
LL -8128.966 -8859.473 -8048.569 -8813.156
p-value 0.499 0.831 0.000 0.000
Survey
year T1 -0.525*** -0.501*** -0.530*** -0.502*** -0.473*** -0.436***
(0.0771) (0.0765) (0.0773) (0.0765) (0.0678) (0.0690)
Observations 2682 2853 2682 2853 2682 2853
Note: This table presents model characteristics of the different selection model estimations, including
the coefficients of the λs from the Heckman estimations and the θs from the Copula estimations, the
log-likelihoods (LL) from the MLEs and the p-value of the test of no independence between u1i and
u2i from the MLE. In addition, the coefficient on the exclusion restriction, the survey year at T1, is
presented. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figures
Figure 1: Response Patterns in the NorLAG Survey Sample
Note: This figure displays the sample sizes and response rates in the two waves of the Nor-
LAG survey. 265 individuals (4.8 percent) of the responders at T1 died between T1 and T2.
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Figure 2: Marginal Health Effects by Education and Age for Men
Note: Marginal effects of education on health (SF12) for upper secondary and higher education com-
pared to lower education for men. The dotted line represents higher education, and the solid line
represents upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference category. The
effect is estimated for each age group, 45–49, ..., 80–84. The brackets indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals. All estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as derived in 3.
Graph A displays OLS estimates based on the unbalanced sample of responders at T2. Graph B
displays OLS estimates of the balanced sample at T2. Results in graph C are estimated by WLS
using population weights on the unbalanced sample at T2, and graph D presents WLS estimates us-
ing the IPWs on the balanced sample at T2. Graph E displays the estimates based on the Heckman
two-step, and graph F displays the Copula estimates using the Joe copula. For graph E and graph
F, estimations are based on responders and non-responders at T2, provided they responded at T1.
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Figure 3: Marginal Health Effects by Education and Age for Women
Note: Marginal effects of education on health (SF12) for upper secondary and higher education com-
pared to lower education for women. The dotted line represents higher education, and the solid line
represents upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference category. The
effect is estimated for each age group, 45–49, ..., 80–84. The brackets indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals. All estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as derived in 3.
Graph A displays OLS estimates based on the unbalanced sample of responders at T2. Graph B
displays OLS estimates of the balanced sample at T2. Results in graph C are estimated by WLS
using population weights on the unbalanced sample at T2, and graph D presents WLS estimates us-
ing the IPWs on the balanced sample at T2. Graph E displays the estimates based on the Heckman
two-step, and graph F displays the Copula estimates using the Joe copula. For graph E and graph
F, estimations are based on responders and non-responders at T2, provided they responded at T1.
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Figure 4: Marginal Health Effects by Education and Age based on Register
Data
Note: Marginal effects of education on health (PCPR) for upper and higher education
compared to lower education. The dotted line represents higher education, and the solid
line represents upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference cat-
egory. The effect is estimated at each age group, 45–49, ..., 80–84. The brackets indi-
cate 95 percent confidence intervals. All estimates are by OLS and are based on Equation
2, and the reported coefficients are as derived in 3. Data are the register data in 2007.
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Figure 5: Mortality Selection: Healthy Survivors
Note: Average reimbursements across age for the high and lower secondary educated groups for cohorts born in
1947 (age 60–68), 1937 (age 70–78), and 1927 (age 80–88) for men and women. “Surv.” indicates those surviv-
ing throughout the period (2007-2014). “All” indicates the gross sample alive at each age (each year 2007-2014).
157
Appendix
Table A1: Probit Estimates for Making the IPW
Men Women
45-49 -0.012 (0.1029) 0.051 (0.1005)
50-54 -0.018 (0.1027) 0.063 (0.1007)
55-59 0.299*** (0.1144) 0.129 (0.1058)
60-64 0.180 (0.1233) 0.100 (0.1130)
65-69 -0.085 (0.1525) 0.048 (0.1485)
70-74 -0.495*** (0.1903) -0.127 (0.1892)
75-79 -0.568*** (0.1953) -0.470** (0.1945)
80+ -0.782*** (0.2975) -0.787*** (0.2863)
Upp. sec. educ 0.300*** (0.0660) 0.180*** (0.0622)
Higher educ 0.604*** (0.0863) 0.495*** (0.0842)
Inc Q2 0.011 (0.0895) 0.115* (0.0685)
Inc Q3 0.096 (0.0900) 0.157* (0.0819)
Inc Q4 0.196** (0.0942) 0.245** (0.1023)
Central -0.032 (0.0593) 0.068 (0.0588)
Cohabitation 0.171*** (0.0630) 0.045 (0.0596)
Retired -0.002 (0.1408) 0.019 (0.1420)
Working 0.089 (0.0867) 0.088 (0.0805)
SF12 -0.003 (0.0063) -0.002 (0.0054)
Cronic -0.130 (0.1196) 0.020 (0.1061)
SRH = 2 0.242** (0.1192) 0.209* (0.1093)
SRH = 3 0.398*** (0.1326) 0.092 (0.1237)
SRH = 4 0.501*** (0.1475) 0.272* (0.1410)
SRH = 5 0.575*** (0.1608) 0.286* (0.1535)
Physical lim. 0.092 (0.1157) 0.186* (0.1015)
Moth alive -0.181** (0.0717) 0.034 (0.0673)
Inc drop 0.009 (0.0583) -0.094* (0.0567)
Inc SD -0.000** (0.0000) -0.000 (0.0000)
Constant -0.286 (0.3274) -0.318 (0.2724)
Observations 2591 2736
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.070
Note: Variables applied for making the IPW. The coefficients are the probit estimates of the likeli-
hood of response in wave 2 based on observable characteristics in wave 1 (Equation 5). Standard
errors in parentheses in column 2 and 4 (SE). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Upp. sec. educ 0.390*** 0.298***
(0.0627) (0.0586)
Higher educ 0.770*** 0.679***
(0.0761) (0.0723)





Pseudo R2 0.091 0.079
Note: First stage of the Heckman two-step selection model. The coefficients are the probit estimates
of the likelihood of response in wave 2 based on observable characteristics in wave 1. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3: Marginal Health Effects of Education by Age for Men - Weight-
ing Approach
Unbalanced Balanced Pop. Weights IPW
Upp. sec. educ
45-49 2.618* 1.394 2.104 1.597
(1.4165) (1.7921) (1.5134) (1.9080)
50-54 3.626** 3.338* 3.682* 4.453*
(1.7703) (2.0156) (1.9518) (2.4559)
55-59 3.546* 4.113* 3.426 4.687**
(1.8588) (2.1430) (2.3367) (2.3686)
60-64 3.971** 1.809 4.650** 1.875
(1.5984) (1.6815) (1.8976) (1.8291)
65-69 1.848 0.100 2.357 1.066
(1.8721) (1.8144) (2.2030) (2.1103)
70-74 1.550 2.789 2.887 3.552*
(1.6098) (1.7943) (1.8280) (2.0254)
75-79 1.635 0.880 2.220 1.016
(2.0167) (2.2030) (2.1847) (2.4356)
80+ 1.329 1.810 -0.581 3.961
(2.8414) (3.3025) (2.6921) (4.2011)
Higher educ
45-49 4.472*** 4.053** 4.271*** 4.511**
(1.3783) (1.7299) (1.4233) (1.8365)
50-54 5.539*** 5.460*** 5.398*** 6.959***
(1.7997) (2.0428) (1.9843) (2.4599)
55-59 5.853*** 6.824*** 5.887** 8.314***
(1.8942) (2.1658) (2.3412) (2.3439)
60-64 6.669*** 4.770*** 7.522*** 5.652***
(1.6195) (1.7065) (1.8665) (1.7949)
65-69 6.051*** 3.263* 5.978*** 4.158*
(1.8498) (1.8348) (2.1772) (2.1696)
70-74 2.015 2.532 2.909 3.318
(1.8987) (2.0923) (2.0937) (2.3653)
75-79 5.419*** 6.139*** 6.326*** 7.209***
(2.0390) (2.2092) (2.0936) (2.4251)
80+ -0.501 0.634 2.815 3.404
(3.0080) (3.4656) (2.6618) (4.1992)
Observations 2185 1799 2067 1753
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.060 0.067 0.087
Mean 48.700 48.785 48.928 47.759
Note: Marginal effects of education on health for upper secondary and higher education compared to
lower secondary education for men. The effect is estimated at each age-group 45-49, ..., 80-85. All
estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as derived in Equation 3. The
first column (Unbalanced), presents OLS estimates based on the ubalanced T2 sample. The second
column presents OLS estimates of the balanced T2 sample. The third column is estimated by WLS
using the population weights on the unbalanced T2 sample, and the fourth column presents WLS
estimates using the IPW and the balanced T2 sample. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
160
Table A4: Marginal Health Effects of Education by Age for Women -
Weighting Approach
Unbalanced Balanced Pop. Weights IPW
Upp. sec. educ
45-49 4.483*** 5.109*** 3.588** 5.804***
(1.6166) (1.8792) (1.7592) (2.0346)
50-54 -0.064 0.032 -1.189 -0.445
(1.5854) (1.7758) (1.6878) (1.9415)
55-59 7.021*** 7.618*** 8.469*** 8.314***
(2.0190) (2.0609) (2.3839) (2.0799)
60-64 2.880* 1.880 3.662** 2.338
(1.6242) (1.7918) (1.8567) (1.9250)
65-69 1.385 2.055 1.228 2.615
(1.6052) (1.8040) (1.6912) (1.9867)
70-74 3.191* 4.435** 3.042* 4.933**
(1.7140) (1.9823) (1.8097) (2.1304)
75-79 -0.304 -0.890 -0.866 -2.388
(1.8856) (2.1839) (2.0412) (2.1887)
80+ 0.462 5.297** 1.453 5.781**
(2.2184) (2.6111) (5.5799) (2.7026)
Higher educ
45-49 4.788*** 5.039*** 4.611*** 6.513***
(1.6137) (1.8626) (1.7214) (1.9746)
50-54 2.022 2.581 0.677 2.884
(1.5809) (1.7237) (1.6463) (1.8617)
55-59 10.086*** 10.200*** 10.967*** 10.353***
(2.0090) (2.0328) (2.3959) (2.0838)
60-64 6.138*** 6.332*** 6.424*** 7.384***
(1.6459) (1.7481) (1.9758) (1.8351)
65-69 4.149** 5.112*** 3.448** 5.519***
(1.6479) (1.7553) (1.7112) (1.9071)
70-74 5.792*** 6.850*** 5.866*** 7.654***
(2.1278) (2.3375) (2.1212) (2.4411)
75-79 1.693 2.046 1.025 1.450
(2.7107) (2.9009) (2.7464) (2.8624)
80+ 6.851** 9.856*** 1.398 10.210***
(2.7084) (3.0085) (4.2583) (3.1840)
Observations 2311 1894 2180 1837
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.085 0.058 0.106
Mean 46.500 46.766 46.716 45.872
Note: Marginal effects of education on health for upper secondary and higher education compared to
lower secondary education for women. The effect is estimated at each age-group 45-49, ..., 80-85. All
estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as derived in Equation 3. The
first column (Unbalanced), presents OLS estimates based on the ubalanced T2 sample. The second
column presents OLS estimates of the balanced T2 sample. The third column is estimated by WLS
using the population weights on the unbalanced T2 sample, and the fourth column presents WLS
estimates using the IPW and the balanced T2 sample
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Table A5: Marginal Health Effects of Education by Age - Selection Model
Men Women
Heckman MLE Copula Heckman MLE Copula
Upp. sec. educ
45-49 2.359 1.555 2.343* 5.338*** 5.159*** 5.009***
(1.7543) (1.6610) (1.4209) (1.8597) (1.8025) (1.6726)
50-54 4.247** 3.490** 3.821** 0.280 0.086 1.162
(1.7660) (1.6846) (1.4868) (1.9804) (1.9175) (1.7503)
55-59 5.211*** 4.297** 4.638*** 7.846*** 7.667*** 8.061***
(1.7904) (1.6720) (1.5221) (1.8625) (1.8059) (1.7232)
60-64 2.721* 1.962 2.800** 2.125 1.933 3.002**
(1.6202) (1.5206) (1.3962) (1.6759) (1.6020) (1.5125)
65-69 1.019 0.254 1.505 2.290 2.106 3.401**
(1.8010) (1.7164) (1.5668) (1.7524) (1.6881) (1.5903)
70-74 3.736** 2.947* 3.788** 4.725** 4.498** 4.542***
(1.8086) (1.7252) (1.5178) (1.9077) (1.8176) (1.6900)
75-79 2.238 1.107 3.360* -0.596 -0.827 1.160
(2.1050) (1.9648) (1.7544) (2.2064) (2.1281) (1.9878)
80+ 3.118 2.028 3.412 5.608** 5.364** 6.472***
(2.6542) (2.5866) (2.1049) (2.3661) (2.2861) (2.2821)
Higher educ
45-49 5.747*** 4.337** 5.609*** 5.516*** 5.142*** 6.228***
(2.1148) (1.8435) (1.6027) (1.9921) (1.7467) (1.5979)
50-54 7.115*** 5.736*** 6.767*** 3.069 2.686 4.458**
(2.0891) (1.8270) (1.6177) (2.2184) (1.9904) (1.7989)
55-59 8.638*** 7.128*** 8.065*** 10.684*** 10.304*** 11.441***
(2.1057) (1.7945) (1.6229) (2.1475) (1.9157) (1.7984)
60-64 6.309*** 5.027*** 6.429*** 6.831*** 6.440*** 7.997***
(1.9054) (1.6474) (1.5107) (2.0883) (1.8320) (1.7076)
65-69 4.806** 3.521* 5.148*** 5.601*** 5.217*** 7.106***
(2.0687) (1.8364) (1.6715) (2.1240) (1.8831) (1.7572)
70-74 4.307* 2.828 4.858*** 7.417*** 6.972*** 8.233***
(2.2810) (2.0063) (1.7997) (2.6330) (2.3733) (2.2133)
75-79 8.206*** 6.485*** 8.744*** 2.672 2.181 5.344**
(2.5677) (2.2551) (1.9375) (3.0422) (2.7715) (2.5301)
80+ 2.934 1.019 3.623 10.557*** 10.007*** 12.280***
(3.1017) (2.8109) (2.3428) (3.6299) (3.3492) (3.2048)
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2853 2853 2853
Note: Marginal effects of education on health for upper secondary and higher education compared to
lower secondary education using the Heckman selection model and the Copula selection model. The
effect is estimated at each age-group 45-49, ..., 80-85. Estimation is based on responders and non-
responders at T2, provided information about gender, age, and education were obtained at T1. The
column “Heckman” presents results estimated by the heckman two-step, the column “MLE” presents
results of the heckamn model estimated by maximum likelihood. The column “Coupla” presents re-
sults estimated by the heckmancopula with copula Joe in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Note: The Vuong test of the likelihood contributions of each observation in the heckman MLE es-
timation compared to the heckmancopula with copula Joe. Estimates are the constant term in an
OLS regression of the difference between the contribution of each observations to the log likelihood
function in the Heckman MLE compared to the Copula MLE.
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Table A7: Marginal Health Effects of Education by Age - Register Data




































Adjusted R2 0.0473 0.0245
Mean 671.7 831.1
Note: Marginal effects of education on annual PCPR for upper secondary and higher education com-
pared to lower education for men and women. The effect is estimated at each age-group 45-49, ...,
80-85. Estimates are based on OLS estimation of Equation 2 using the register data in 2007, and
the reported coefficients are the marginal effects as derived in 3. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Education on days of Hospitalization across
Age
Note: Marginal effects of education across age on the likelihood of having a hospital admis-
sion. The dotted line represents higher education, and the solid line represents upper secondary
education. Estimation is by a Tobit regression using the register data in 2008 on a binary
variable based on having a record of a hospitalization in the current year. Records of hos-
pitalizations are not available for 2007. The brackets indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure A2: Marginal Health Effects of Education w/o Institutionalized
Note: Marginal effects of education on Reimbursements across age without the ad
hoc reimbursements for the institutionalized. The dotted line represents higher ed-
ucation, and the solid line represents upper secondary education. Estimation based
on the register data in 2007. The brackets indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure A3: Poor Health: Marginal Health Effects by Education and Age
for Men
Note: Marginal effects of education on the likelihood of having poor health for upper secondary and
higher education compared to lower education for men. The dotted line represents higher education,
and the solid line represents upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference
category. The effect is estimated for each age group, 45–49, ..., 80–84. The brackets indicate 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. All estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as
derived in 3. Graph A displays OLS estimates based on the unbalanced sample of responders at T2.
Graph B displays OLS estimates of the balanced sample at T2. Results in graph C are estimated by
WLS using population weights on the unbalanced sample at T2, and graph D presents WLS estimates
using the IPWs on the balanced sample at T2. Graph E displays the estimates based on the Heckman
two-step, and graph F displays the Copula estimates using the Joe copula. For graph E and graph
F, estimations are based on responders and non-responders at T2, provided they responded at T1.
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Figure A4: Poor Health: Marginal Health Effects by Education and Age
for Women
Note: Marginal effects of education on the likelihood of having poor health for upper secondary and
higher education compared to lower education for men. The dotted line represents higher education,
and the solid line represents upper secondary education. Lower secondary education is the reference
category. The effect is estimated for each age group, 45–49, ..., 80–84. The brackets indicate 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. All estimates are based on Equation 2, and the reported coefficients are as
derived in 3. Graph A displays OLS estimates based on the unbalanced sample of responders at T2.
Graph B displays OLS estimates of the balanced sample at T2. Results in graph C are estimated by
WLS using population weights on the unbalanced sample at T2, and graph D presents WLS estimates
using the IPWs on the balanced sample at T2. Graph E displays the estimates based on the Heckman
two-step, and graph F displays the Copula estimates using the Joe copula. For graph E and graph
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